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
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THE PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

No. 20.—October, 1884.

I.

SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY AND THEISM.

THE Theory of Things taught in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer is, in its ultimate elements, essentially Theistic.* That is to say: its hypothesis of evolution and dissolution, although at many points diverted from its business of unifying knowledge, that it may better serve the agnostic argument; yet is derived, as it declares, from data, which we discover are nothing more nor less than the ultimate truths of the hypothesis of creation by external agency, and of the Self-Existence, the Eternal, Absolute, and Personal Being of the Creator.

This conclusion which we have reached in our examination, leads to the corollary, that the hypothesis of evolution and dissolution is true, so far as it is dependent on, or consistent with, the First Principles of the Philosophy; and false, so far as it is informed or influenced by its agnostic argument.

Our further inquiry, therefore, will be, not for the best evidence of the truths of Theism, which we have found already are the ultimate truths of the new system, but for illustrations of these truths from this Theory of Things. And while searching for secondary criteria answering to the absolute criterion of consciousness, we may look for correspondence not only of relative realities with the Absolute Reality, and of relative causes with the Absolute Cause; but also of the relative personality of man the rational creature, with the Absolute Personality of the Creator.

* See PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, July, 1883.

The testimony of consciousness to the Personal Being of the First Cause or Creator, though trustworthy without verification, may be held with more confidence as we shall discover the untenable nature of the objections, that it is (1) anthropomorphic, (2) uncertain, and (3) incongruous with other truths.

I—*The Conception of Absolute Personality is not vitiated by Anthropomorphism.*

To think of the "Absolute Force" is to think of the "Absolute Reality" as anthropomorphous. The muscular force which we experience leads us to the recognition of the objective force which resists its action, and to the consciousness of the Absolute Force, that is their "Ultimate Cause."

"Thus all other modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of Force, but experiences of Force are not derivable from anything else. Indeed, it needs but to remember that consciousness consists of changes to see that the ultimate datum of consciousness must be that of which change is the manifestation; and that thus the force by which we ourselves produce changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general, is the final disclosure of analysis. . . . The sense of effort is our subjective symbol for objective force in general, passive and active."*

"Resistance, as known subjectively in our sensations of muscular tension, forms the substance of our consciousness of force. That we have such a consciousness is a fact which no metaphysical quibbling can set aside. That we must think of force in terms of our experience—must construct our conceptions of it out of the sensations we have received, is also beyond question. That we have never had, and never can have, any experience of the force by which objects produce changes in other objects, is equally indisputable. And that, therefore, our notion of force is a generalization of those muscular sensations which we have when we are ourselves the producers of changes in outward things, is an unavoidable corollary."†

While these terms make our experience of subjective force the symbol of the Absolute Force or Cause, they are nevertheless the terms of exact science and of all ultimate scientific ideas. For our subjective experiences of relative forces "are those from which our consciousness of Space is abstracted"; and the relative forces thus disclosed to us as objective, "form the whole content of our idea of matter"; and also "motion as we know it is thus traceable."

"So that the continuity of Motion, as well as the indestructibility of Matter, is really known to us in terms of Force." "But now what is the Force of which we predicate persistence? It is not the force we are immediately conscious of in our muscular

* First Prin., §§ 50 and 60.

† Prin. of Psy., Vol. II., § 343. See also *Ib.*, Chap. XVII., and First Prin., Part II., Chapters III. to VI., inclusive, and foot-notes.

efforts ; for this does not persist. . . . Hence the force of which we assert persistence is that Absolute Force of which we are indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of the force we know."*

Thus Absolute Force and Absolute Cause, as convertible terms, are anthropomorphic representations of Absolute Being, because they are derived from our experience of subjective force as a relative cause of changes.

Moreover, "the final disclosure of analysis," namely: "the force by which we ourselves produce changes," as the "symbol" of "the Absolute Cause of changes," cannot be revealed to us even as a primordial datum of consciousness, independent of our acts of volition and the action of our will.

"Respecting the perception of resistance, that is of muscular tension, it has still to be pointed out, that it consists in the establishment of a relation between the muscular sensation itself and that state of consciousness which we call *will*—a relation such that the unbalanced surplus of feeling of whatever kind, which for the moment constitutes the will, is the antecedent of the muscular sensation and coexists with it while it lasts. That the muscular sensation alone does not constitute a perception of resistance, will be seen on remembering that we receive from a tired muscle a feeling nearly allied to, if not identical with, that which we receive from a muscle in action ; and that yet this feeling, being unconnected with any act of volition, does not give any notion of resistance."†

If we concede that the words "will" and "volition," as used in the foregoing extract, indicate no more than the surplus of feeling resulting from the earlier experiences of the individual or the accumulated experiences of the race, and less than the ideas of will and volition that enter into the conception of personality; we have, nevertheless, those subjective elements of experience, dependent upon our mental acts and states, that are given to us as legitimate symbols of the Absolute.

Now, if our consciousness of the force by which we produce changes may lead us to the consciousness of "the Absolute Cause of changes," so unlike "force as we know it" in our experience, as to be "persistent" and "transcendent," why may not our consciousness of our own relative personality lead us to the consciousness of the "Absolute Being" "transcending demonstration" and "without beginning or end," as Absolute Personality.

There is no metaphysical objection in the way of such analogy ; for the argument in the chapter on "The Relativity of All Knowledge,"‡ which discloses the "Absolute" as "Cause" without determining the same within limits, makes it possible to represent the "Absolute Cause" as personal without detracting from the same as the Infinite Cause.

* First Prin., §§ 47, 48, 49, 53, 62.

† Pr. of Psy., § 351.

‡ First Prin., Ch. IV. See *Ib.*, Ch. II., §§ 12 and 13.

The only question is one of fact, viz.: Is our consciousness of our own personal existence as clear and certain as our consciousness of the force we exercise as the relative cause of changes? The answer is unequivocal and conclusive.

"The existence of each individual as known to himself, has always been held by mankind at large, the most incontrovertible of truths. To say, 'I am as sure of it as I am that I exist,' is, in common speech, the most emphatic expression of certainty. And this fact of personal existence, testified to by the universal consciousness of men, has been made the basis of sundry philosophies, whence may be drawn the inference that it is held by thinkers as well as by the vulgar, to be beyond all facts unquestionable. Belief in the reality of self is, indeed, a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape."*

These affirmations are followed in the text by an examination of the several hypotheses of negation, which are respectively condemned on the general ground already indicated, and also on the specific ground that each negative hypothesis suggests some particular question which the sceptic cannot answer, and which therefore he cannot substitute for the insoluble problems of the affirmative.

"Or once more, if, as he must, he admits that he has an impression of his personal existence, what warrant can he show for rejecting this impression as unreal, while he accepts all his other impressions as real? Unless he can give satisfactory answers to these queries, which he cannot, he must abandon his conclusions, and must admit the reality of the individual mind."†

Here any mind not imbued with the spirit of the "new philosophy" or "modern metaphysics" would rest assured of its own personal existence. But notwithstanding the affirmations of the reality of the individual mind or self, and of the impossibility that any hypothesis should enable us to escape belief in this reality, an hypothesis of escape is proposed in these words:

"But, now, unavoidable as is this belief—established though it is, not only by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the sceptical argument—it is yet a belief admitting of no justification by reason; nay, indeed, it is a belief which reason, when pressed for a distinct answer, rejects. . . . So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be truly known at all; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought."‡

The obvious reply to the allegation that "it is yet a belief admitting of no justification by reason," would be that it is expressly taught in the philosophy that the truths of consciousness do not need any justification by reason, except to prove their congruity with other truths.§ But it is finally denied that "the personality of which each is conscious," and which is "testified to by the universal consciousness of men," is, after all, a proper subject of consciousness. To this

* First Prin., § 20.

† Ib.

‡ Ib.

§ First Prin., §§ 39 and 40 and 45; and Prin. of Psy., Part VII.

denial, therefore, our attention is called; and we find that it is made on only this purely speculative ground, that "the fundamental condition to all consciousness" is the antithesis "of subject and object," while "a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one—in which the subject and object are identified." *

But this sceptical argument would exclude "the primordial, the universal, the ever present constituent of consciousness," namely: "the impression of resistance"; † "that is, of muscular tension," ‡ "which consists in the establishment of a relation between the muscular sensation itself and that state of consciousness which we call will." § This constituent of consciousness, therefore, does not depend upon "the antithesis of subject and object," but is purely subjective, inso-much as we have seen "the sense of effort is our subjective symbol for objective force in general passive and active," || including all relative forces that are objective as well as the Absolute Force. As regards certain activities of objective forces, we may think of them in terms other than those furnished by our respective sensations of them, as for example: light, heat, and sound; but in all such cases we "*do* think of them in terms of mechanical force, that is, in terms of our muscular sensations; and resistance, as disclosed by opposition to our own energies, is the only species of external activity which we are obliged to think of as subjectively and objectively the same." For, "to form a conception of force in the *non-ego* different from the conception we have of force in the *ego*, is utterly beyond our power." ¶ This sceptical argument is also overruled by the constructive arguments of the Psychology.

The conclusions are obvious. If our consciousness of force in the *ego* may legitimately produce in us the consciousness of Force other than ourselves, our consciousness of personality in the *ego* may legitimately awaken in us a consciousness of Personality other than ourselves. If our subjective experiences of our own relative force may properly, and for the purposes of science necessarily, symbolize the Absolute Being as Absolute Force, our subjective experiences of our own relative personality may likewise symbolize Absolute Being as Absolute Personality.

It is, therefore, against the hypothesis of evolution and the representation of the Infinite as the First Cause, as well as against the hypothesis of creation and the representation of the Infinite as the

* First Prin., § 20.

† Pr. of Psy., § 347.

‡ Ib. §§ 349-351.

§ Ib., § 351.

|| First Prin., § 60.

¶ Pr. of Psy., § 349. And see Ib., §§ 439 and 470.

Personal Creator, that the agnostic argument is in effect addressed as follows :

"To think of the Creative Power as in all respects anthropomorphous is now considered impious by men who yet hold themselves bound to think of the Creative Power as in some respects anthropomorphous, and who do not see that the one proceeding is but an evanescent form of the other."*

This frivolous objection to the idea of Personality of the Absolute, expressed in the chapter on "The Reconciliation," is suggested in more general terms in the chapter on "The Relativity of all Knowledge," as follows : "That which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused—the two being in the very meaning antithetically opposed."†

The general answers to this declaration are found in the foregoing considerations. More specific, if not more conclusive, answers are found in the statements of the chapter on "The Persistence of Force," repeated elsewhere in "First Principles," to this effect : that Absolute Force, "the uncaused," is represented as the cause of the relative reality of force, and thus "assimilated" to this relative force, which is represented as the cause of the relative realities of matter and motion.‡ To postulate the uncaused and the caused as alike the direct causes of relative reality in some form or mode, is to postulate that the uncaused is in one respect at least symbolized by and similar to the caused.

The theory by which knowledge is unified in the philosophy thus affords analogies against its agnostic argument. If the Infinite Force may be revealed in consciousness as the antitype of our own subjective and finite force, and without the anthropomorphic limitations and conditions, the Infinite Personality may be revealed in consciousness as the antitype of our own subjective and finite personality, without anthropomorphic limitations and conditions. If the Absolute may have its likeness in the relations of mechanical cause and effect, the Absolute may have its image in the human will as the free cause of moral action, superior to natural causation. In fine, the ultimate ideas of Absolute Force and Absolute Personality are alike vicious or valid, inasmuch as they are in the same sense anthropomorphous, and in the same degree and manner related to that which is subjective and conditioned in human experience.

II.—*Our Consciousness of Personal Being is not Void for want of Certainty.*

An anomalous assertion in the agnostic argument suggests that the probability of a supposed mode of Being may be in proportion to its

* First Pr., § 31.

† Ib., § 24.

‡ Ib., §§ 60, 61.

inconceivability. Arguing against Mr. Mansel's assumption that "it is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite," Mr. Spencer alleges that "duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality." Denying "that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality," and declaring that "the choice is rather between personality and something higher," Mr. Spencer, by some strange solecism in his sceptical reasoning, says, that although it is true that we "are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of being," yet "this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse." *

How can the inconceivability of a higher mode of being be a reason against questioning its existence, if, as the sceptical argument teaches, every mode of being is inconceivable?

In particular, why should Personality as one mode of Being be questioned, and its alternative, another mode of Being, be admitted without questioning, for one and the same reason, namely: that each of these alternative modes is supposed to be unthinkable?

Moreover, if the inconceivability of the higher mode of Being is a reason for not questioning its existence, we have good warrant for believing that the Absolute has some higher mode of Being than the manifestation of relative forces in matter and motion. The theory of the conservation of energy translated through changes into things that appear, is not inconsistent with the idea of energy transcending all such translations. If the Cause of all things has no reserved force in addition to the relative forces or secondary causes in nature, then the Absolute Reality of the philosophy is a myth, having no existence beyond the fiction that it is the aggregate of all relative realities. But the doctrines of the chapter on The Relativity of all Knowledge, as well as the "First Principles" in the chapter on the "Persistence of Force," show that the Absolute is more than the total of all relative causes and realities.† There may, therefore, be a withholding as well as a holding forth, by the "Unchanging" "Cause of changes." The affirmative is alone consistent with the truth of "the Persistence of Force," which precludes the assumption that "without some act of conserving, force would disappear";‡ and the negative is inconsistent with the postulate of the philosophy that the Absolute transcends, not only knowledge, but also all relative existence.§ "The Cause of all things," therefore, persists, not only in the "relations" and "equivalence and transformation of forces," || by the manifesta-

* First Prin., § 31.

† First Prin., § 13.

‡ Ib., § 60.

§ First. Prin., §§ 26, 46, 60 (and foot-notes), 191, 194.

|| Ib., §§ 65 and 66.

tion and conservation of energy, but also in the reservation of energy not thus revealed.

Now, if "the origin of the universe" involves such choice between the holding forth and the withholding of energy, and therefore election and design, may not the same elements of Personality be exhibited in "the nature of the universe" as now constituted and upheld through "unbroken causation" and "uniformity of law"?* The familiar illustrations of the control of the forces of nature within limits by the finite will of man, so as to produce effects which but for his interference would never have resulted, affords an analogy of the government of the universe by the Supreme Being, and of absolute interference and providence in the exercise of such government, without violation of law or of "the equivalence and transformation of forces." The only possible answer is, that the analogy assumes that the human will is, in a measure, free from mechanical causation, and not a mere link in the unbroken chain of cause and effect. The reply is, that this assumption is established by the universal testimony of the race, and that the contrary cannot be proved from the data of experience or the inductions of science.

But independent of all the implications or assumptions relating to the finite will of man, the argument from simplicity raises the presumption that the Absolute Personality exhibited in the origin of relative forces is also manifested in their present action and direction. That such personal government and continuance of the universe is conceivable in connection with the reign of law and the conservation of all created forces, is apparent from the conception of the personal agency of man, without reference to the truth of the conceptions. But if inconceivable, it would not, therefore, be incredible; and, as we have seen, it would not be improbable as a higher manifestation of the Power transcending knowledge—higher than the conservation of energy. We do not say in the terms of the text that the supposition would be more probable if unthinkable, but we are thus justified in saying that it would not be less probable on that account. That in this respect no distinction is made between modes of Being and manifestations of Being, between the existence of the Absolute and the action of the Absolute, is evident at many points in the constructive parts of the "new system," from which, as illustrations, we cite the following :

"The Absolute Cause of changes, no matter what may be their special natures, is not less incomprehensible in respect of the unity or duality of its action, than in all other respects. We cannot decide between the alternative suppositions, that phenom-

* First Prin., chaps. 7 and 8.

ena are due to the variously conditioned workings of a single force, and that they are due to the conflict of two forces. Whether, as some contend, everything is explicable upon the hypothesis of universal pressure, whence what we call tension results differentially from inequalities of pressure in opposite directions; or whether, as might be with equal propriety contended, things are to be explained on the hypothesis of universal tension, from which pressure is a differential result; or whether, as most scientists hold, pressure and tension everywhere coexist, are questions which it is impossible to settle. Each of these three suppositions makes the facts comprehensible only by postulating an inconceivability. . . . And however verbally intelligible may be the proposition that pressure and tension everywhere coexist, yet we cannot represent to ourselves one ultimate unit of matter as drawing another while resisting it. Nevertheless, this last belief is one which we are compelled to entertain."*

We are told that we are compelled to the belief of this inconceivable proposition by our own subjective experience; that "probably this conception [sic] of antagonistic forces is originally derived from the antagonism of our flexor and extensor muscles," from which, by a higher abstraction, results the conception [sic] of attractive and repulsive forces pervading space."† But the "inconceivability" of these "conceptions" of "universally coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion" is due not to the infinity of space which they are supposed to occupy, nor to the process by which they are sublimated from perceptible properties, or "idealized";‡ for the supposition, if confined to "one ultimate unit of matter as drawing another while resisting it," is unthinkable.

"The coexistence everywhere of antagonistic forces,"§ though given as a postulate, "necessitated by the form of our experience,"|| "makes the facts comprehensible only by postulating an inconceivability": for "we cannot truly represent to ourselves" "the coextensive existence of these opposite forms of force"¶ which are predicated as "forms under which the conditions of our consciousness oblige us to represent the absolute force which transcends our knowledge."**

It is more difficult to believe that these inconceivable symbols stand for the Absolute, or that forces "which we cannot truly represent to ourselves," are "forms under which the conditions of our consciousness oblige us to represent the absolute," than to believe that Personality is one of the "higher" "forms under which the workings of the Unknowable are cognizable by us"—one of the "higher" modes of the "Unconditioned as presented under the conditions of our consciousness."†† The theory of personal action, in its unity, as compared with that of the dual action of antagonistic centres of force, representing the Absolute, is more simple in hypothesis, more conceivable and consistent within itself, and more clearly and certainly

* First Prin., § 74.

† Ib., and §§ 18 and 176.

‡ Ib. § Ib., § 88.

|| Ib.

¶ Ib. § 176.

** Ib.

†† Ib., § 74.

certified by consciousness; and is, therefore, the true theory of things, if congruous with other truths.

III.—*Personality is the only supposable Mode of Being, that is verified by All Orders of Phenomena.*

While we may refuse to think of the Power manifested by phenomena, as a Person, "we shall always be under the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of Being, that is, of representing it to ourselves as some form of thought."* Though the Personality of this Power transcends all modes and manifestations, it may be thought of in form within its self-imposed limitations of both manifestation and mode. Thus it is mentioned in the chapter on "The Reconciliation," in connection with some supposed "higher mode of Being." But no such higher mode of Being is designated in the sceptical argument, or in the constructive argument of the philosophy. The mode adopted in the Hypothesis of Evolution and Dissolution, is a lower one, viz.: the action of the Absolute Cause by means of "the coexistence everywhere of antagonistic forces."† The comparison is, therefore, limited to the higher mode of unity of action by means of Personality, and the lower mode of duality of action by means of "the coextensive existence of these opposite forms of force."‡

The Personality of "the Power manifested to us, through all phenomena," whether considered as an ultimate truth respecting Being Absolute and Transcendent, or as a relative truth concerning only the action manifestation, or mode of Being, is consonant with all other truths.

It is congruous with the absolute truth of the Persistence of Force, which, as we have seen, involves the elements of Personality.

It is not incongruous with the assumption of the relative truth of the lower mode of universal centres of opposite forms of force. Its unity of action may underlie as well as transcend the duality of action of these antagonistic forces, even as their dual action is supposed to underlie the multiform movements resulting from the equivalence and transformation of all relative forces in the universe.

In fine, Personality, if inconsistent with these or other truths, should be denied. But the agnostic argument expressly asserts that "duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality."§ It must, therefore, be presumed that there is no such incongruity.

But we go further—from presumptions to proofs, that Personality

* First Prin., § 31.

† Ib., § 88.

‡ §§ 74-176.

§ Ib., § 31.

is the only supposable mode of Being that is verified by all orders of phenomena.

We may consider the proofs and phenomena under the several heads of (1) First Things; (2) Last Things; (3) Correspondence; (4) Phenomena of Mind; and (5) Testimony of Consciousness.

(1).—*First Things; or, the Beginnings of Evolution.*

Successive evolutions, "ever the same in principle, but never the same in concrete result,"* are among the special revelations of the new philosophy. Such successions, though purely speculative, come within the hypothesis proposed for the complete unification of knowledge, which undertakes to "formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible."† Each era of evolution is supposed to begin where the preceding epoch of dissolution ends. These reverse processes in alternate periods are thus defined: "Evolution under its simplest and most general aspect is the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; while Dissolution is the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter."‡ The relative causes of these respective changes are supposed to be the attractive and repulsive forces respectively predominating in the inconceivable centres of opposite forms of force pervading space.§

Is the cause assigned adequate to explain evolution? If dissolution be determined as in the hypothesis by balance of forces and equilibrium,|| whence comes the preponderance of attractive forces for the beginning of a new evolution? To meet the difficulty here suggested, it is evident that several conjectures have been interposed, viz.: "unstable equilibrium," "moving equilibria," and "incident forces."

But these phrases do not explain: the supposed factors do not account for the facts assumed. "The phrase *unstable equilibrium* is one used in mechanics to express a balance of forces of such kind, that the interference of any further force, however minute, will destroy the arrangement previously subsisting, and bring about a totally different arrangement."¶ The illustrations** of unstable equilibrium are phenomena within our observation, of objects or systems which are not absolutely "homogeneous," and which are not entirely free from the interference of "further forces" outside of their limits.

* First Prin., § 183.

† § 186.

‡ Ib., § 97.

§ Ib., §§ 170, 176, 183.

|| Ib., §§ 176, 177.

¶ Ib., § 149.

** Ib., and § 150.

But we have no analogy or presumption of the state of equilibrium or rest and homogeneity, in which the evolutions of the universe are supposed to begin. The effect of "further forces" acting from without, upon one completely homogeneous body or system, may well be questioned.* But whence these "further forces" in the evolutions of the universe? There is no reason for the presumption of relative forces outside of the universe in its evolution. The question therefore behind the effects of these supposed further forces falling upon the homogeneous in the origin of universal evolution, is, whence do these forces come? If they come from within the homogeneous whole out of which evolution arises, then they are not the *further* forces of the hypothesis. If they come from without the homogeneous whole of evolution, then they are outside of the universe and the hypothesis, and are supernatural.

It is evident that unless we assume two postulates,—viz.: (1) limits to evolution in space, and (2) irregularity of form to these limits—we must predicate that a complete balance of forces results from complete dissolution, and therefore precedes any possible era of evolution. Thus assuming such irregular limits, it is said:

"That any finite mass of diffused matter, even though vast enough to form our whole sidereal system, could not be in stable equilibrium; that in default of absolute sphericity, absolute uniformity of composition, and absolute symmetry of relation to all forces external to it, its concentration must go on with an ever-increasing irregularity: and that thus the present aspect of the heavens is not, so far as we can judge, incongruous with the hypothesis of a general evolution consequent on the instability of the homogeneous."†

But assuming such limits to evolution, there is nothing in the hypothesis to justify the supposition of "default of absolute sphericity" or of "absolute uniformity of composition," in the material of evolution at the beginning. Such supposition would leave the differences in form and in composition to be accounted for outside of the hypothesis. And there is, as we have seen, no justification for the assumption of "external forces," except the assumption that evolution is limited in space. This necessary inference is illustrated by the express admission in the argument for "The instability of the homogeneous," as follows: "If centres of force, absolutely uniform in their powers, were diffused with absolute uniformity through unlimited space, they would remain in equilibrium."‡

The admission in the text is qualified by the immediate context, as follows: "This, however, though a verbally intelligible supposition, is one that cannot be represented in thought; since unlimited space

* First Prin., §§ 146, 147, 148.

† Ib § 150.

‡ Ib., § 155.

is inconceivable." * But how can this hypothesis depending upon the supposition of inconceivable centres of opposing forms of force pervading space, of which it is conceded that the supposition "makes the facts comprehensible, only by postulating an inconceivability," as "we cannot truly represent to ourselves one unit of matter as drawing another while resisting it"; † how can this hypothesis which however "verbally intelligible," "we cannot truly represent to ourselves," exclude a supposition secondary to the first, simply because it, though also "verbally intelligible," "cannot be represented in thought"?

The justification of the hypothesis on the assumption that space is limited, is in direct opposition to the first principles from which the hypothesis is ultimately deduced. Space, according to the data of the philosophy, admits of no limitation in thought. "And the Force which the Universe presents, falls into the same category with its Space and Time, as admitting of no limitation in thought." Of this Power, "no limits in Time or Space can be conceived" or "imagined." ‡

Moreover, if this Infinite Power as the Absolute Cause of changes, acts only within limits of space, there must be election exercised by this Power in thus acting in one place or sphere and not in others; and the agnostic argument is revolutionized by its own implication of election of a part of the universe as the theatre of evolution.

That the argument of the hypothesis for an endless series of evolutions, depends ultimately upon the assumption that they are confined within definite limits of space, is evident from the chapters on "The Instability of the Homogeneous," "The Multiplication of Effects," "Segregation" and "Equilibration."

Complete balance of forces would prevent the operation of "incident forces" or "further forces," if evolution and dissolution were universal.

"In all cases then, there is progress toward equilibration. That universal coexistence of antagonist forces which, as we before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm; and which, as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a balance." . . . "Now the facts which it behoves us here to observe are these: First, that the various motions which an aggregate possesses are separately equilibrated; those which are smallest, or which meet with the greatest resistance, or both, disappearing first; and leaving, at last, that which is greatest, or meets with least resistance, or both. Second, that when the aggregate has a movement of its parts with respect to each other, which encounters but little external resistance, there is apt to be established an *equilibrium mobile*. Third, that this moving equilibrium eventually lapses into complete equilibrium." . . . "Those successively changed forms which, if the nebular hypothesis be granted, must have arisen during the evolution of the Solar System, were so many

* First Prin., §§ 155, 182.

† *Ib.*, § 74.

‡ *Ib.*, §§ 190, 191, 194.

transitional kinds of moving equilibrium; severally giving place to more permanent kinds on the way toward complete equilibration. . . . But the fact it chiefly concerns us to observe, is that the process must go on bringing things ever nearer to complete rest. . . . Here presents itself a final question. . . . If evolution of every kind is an increase in complexity of structure and function that is incidental to the universal process of equilibration, and if equilibrium must end in complete rest, what is the fate toward which all things tend? . . . Are we not manifestly progressing toward omnipresent death? That such a state must be the outcome of the processes everywhere going on, seems beyond doubt. Whether any ulterior process may reverse these changes and initiate a new life, is a question to be considered hereafter. For the present it must suffice that the proximate end of all the transformations we have traced is a state of quiescence. This admits of a *priori* proof. It will soon become apparent that the law of equilibration, not less than the preceding general laws, is deducible from the persistence of force. . . . Hence this primordial truth is our immediate warrant for the conclusions that the changes which Evolution presents cannot end until equilibrium is reached, and that equilibrium must at last be reached.*

"Whether any ulterior process may reverse these changes and initiate a new life," depends upon speculations concerning the limits of these changes in space, such as we have considered, and of which we cite the following illustrations:

"If the ether which fills the interspaces of our Sidereal System has a limit somewhere beyond the outermost stars; . . . or supposing the ethereal medium to have not such limit, yet, on the hypothesis of an unlimited space, containing, at certain intervals, Sidereal Systems like our own, it may be that the quantity of molecular motion radiated into the region occupied by our Sidereal System radiates; in which case the quantity of motion possessed by it, remaining undiminished, it may continue during unlimited time its alternate concentrations and diffusions. But if, on the other hand, throughout boundless space filled with ether, there exist no other Sidereal Systems subject to like changes, or if such other Sidereal Systems exist at more than a certain average distance from one another, then it seems an unavoidable conclusion that the quantity of motion possessed, must diminish by radiation; and that so, on each successive resumption of the nebulous form, the matter of our Sidereal System will occupy a less space until it reaches either a state in which its concentrations and diffusions are relatively small, or a state of complete aggregation and rest. Since, however, we have no evidence showing the existence or non-existence of Sidereal Systems throughout remote space; and since, even had we such evidence, a legitimate conclusion could not be drawn from premises of which one element (unlimited space) is inconceivable, we must be forever without answer to this transcendent question."†

Thus the hypothesis which seeks to explain the universe by unbroken causation, without the interference of the First Cause, comes short of such explanation by its own self-imposed limitations. The theory is obliged to assume either limits to the ether in space, or limits to its own scope or sphere by confining its explanations to our own sidereal system, while assuming the existence of other systems throughout remote space. In the one case the hypothesis fails to account for the universe; and in the other case it assumes that the universe cannot fill "unlimited space," but fills "unlimited time." The estoppel and the stultification are sufficient to show not only the limi-

* First Prin., §§ 170 to 177.

† Ib., § 182.

tations, but also the contradictions of the hypothesis of evolution without creation. The assumption of "unlimited time," in the play of relative forces, can be justified only by excluding the assumption of "unlimited space" as the theatre of their action. One supposition, however, is no more untenable or unthinkable than the other. But the assumption of "unlimited time" is necessary to the hypothesis, for otherwise the beginning of things would imply creation. Thus, in order to exclude the theory of creation or election by the First Cause in respect of the limits in time, the hypothesis of evolution implies that the theory of election or design by the First Cause in respect of limits in Space cannot be excluded.

Moreover, on the assumption of the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the exact equivalence and transformation of forces, we cannot explain the supposition that the endless series of evolution in unlimited time should be other than exact repetitions of each other. But the hypothesis assumes that these successive evolutions should be "ever the same in principle, but never the same in concrete result."

In fine, the evolution now going on must be accounted for, if at all, not by the persistence of relations among forces or unbroken causation or secondary causes, but by the independent action and election and design of the Absolute Cause.

(2).—*Last Things ; or, Moral Perfections as Final Causes.*

The hypothesis of evolution and dissolution includes, as we have seen, an intermediate state of rest. It is supposed that the changes, called moving equilibria, just preceding this state of equilibrium, and terminating in dissolution, will carry the human race to "the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness"—"the highest conceivable state of humanity." *

This doctrine of equilibration pervading all the divisions of the special philosophy; embracing not only the inorganic, but also the organic and the "super-organic"; including life, language, society, science, art, and literature; is made prominent and conspicuous in that part of "The Principles of Morality" entitled, "The Data of Ethics."

By the terms of this treatise, Absolute Right and Absolute Good are possible at the stage just preceding the destruction of all moral life in universal dissolution.† But unlike the future world of faith or intuition, this future mundane state of speculation fails to impart to

*First Prin., §§ 176, 189, *et al.*

† Data of Ethics, Chapter XIV.

present experience "the power of an endless life." Indeed, it not only fails to make the present practice of the absolute virtues obligatory, or to draw from perfect manhood any motives for the relatively primitive man of this present epoch; but it positively enjoins its disciples to refrain from the pursuit of perfect virtue in our imperfect condition of society. The theory is, that "ideal conduct" and "ideal life" are proper in an ideal social state, but not in society at its present stage of evolution.* So far, therefore, the data of ethics of the philosophy come short of the data of ethics of Christianity.

On the obverse side, however, of the standard of morals raised by the theory of evolution, we read that perfect equity and pure benevolence, though relegated to the future and divested of all painful or heroic or saintly self-sacrifice, and left only to the simple pleasures of altruism, do even thus find a potential place among the principles of morality. But on what theory are these altruistic pleasures of the future, while represented as impossible and improper virtues of the present, deduced from the universal centres of opposing forms of force in space? Where, in the re-distribution of matter and motion, or in the evolution of life from the small beginnings in lowest organisms and simple reflex action responsive to the environment, does this pleasure in pure regard for others intervene? If "the restraints properly distinguished as moral are unlike those restraints out of which they evolve,"† whence the differentiation? If the feelings which "are entailed on others" are factors in the problem of human conduct and character, "increasing the difficulty" of explanation‡ from the unbroken causation of relative forces in nature, when, in the integration of matter and dissipation of motion, excluding all freedom of the human will, and ignoring the Divine Will, were these motives introduced? If the end be pure regard and preference in the human mind for universal good, why not also intuition of the Supreme Good or God? Evolution can explain the one as well as the other.

In the trial and compromise between egoism and altruism, the "Data of Ethics" teaches that only in the end of the world is there any obligation to obey the perfect code of morals which the Christian religion enacts to take effect immediately. Now, how have these religious conceptions anticipated their actual and proper environment on the exclusive hypothesis of evolution?

Referring to Christianity, it is intimated that agnostics "may not think it absurd to believe that a rationalized version of its ethical principles may eventually be acted upon."§ Whether this "rational-

* Data of Ethics, Chapter XV.

† *Ib.*, § 45.

‡ *Ib.*, § 56.

§ § 98.

ized version " shall be distinguished by the elimination of the supernatural as the accredited source of the statement of these "ethical principles" in all their just relations and perfections, we are not told; but the question remains, Whence are these "ethical principles" so far in advance of evolution? Whence are those principles formulated in the Christian Scriptures, which now, after the lapse of ages since their promulgation, are accepted in the ethics of evolution as in advance of even the present day and worthy of the last times?

Conceding that there are partial truths in the ethical estimates of "excellence of being," "perfection of nature," and "integrity of motive," and in the "intuitionist" as well as in the "utilitarian" systems or theories of morals, the "Data of Ethics" further affirms, respecting truth, as follows: "The theological theory contains a part. If for the divine will, supposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally revealed end toward which the Power manifested throughout Evolution works; then, since Evolution has been, and still is, working toward the highest life, it follows that conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved, is furthering that end."*

Now, if there can be ascertained the "principles" of the higher or "highest life" as "the naturally revealed end," before it is attained in the actual experience of the race, what is this end but final cause? If the revealed end be absolute equity and benevolence, is it not a revelation of the absolute justice and mercy in the action of "the Power by which we are acted upon"? It may be argued that finality is not final cause until it is connected with some efficient cause. Granted for argument. The dependence of all phenomena and relative realities as effects, upon the Absolute Reality as the First Cause, is one of the first principles of the philosophy. The finality of the best and the perfect in the life, conduct, and character of man is, therefore, the final cause of "the Power by which he is acted upon," "the Power manifested throughout evolution" working toward the naturally revealed end of moral perfection. What is this but the argument from design in support of natural theology?

(3).—*The Argument from Correspondence.*

"Admitting, as we must, that life is impossible unless through a certain agreement between internal convictions and external circumstances; admitting, therefore, that the probabilities are always in favor of the truth, or at least the partial truth, of a conviction; we must admit that the convictions entertained by many minds in common are the most likely to have some foundation."†

* Data of Ethics, § 62.

† First Prin., § 1.

"Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial." * "An unbiassed consideration of its general aspects forces us to conclude that Religion, everywhere present as a web running through the warp of human history, expresses some eternal fact." †

These conclusions are in accordance with the postulates, "that life is the maintenance of a correspondence between the organism and its environment, and that the degree of life varies as the degree of correspondence"; ‡ that "the several grades of Mind and its component faculties, are phases in the correspondence and factors in the correspondence," § and "that the strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to be followed by its consequent, is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize." ¶

If we concede the claim that this doctrine of correspondence "supplies a reconciliation between the experience hypothesis as commonly interpreted, and the hypothesis which the transcendentalists oppose to it"; ¶ we concede simply that ideas, intuitions, and forms of thought which are universal, are the results of accumulations of experience through successive generations responsive to the environment. Thus in respect of the ideas of Space and Time, "as the substrata of all other relations in the *non-ego*, they must be responded to by conceptions that are the substrata of all other relations in the *ego*. Being the constant and infinitely-repeated elements of thought, they must become the automatic elements of thought—the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of—the 'forms of intuition.' " **

The assumption that ideas *a priori* in respect of the individual mind, are the results of the experience of the race, and in this respect are *a posteriori*, does not impair the argument based on the authority of consciousness. For thus we have the testimony of the inner voice confirmed by its necessary correspondence with objective truth. The true theory of things is therefore evidenced by universal intuitions of the mind.

If "the degree of life varies as the degree of correspondence," we shall find the truth of Theism or Atheism or Agnosticism revealed by the higher or lower life moral and intellectual of the peoples and persons that are their respective adherents. Nay, more; "the strength of the tendency" in the human mind to believe in the Divine Intelli-

* First Prin., § 4.

§ Ib., § 176.

† Ib., § 6.

‡ Ib., § 137.

§ Pr. of Psy., § 168.

¶ Ib., § 203.

** Ib.

gence and Personality, is proportionate to the objective truth of this belief.

The hypothesis which posits the "agreement between internal convictions and external circumstances," necessarily postulates the universal conviction of the Divine Being as sufficient proof of the "eternal fact"; and as competent to establish not only the existence of the Unknowable, but the existence of "the Power by which we are acted upon," with "modes" and "attributes" corresponding to "the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of—the forms of intuition."

But for higher proofs of the Personality of the Power behind phenomena, we go to the higher ground that mind is as real as matter, and that the human mind is, independent of its environment, a true symbol of the Divine Mind.

(4).—*The Phenomena of Mind.*

The Absolute Reality underlying the two relative realities of Matter and Spirit is represented in the "series of deductions" or "synthetic" terms of the philosophy by Matter, but not by Spirit. The Absolute Force is postulated as the cause of only two kinds of relative force, which respectively are the secondary causes of Matter and Motion.* The action of "the Absolute Cause of changes" is limited to the coextensive existence of centres of opposite forms of force from which are derived, by deduction, the laws of Matter and Motion, but not of Spirit.

"From universally coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion, there result certain laws of direction of all movement."† "Given the coexistence everywhere of antagonist forces—a postulate which, as we have seen, is necessitated by the form of our experience—and rhythm is an inevitable corollary from the persistence of force."‡ The direction and rhythm of motion are the derivative data from which are deduced the doctrines of "the multiplication of effects" resulting first in "segregation" and finally in "equilibration" preceding "dissolution."§

But the "series of deductions"|| from the inconceivable supposition of centres of force and duality of action pervading space, do not include spiritualistic phenomena. Illustrations, and here and there partial inductions relating to the super-organic, abound in the general philosophy and some of its special divisions. But nowhere are the

* Pr. of Psy., § 60.

§ Ib., Chapters 9 to 24.

† Ib., § 75.

|| Ib., § 74.

‡ Ib., § 88.

laws of mental manifestations derived by any deductive or synthetic process from the coexistence of antagonistic forces.

The entire hypothesis of evolution and dissolution is stated in the terms of Matter, Motion and Force. The law sought is "the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion." * "The formula finally stands thus: Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." †

The assumption, on which evolution thus defined and limited to the terms of matter and motion, and the corresponding processes of dissolution stated in the same terms, are enlarged, "to be the law of the entire cycle of changes passed through by every existence," ‡ is given as follows:

"We come now to one of the additions that may be made to the general argument while summing it up. Here is a fit occasion for observing a higher degree of unity in the foregoing inductions than we observed while making them. . . . While we think of Evolution as divided into astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, etc., it may seem, to a certain extent, a coincidence that the same law of metamorphosis holds throughout all its divisions. But when we recognize these divisions as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrangement and acquisition of knowledge—when we regard the different existences with which they severally deal as component parts of one Cosmos, we see at once that they are not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same manner." §

Thus it is conceded that the law of evolution, if derived in the "series of deductions" from the principle of the Persistence of Force, as claimed respecting the inorganic, is not thus derived in the departments of the organic and "super-organic," which it is confessed can be unified with the inorganic, if at all, only by separate "inductions" and "additions." But the "higher degree of unity" that was "observed while making" these inductions, does not exist. Spirit and matter are not bound together in the "series of deductions"; and therefore they are not bound together in the rigid law of necessity or unbroken causation. Whatever may be the warrant for tracing analogies between physical phenomena and spiritualistic phenomena, there is absolutely no warrant whatever for identifying the evolution or the origin of mind with the integration of matter.

That our positions are here well taken appears from the distinctions made in the argument for the supposed unity, as follows:

"Before proceeding to interpret the detailed phenomena of Life and Mind and Society, in terms of Matter, Motion and Force, the reader must be reminded in what

* Pr. of Psy., § 92.

† Ib., § 145.

‡ Ib., § 186.

§ Ib., § 188.

sense the interpretations are to be accepted. . . . The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols remain symbols still."* "Specially stated, the problem is to interpret mental evolution in terms of the re-distribution of Matter and Motion. . . . Though the development of Mind itself cannot be explained by a series of deductions from the Persistence of Force, yet it remains possible that its obverse, the development of physical changes in a physical organ, may be so explained; and until it is so explained, the conception of mental evolution as a part of Evolution in general remains incomplete."†

Is, then, matter a symbol of mind, or is mind a symbol of matter? Neither is the symbol of the other, but each as a relative reality is a symbol of the Absolute Reality. The philosophy postulates respecting "the forces of the outer and the inner worlds," that "neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate"; and that "though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the "Unknown Reality which underlies both."‡

If, therefore, "neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate," why are not the forces of the outer world interpreted in the terms of the inner world, as well as the forces of the inner world in the terms of the outer world? Or why are not the two forces interpreted respectively in their own terms? The answer is, that the forces of the inner world cannot be connected with the Persistence of Force through its action in universal centres of antagonist forces pervading space, and with the "series of deductions" therefrom, reducing all changes to the law of necessity; except by transforming the terms, and always using the terms of the outer world for those of the inner world.

Why is it "over and over again" assumed "that the deepest truths we can reach, are simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force; and that Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality"; § if spirit is also a symbol of the Absolute Reality, and "the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and matter"?

The assumption is justified only by the further assumption respecting "the forces of the outer and the inner worlds," that between their respective "effects there are likenesses of connection, the most constant of which we class as laws of the highest certainty."|| But this further assumption is ignored in the unification of knowledge,

* Pr. of Psy., § 194.

† Ib., § 221.

‡ First Pr., § 194.

§ Ib.

|| Ib.

for correspondence between the transitional steps in the respective processes resulting from the respective forces of the two worlds is not traced. Ignored, do we say? Nay—the assumption is denied in the special division of the philosophy relating to Psychology, where treating “nervous phenomena as phenomena of consciousness,” and as “a class of facts without any perceptible or conceivable community of nature,” with facts presented to us objectively, we are taught that “the quantitative correlation of feeling and nervous change, holds true only within narrow limits.”* Thence we are taken to more advanced positions in differentiating matter and mind, as follows: “A far more radical distinction remains to be drawn. . . . Mind still continues to us a something, without any kinship to other things; and from the science which discovers by introspection the laws of this something, there is no passage by transitional steps to the sciences which discover the laws of these other things.”†

The assumption “of correlation” and “equivalence” between the “forces of the outer and inner worlds,”‡ is therefore without justification. Without warrant from deduction or induction or analogy, the supposition follows beyond “the First Principles of Philosophy,” to the “derivative data” concerning only inorganic and mechanical forces, considered in the chapters on “the persistence of relations among forces,” and “the transformation and equivalence of forces.” There is no common ground or “passage by transitional steps” between the “sciences which discover the laws” of the two worlds.

“The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science, are thus not smaller but greater than those of any other science.”§ “When the two modes of Being which we distinguish as Subject and Object, have been severally reduced to their lowest terms, any further comprehension must be an assimilation of these lowest terms to one another; and, as we have already seen, this is negated by the very distinction of Subject and Object, which is itself a consciousness of a difference transcending all other differences.” . . . “Nevertheless it may be as well to say here, once for all, that were we compelled to choose between the alternatives of translating mental phenomena into physical phenomena, or of translating physical phenomena into mental phenomena, the latter alternative would seem the more acceptable of the two.” . . . “Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if they are what they are supposed to by those who identify them with their symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is insurmountable. . . . Either way, therefore, it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence.”||

We do not deny that many contradictions of these excerpts are to be found in the several departments of the philosophy.¶ But we do contend that if the citations are true, “it is impossi-

* Pr. Psy., §§ 41, 47.

† Ib., § 56.

‡ F. Prin., § 194.

§ Prin. Psy., § 56.

|| Ib., § 62, 63.

¶ *e. g.*, Ib., § 272.

ble" "to interpret the detailed phenomena of Life, and Mind and Society, in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force." The force here mentioned is of two kinds, the relative causes respectively of matter and motion.* But while each of these forces is distinguished as the cause corresponding to a distinct relative reality as its effect, neither is postulated as the cause of Spirit. Spirit, therefore, must be due to a third mode or to the direct fiat of the Absolute. And from the universal centres of antagonist forces of the outer world, the "derivative data" of evolution are drawn in a "series of deductions," respecting the integration of matter, the direction and rhythm of motion and the multiplicity of effects; none of which are shown to be deductions from the forces of the inner world. But if Matter and Spirit, though alike dependent on the Absolute Being, are as relative existences entirely independent of each other; and if the translation of the phenomena of Matter into the phenomena of mind be barely possible, but the translation of the phenomena of mind into the phenomena of matter be impossible: the laws governing them respectively should be deduced in independent terms and series. The correlation and the equivalence of forces of the outer world, do not bind the forces of the inner world, by the same necessity of "unbroken causation" and "uniformity of law." †

But these terms binding external forces in necessity, are transferred to the sphere of the inner world, though not translated into its modes; and are used to contradict and suppress the testimony of consciousness to the fact of "free-will." ‡ This denial of our own personality, is a denial by the philosophy, through its theory of things, of its first principles, viz.: the reality of spirit as an existence independent of matter; and the authority of consciousness paramount to reason.

(5).—*The Testimony of Consciousness.*

The synthetic philosophy, in its true scope and character, is, as its title signifies, a synthesis rather than an analysis. It is, in its first principles and primary data, a synthesis of deductions from a body of thought rather than of things; though many of its derivative data respecting "super-organic" existences, are derived from imperfect inductions or assumed analogies.

That the principle of the persistence of force is revealed in consciousness; and that all the fundamental principles of the philosophy are derived by deduction from this first principle, is admitted in the citations already made, as well as in the following selections:

* F. Prin., § 60.

† Ib., Chapters VII. and VIII.

‡ Pr. Psy., Vol. I., Chapter 9.

"Clearly, then, Persistence of Force is an ultimate truth, of which no induction is possible." . . . "And whoever contemplates the relations in which it stands to the truths of science in general, will see that this truth transcending demonstration is the Persistence of Force."* "The first deduction to be drawn from the ultimate truth that force persists, is that the relations among forces persist."† "Thus what we call uniformity of law, resolvable as we find it into the persistence of relations among forces, is an immediate corollary from the persistence of force."‡

Similar processes of deduction connect the doctrine of "the transformation and equivalence of forces" with the same fundamental truth as its corollary.

"And since the persistence of force, being a datum of consciousness, cannot be denied, its unavoidable corollary must be accepted. This corollary cannot, indeed, be made more certain by accumulating illustrations. The truth, as arrived at deductively, cannot be inductively confirmed."§ "No number of analytical truths will make up that synthesis of thought which alone can be an interpretation of the synthesis of things."|| "In other words, the phenomena of Evolution have to be deduced from the Persistence of Force."¶

The deductions from this ultimate truth are, however, legitimately limited to mechanical and other forces of the outer world. In the chapter on "the persistence of relations among forces," there are no processes or illustrations relating to "super-organic" existences. In the chapter on "the transformation and equivalence of forces," the law is carried to forces classed as mental and social, by analogy and on the assumption of complete correlation between these forces and physical forces. That this assumption is unwarranted appears from the admissions already quoted, to the effect that "the quantitative correlation of feeling and nervous change holds true only within narrow limits"; that "there is no passage by transitional steps" between the sciences which discover the laws respectively of the inner and the outer world; and that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence." That the analogy is not justified appears also from the forces of which the persistence of relations and transformation and equivalence are predicated, viz.: the two kinds of force: (1) "The space-occupying kind of force"; and (2) "The power shown alike in the movements of masses and in the movements of molecules."** Evolution from the inconceivable centres of antagonist forces is stated in terms of matter and motion, ignoring all terms of mind in the proper processes of deduction. Unless, therefore, the assumed analogy is established by complete induction, including the corollaries of mechanics and excluding Personality, it is not justified.

Now, we have already seen that the data of consciousness are sim-

* F. Prin. (§ 59, Ed. of 1873, and) § 61, Ed. of 1878, Appleton.

† Ib., § 63.

‡ Ib., § 65.

§ Ib., § 73.

|| Ib., § 90.

¶ Ib., § 147.

** Ib., § 60.

ply deliverances of the Absolute Personality of the Ultimate Cause, and of the limited personality of man. The induction of truths from the facts of the inner world cannot be complete without all the data of consciousness. The principle of persistence of force, while not inconsistent with, is incompetent to explain all orders of phenomena in even the outer world, as we have also seen. But personality is congruous with persistence of force, and with the phenomena of the inner and the outer world.

Thus the criterion of congruity with all other truths, makes the principle of persistence even less certain than the principle of Personality. "Hence, Philosophy, compelled to make those fundamental assumptions without which thought is impossible, has to justify them by showing their congruity with all other dicta of consciousness"; and "setting out with these fundamental intuitions provisionally assumed to be true," "the complete establishment of the congruity becomes the same thing as the complete unification of knowledge in which Philosophy reaches its goal."*

"But philosophy requires for its datum some substantive proposition. . . . Having assumed the trustworthiness of consciousness, we have also to assume as trustworthy some deliverance of consciousness. What must this be? Must it not be one affirming the widest and most profound distinction which things present? Must it not be a statement of congruities and incongruities more general than any other? An ultimate principle that is to unify all experience, must be coextensive with all experience—cannot be concerned with experience of one order or several orders, but must be concerned with universal experience. That which Philosophy takes as its datum, must be an assertion of some likeness and difference to which all other likenesses and differences are secondary."† "What is this division equivalent to? Obviously it corresponds to the division between *object* and *subject*. This profoundest of distinctions among the manifestations of the Unknowable, we recognize by grouping them into *self* and *not-self*."‡ "I might, indeed, safely have assumed this ultimate truth, which Common Sense asserts, which every step in Science takes for granted, and which no metaphysician ever for a moment succeeded in expelling from consciousness. Setting out with the postulate that the manifestations of the Unknowable fall into two separate aggregates constituting the world of consciousness and the world beyond consciousness, I might have let the justification of this postulate depend on its subsequently proved congruity with every result of experience, direct and indirect. But as all that follows proceeds upon this postulate, it seemed desirable briefly to indicate its warrant with the view of shutting out criticisms that might else be made. It seemed desirable to show that this fundamental cognition is neither, as the idealist asserts, an illusion; nor as the sceptic thinks, of doubtful worth; nor as is held by the natural realist, an inexplicable intuition; but that it is a legitimate deliverance of consciousness elaborating its materials after the laws of its normal action. . . . So much, then, for the data of Philosophy. . . . Before proceeding with the substantial business of Philosophy—the complete unification of knowledge partially unified by Science, a further preliminary is needed. The manifestations of the Unknowable, separated into the two divisions of self and not-self, are redivisible into certain most general forms, the reality of which Science, as well as Common Sense, from moment to moment assumes."§ "We must, therefore, confess that Reason is utterly incapable of showing the unreasonableness of those primary deliverances of consciousness which yield Subject and Object as independent existences."||

* F. Prin., § 40. † Ib., § 42. ‡ Ib., § 44. § Ib., § 45. || Pr. of Psy., § 441.

The unification of knowledge, therefore, cannot be secured by assuming a principle which ignores these "independent existences"; or explains the one in the "terms" of the other, thus making the distinction "of doubtful worth"; or which confounds "the widest and most profound distinction which things present" with those which are "secondary," making all or any of the subdivisions and derivative data of matter determine the corresponding divisions and data of mind, without derivation by deduction or otherwise in the terms of mind, and only upon the presumption that what is true of one "world" must be true of the other. Personality supplementing Persistence of Force, is the only principle which "is concerned with universal experience," or coterminous and congruous with the known facts of Mind as well as matter, or competent to explain the beginnings of manifestations in either "world," or coextensive with all orders of phenomena. "The trustworthiness of consciousness" is the sufficient ground of our argument; independent of the concessions that "the quantitative correlation of feeling and nervous change holds true only within narrow limits"; and that "we know nothing of cause save as manifested in existences we class as material—either our own bodies or surrounding things."* These concessions, however, are alone sufficient warrant for excluding the assumption that existences we class as mental are bound by the chain of unbroken causation or necessity simply by the correlation, transformation, and equivalence of forces, as the results obtained by deduction from our consciousness of "Cause." Thus we may account for the phenomena of matter, or part of these phenomena, by Cause as a symbol of the Absolute Being, but must account for the phenomena of mind by some other mode or principle of Being. But the argument from these concessions admits less of the influence and sphere of Cause than we have assumed in our argument from the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness. Our argument assumes that the relative personality of man, the rational creature, is limited and conditioned by causes in his organism and environment; as well as that the relative chain of causation in "the outer world" of inorganic and organic existences is limited and conditioned by the qualified freedom of the human will; and that both cause and personality as relative realities concurrent but not exclusive, represent the Absolute Being as Absolute Cause and as Absolute Personality. The one representation is no more than the other, a limitation of the Absolute.† "If the antithesis of subject and

* Pr. of Psy., §§ 47 and 272.

† First Pr., § 13.

object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united";* it is true only in the sense of complete and absolute knowledge or comprehension; for otherwise it excludes our consciousness of Absolute Cause as well as of Absolute Personality.

Another illustration of the inadequacy of the Persistence of Force to unify our knowledge of mental phenomena, is seen in the limitation of its principal "corollary," the doctrine of "the transformation and equivalence of forces."

"We cannot hope to establish equivalence among the successive manifestations of force."† "There can be no phenomena of consciousness beyond its successive states and the modes of succession of its states—the states themselves and the changes from one state to another."‡ "As all relations are finally reducible to one, which is nothing else than a *change* in consciousness, it follows, even *a priori*, that all relations among the changes in consciousness must themselves be other changes."§

It is impossible, therefore, to establish by complete induction the assumed "fact that forces unceasingly metamorphosed are nowhere increased or decreased" in "the currents of our thoughts."|| The mechanical theory of mind which, excluding personality, seeks to explain all mental phenomena, is opposed to the derivative data as well as the primordial implication of consciousness, and is unsupported by any synthesis from first principles or any analysis of facts.

SUPPLEMENT AND SUMMARY.

"The genesis of religion" is assumed to be "the ghost theory" in the last article of the agnostic argument entitled, "Religious Retrospect and Prospect," as elsewhere in the "Principles of Sociology," of which as we are advised the article is to form a part.¶ In this supposed evolution of "ideas concerning the supernatural," no account is taken of the historical proofs which have in recent years so rapidly accumulated, tending to show that monotheism is older than polytheism. Against all the old as well as the newly discovered evidence, we assume, for argument's sake, that monotheism is a modern development. But so is the doctrine of "The Persistence of Force." If one, then both, must in the future be set aside on the presumption that principles and deliverances of consciousness are true in proportion to their novelty.

We do not need to be told that "the spreading recognition of

* Pr. of Psy., § 272.

† First Pr., § 67.

‡ Pr. of Psy., § 361.

§ Ib., § 376.

|| F. P., § 67, and Pr. of Psy., Ch. on "Consciousness in General," §§ 377 *et al.*

¶ *The Popular Science Monthly*, January, 1884.

natural causation conflicts with this mythological evolution" of "a hierarchy of gods," from "the ghost theory of the savage." But Mr. Spencer here implicitly tells us more, to wit: that the recognition of natural causation conflicts with the conception or consciousness of one Absolute Personality. The positivist, however, would go further still, and say that the recognition of natural causation conflicts with the conception or consciousness of one Absolute Cause, the very consciousness from which Mr. Spencer derives his principle of the Persistence of Force, and deduces the corollary of "natural causation." One assertion is as true as the other. It is not in proof, and it is not a fact, that the spreading recognition of natural causation conflicts, in the most highly endowed or evolved minds, with the conception or consciousness of Supernatural Power or Supernatural Personality.

We are told that "whoever conceives any other will than his own, must do so in the terms of his own will." But we are told also in the same article, that "He is compelled to symbolize objective force in terms of subjective force, from lack of any other symbol"; and it follows, of course, that whoever conceives any other force or energy than his own, must do so in terms of his own force or energy.*

Next we are told that "will like emotion necessarily supposes a series of states of consciousness." But in the same sense this is true of the Absolute Force, as well as of objective forces which are relative; for our notions of one and all are derived from our subjective experience or consciousness.†

Then we are told, that "the conception of a Divine will, derived from that of the human will, involves, like it, localization in space and time." In the same view it is clear, that the conception of the Absolute Cause, derived from our subjective experience of muscular force and energy, likewise involves localization in space and time.

Shall we follow further? Similar parallels and presumptions may be made over and against the assertions respecting the conception of Divine Intelligence.

The sceptical criticism comes to a point in the statement, that "these and other difficulties, some of which are often discussed, but never disposed of, must force men hereafter to drop the higher anthropomorphic characters given to the First Cause, as they have long since dropped the lower." The implication of which is, of course, that the elements of Personality, being "anthropomorphic characters," and limitations of the "consciousness which transcends the

* First Pr., Chapters 3 to 7. Pr. of Psy., § 348 and Chap. 17.

† Pr. of Psy., §§ 351, 361, 376 and *supra*, "I."

forms of distinct thought," must at last disappear. But to think of the Ultimate Cause or Energy is likewise to give to this consciousness of the Ultimate Reality, an anthropomorphic character and a metaphysical limitation.*

We must assume that the "ghost theory" contained "at the outset a germ of truth," if we admit that from or through this theory is evolved a true conception or consciousness of the Reality. But to assume that this germ of truth in the ghost theory of the savage, is to be found in his experience of muscular force and energy, rather than in his consciousness of his own will and personality, is to beg the whole question. "Consequently the final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man is, that the Power manifested throughout the universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness." Hence the "dematerialization" of "this one supernatural power," requires the elimination of the terms of "force" and "energy," even more than its "deanthropomorphization" requires the elimination of the terms of "will," and "personality," from our conception and representation and consciousness of the same. "This necessity we are under, to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the universe"; and therefore the spiritualistic conception of Personality, rather than the exclusive conception of Cause, is commended to religionist and scientist and thinker alike, as the proper symbol of the Supreme Being; "for we know nothing of cause, save as manifested in existences we class as material—either our own bodies, or surrounding things."†

"Especially must this be so when he remembers that the very notions, beginning and end, cause and purpose, are relative notions belonging to human thought, which are probably inapplicable to the ultimate reality transcending human thought." Hence if we must reject the primordial conception or consciousness of Absolute Personality, because except as a symbol it is "inapplicable to the Ultimate Reality," we must, for the same reason, reject the primordial conception or consciousness of "Absolute Cause," "without beginning or end," and its fundamental principle of "The Persistence of Force," with its corollaries of "unbroken causation," and "uniformity of law," and all the "derivative data" formulated through the "series of deductions" in "the hypothesis of evolution and dissolution."

* First Prin., § 13, and *supra* "I."

† Pr. of Psy., §§ 47 and 272.

Thus the sceptical criticism must impeach the philosophy before it can impeach Theism.

The apostle of agnosticism gives to "the present cultured man" this present creed: "Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed." But this confession abjures the agnostic argument, which, concerning "the nature of the universe," makes the conception of the Cause of all things, as Infinite, a symbolic conception of the illegitimate sort, entirely vicious and untrustworthy, and respecting "the origin of the universe," makes the "Theistic Hypothesis" of "creation by external agency," also untenable and illusive, for no other reason than that it contains as its "ultimate element," the idea of the eternity of the Creator or First Cause.*

Now these postulates that the Power behind phenomena is Infinite and Eternal, which as against religion and the theory of creation, the agnostic denies or ignores as "impossible ideas," or "unthinkable" as well as "unknowable," he affirms in favor of science and the theory of evolution, as "absolute certainties."

In this composition of contradictions, Mr. Spencer furnishes us with a negative justification of Theism, more complete than his negative justification of Realism. "By a negative justification of Realism, I mean a proof that Realism rests on evidence, having a greater validity than the evidence on which any counter hypothesis rests."† "Finding that any hypothetical doubtfulness of the Realistic conception must be immeasurably exceeded by the resulting doubtfulness of every anti-Realistic argument, we find that Realism is negatively justified."‡

The Theistic hypothesis "rests on evidence having a greater validity than the evidence on which any counter hypothesis rests." "Any hypothetical doubtfulness" of its conception of Personality is "immeasurably exceeded by the resulting doubtfulness of every argument" against it. "Should the idealist be right, then the doctrine of Evolution is a dream."§ Should the compromise between monotheism and positivism, called agnosticism, be right, then the hypothesis of evolution and dissolution deduced from the conception of one Infinite, Eternal, Independent, and Absolute Cause, is a dream.

But the positive justification of Theism is also more convincing

* First Pr., §§ 11 and 12.

† Ib., § 441.

‡ Pr. of Psy., § 402.

§ Pr. of Psy., § 337.

and conclusive than is the positive justification of realism.* The Personality, as well as the Persistence of the one Supernatural Power, is a deliverance of consciousness, and as well also is of provisional authority without confirmation or comparison with the other data of philosophy. The two postulates are, if either is, derived from our subjective experiences; so that if one is, then both are, vitiated by anthropomorphism, and void for uncertainty. Both propositions, as provisional assumptions adopted on the simple testimony of consciousness, are verified by their congruity with other truths. But the principle of Persistence is not, and the principle of Personality is, paramount and supreme: for the one is not, and the other is, "coextensive with all experience," reconciling science and religion, conserving "the profoundest of distinctions" between "Subject and Object as independent existences," and Will and Force as independent conceptions, and unifying our knowledge of the phenomena of Matter and Mind.

OSCAR CRAIG.

* Pr. of Psy. Chapters 14 to 19 inclusive.

II.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE RELIGIOUS INSTINCT.

THE history of culture during the last twenty years has been the effort of human thought to reach the unity of human knowledge. The aim of man in all departments has been to obliterate the special features of his own department, to find a point of union between his distinctive sphere of knowledge and those other spheres of knowledge which are distinctive of other minds. In no direction has this tendency toward incorporation been more marked and striking than in the sphere of religious apologetics. The attitude of the Christian intelligence toward the scientific spirit of the age has undergone and is undergoing a profound change; it is more and more being transformed from a posture of antagonism and defiance into an attitude of reconciliation and friendship. It is only fair to state that the first proposals of peace were made by science itself in the person of one of its ablest living representatives. It is to Mr. Herbert Spencer that our age is chiefly indebted for the suggestion of a compromise between the claims of Science and the claims of Religion. In the introductory chapters of his "First Principles" he has not scrupled to affirm that scientific investigation is landed at last in the very element which constitutes the foundation of religious experience; the one ends where the other begins—in the sense of an unfathomable mystery. The confession which twenty years ago Mr. Spencer made on the part of science has in turn been quite recently made on the part of religion. Mr. Drummond, in his very striking work, "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," has ventured to outstrip all contemporary apologists in his desire for reconciliation. If Mr. Spencer has affirmed that there lies a religious element at the back of science, Mr. Drummond has returned the compliment by maintaining that there is a scientific element at the back of religion, and that the scientific element consists in those very laws of Biogenesis and Natural Selection which were supposed by a former generation to form the strongest barriers to religious faith.

We have coupled together these two works, not as being equally famous, but as being equally symptomatic. Each of them is a test case, because each of them is a testimony coming from an unexpected quarter. Mr. Spencer is the most pronounced, the most thorough-going, the most uncompromising of evolutionists; Mr. Drummond is the most earnest, the most devout, the most practical of evangelicals; yet the one places religion at the foundation of science, the other places science at the foundation of religion. The fact is symptomatic of a change along the whole line of human thought. It apprises us that we are no longer under the régime of August Comte, nor under the control of a philosophy which relegates religion to the infantile age of humanity. It tells us that however positive may be the philosophy of the present day, it is a positivism which includes in the number of its facts the existence and the efficacy of a religious sentiment. It recognizes the truth that agnosticism is as much at the root of science as at the root of religion, and that the final and inevitable stage in every process of study is a stage of mystery and marvel.

We propose to make this symptom of the times the basis of a few observations. We wish briefly to examine the ground of the present tendency, the reason on which it rests, and the hope to which it points. We intend to ask what is the precise attitude which the religious instinct occupies in relation to modern science? We shall limit ourselves exclusively to the facts of what is called natural religion, and, to concentrate our attention still further, we shall confine our view to the single and fundamental problem of a divine existence. The question which we propose to consider is this: Is the modern doctrine of evolution unfavorable to the development of the religious sentiment? Does it tend naturally to dwarf the growth of the primitive instinct or to exert a chilling influence on the warmth of early days? Conceding that there is no incompatibility between the conclusions of early faith and the premises of modern science, is there not an incompatibility between the spirit of early faith and the spirit of modern science? There are three elements which constitute the natural basis of religion—a sense of wonder, a sense of fear, and a sense of dependence; can these stand the test of the principle of evolution? Must not wonder vanish when we have made the transition from an age of perpetual miracle into a world of invariable law? Must not fear subside when we have passed from the contemplation of natural catastrophes as the direct judgments of heaven to the contemplation of such catastrophes as a mere sequence of effects from their causes? Above all, must not dependence pass away when, by the operation of that great principle of evolution, called the survival

of the strongest, the lives of human beings have emerged from their weakness and their frailty into the robustness and the vigor of fully developed forms?

These are the questions which suggest themselves to one who studies the elements of religious experience on the one hand and the laws of scientific thought on the other. The first impression created by the prospect of such a study is one adverse to an adjustment of rival claims. It seems as if the wonder of primitive times were about to give place to an age of universal explanation which shall leave no room for the wings of faith, as if the fear of primitive times were about to be displaced by the confidence of a heart that has detected the secrets of nature, as if the dependence of primitive times were about to be supplanted by the conscious strength of a will that has come to recognize itself as the latest and ripest product of creation. All this, we say, is the first impression of the student of comparative thought. Yet strangely enough this is the very impression which a deeper study of the question has tended most to dissipate. If there is one truth which the modern gospel of evolution has revealed more distinctly than another it is this, that the primitive religious elements of wonder, fear, and dependence have only received their development in the culture of modern life, that their primitive stage is a disadvantage to them, that so far from being more spontaneous in the world's infancy, they have only reached their spontaneity with the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Let us look at them each in turn.

What is the highest manifestation of the sense of religious wonder? Most of us at the first blush will be disposed to say, the creed of the Polytheist. But is it so? The primitive man looks out upon the forces of nature and asks, what are they? It is beyond all question that it is the sense of wonder which prompts him to ask. But is it equally clear that it is the sense of wonder which helps him to answer? What is his answer? What conclusion does he come to regarding the nature of these forces which have wakened within him a feeling of mystery?—he decides that they are human beings endowed with powers and properties analogous to his own. Is that decision the product of a sense of religious wonder? is it not, on the contrary, the direct result of a *defect* in the sense of wonder? What is it that enables him to come to a conclusion so speedy, and to a conclusion so inadequate? It is simply the inadequacy of his sense of mystery. He finds an explanation of nature in the powers of his own mind just because he does not really feel that there is anything in nature which transcends the powers of his own mind. The fact of his personal ex-

istence, as he knows it and conceives it, is in his view quite adequate to explain the forces and processes of the universe. Accordingly he gives to these forces and to these processes not only a human dress, but the dress of a very soiled humanity. He clothes them in his own garments, and in these garments he worships them. His worship is really a homage paid to himself; he adores in the forces of nature the reflection of his own shadow. Such an adoration cannot be the effect of the man's sense of mystery. It springs rather from the fact that his sense of mystery is not developed, that his wonder is not strong enough, that he is as yet too little impressed with his comparative insignificance in the vastness of the visible creation. He feels himself to be the measure of the universe, and therefore he has no scruple in explaining the universe by himself. We are accustomed to speak of the periods of individual and national childhood as ages of faith; it would be more correct to say that they are ages distinguished by the weakness of faith. They are ages of credulity, but credulity rightly understood is not the equivalent, but the opposite of faith. Intellectual faith, in the Christian and highest sense of the term, is the power to trust in the absence of an explanation; intellectual credulity is, strictly speaking, the inability to trust in the absence of an explanation. It is the necessity to find a reason for all it sees—a necessity so strong that it is willing to accept almost any reason that is offered to it. An age of credulity must of necessity be an age in which the faculty of wonder is small. It must be an age in which man's sense of his own capacity is an over-weaning force. The tendency to attempt an explanation of everything is itself an indication that the feeling of the marvellous is low and that the sense of natural power is high, and the indication is corroborated and confirmed by the facility and the suddenness with which the crudest explanation is received. That is the origin of Polytheism, of Fetichism, of Nature Worship in all its forms. The multiplicity of such forms of faith in the primitive ages of humanity is a proof, not of the superior strength, but of the greater weakness of the religious instinct, for it is a sign that the marvellous nature of life has not yet dawned upon the primitive mind, and that the transcendent majesty of creation is as yet a sealed book to the thoughts of man; the days of early faith are days of little wonder.

If we would see the sense of wonder in its full development we must come to modern times. Nowhere, perhaps, has it been so fully developed as in the spirit of the nineteenth century. Ours is called an age of Agnosticism. It may be so, but let it not be forgotten that wherever the spirit of religion is high there will of necessity be

a spirit of Agnosticism. This is only in other words to say that wonder is an element of religion. Agnosticism, if it be real and reverent, is as truly the child of wonder as Nature Worship is the product of the absence of wonder. Agnosticism has its place in Christianity as well as in Science. It is the recognition of the fact that there are heights and depths in the universe which are unsearchable, and which man should recognize to be unsearchable. Christian faith is essentially the trust of the human soul in the midst of its wonder, or, as the Hebrew writer puts it, "As seeing Him who is invisible." Destroy the sense of wonder—in other words, the spirit of Agnosticism—and you pluck up from the root the possibility of Christian faith; you lead the mind back again to that stage of its primitive development when it believed itself to be in possession of all knowledge, because it felt not within itself the mystery of its own being.

It is a popular notion that modern science has narrowed the range of the marvellous; it has, in truth, extended that range into universal dimensions. The savage is startled into a momentary wonder by what we call the special aspects of creation. He sees in the thunder-storm, in the hurricane, and in the earthquake, what seem to be the evidences of superhuman powers; that is to say, the powers appear to be superhuman until he has found for them his easy explanation. The man of modern science, on the other hand, attempts no explanation of these phenomena; he assigns them to the action of a force whose nature he leaves where he has found it—in mystery. But what the man of modern science denies is the speciality of the mystery. He does not, any more than the savage, refuse to uncover his head before the marvel of the thunder-storm, the hurricane, and the earthquake. What he does refuse is to acknowledge that there is any marvel in the thunder-storm, the hurricane, and the earthquake, which is not similarly present in the still small voices of nature. We say similarly present, for that is the special dogma of our modern science. The conception of nature at which we have now arrived, is the conception of one mighty force fulfilling itself in many ways. It may speak through the thunder, or it may manifest itself in the silent growth of the flower; but the force which speaks in the thunder is the force which grows in the flower. It is in each case marvellous, and modern science has seen its marvellousness, but she has seen in each case one and the same marvel. She has refused any longer to assign to any natural process a monopoly of the sense of wonder. She has recognized the fact that in every process of nature there is operative the whole of nature; that not the smallest part of the vast abric can be influenced without affecting to its utmost length and

breadth the entire structure of that fabric. Therefore it is that the man of modern science wonders not less but more than the man of primitive culture. He sees throughout the whole what the man of primitive culture finds only in the individual part; he recognizes in the universal framework the presence of that identical mystery which the primitive man beholds only in the special and the extraordinary. The savage wonders at certain processes of nature; the man of science wonders at nature herself, for that which the savage sees in one process is what the man of science beholds in all.

The second element which constitutes the natural basis of religion is fear, or, as we more correctly call it, reverence. It is commonly thought to have its bloom in the days of primitive culture—a thought which has found expression in the proverb, “Ignorance is the mother of devotion.” Yet perhaps a wilder delusion, or one more contrary to the facts of experience, was never conceived. The truth is, the primitive man is deficient in reverence. He has no reverence for the universe as a whole, nor for any part of the universe which seems to *be* a part of it. He only bows down before that which appears to him to be a violation of the universal law—a clear proof that to him the universal law is not a subject of reverence. He adores that which he calls extraordinary, which presents to him the aspect of a distinctive and peculiar phenomenon isolated from the common life of man, and he thereby bears witness to the fact that he does not consider the common life of man to contain any element that is worthy of adoration. We believe that Goethe is correct in saying that the earliest recognition by the heart of man of a duty of universal reverence is found in Christianity. He tells us that here we encounter a three-fold adoration—a reverence for things above us, a reverence for things around us, and a reverence for things beneath us. What is it that has given to Christianity this power to reverence the universe as a whole? It is the recognition of the fact that the universe as a whole is pervaded in all its parts by one and the self-same *Power*. Strictly speaking, there is no reverence for things beneath us; that which we adore in them is the incarnation in them of the same inscrutable Principle which sways the mightiest forces. That which Christianity has taught us to adore is not really the lowliness of the *cross*, but its height; not the insignificance of things called commonplace, but the divinity that hides in them. It has not told us to cultivate reverence by looking down; what it does say is, that the things of the universe on which we have been accustomed to look down, are really above us; that there is present in them the same Power which is present in the heights of creation, and that their seeming insignificance in

the ocean of being is in reality an essential component of "The fullness of Him that filleth all in all."

Now, the gospel of Christianity is in this respect identical with the gospel of modern science. It is the merit of modern science that it has exhibited physically what Christianity has proclaimed historically—the presence of a transcendent Power alike in the highest and in the lowest spheres of creation. The doctrine of the correlation of force as exhibited by Mr. Herbert Spencer, is the doctrine of a mysterious, inscrutable, indefinable Power, everywhere present, everywhere persistent, permeating at once the heights and the depths of being, and manifesting an impartial energy alike in the processes that are vast and in the works that are lowly. The effect of such a conception on the scientific mind itself cannot be doubtful; it must end in the kindling of an universal reverence. We say universal, to distinguish it from the reverence of the savage. It is no longer a veneration of that which seems to contradict the order of nature; it is a veneration of the order of nature itself. It is no longer a homage paid to the extraordinary and unusual; it is a homage yielded to the daily course of law. It is no longer a sense of awe experienced merely from the thunder, the earthquake, and the fire; it is a sense of awe experienced in the knowledge that, alike in thunder and in stillness, alike in earthquake and in calm, there is present the operation of the self-same inscrutable Force—the Power that is not ourselves.

The third element, which lies at the basis of natural religion, is the sense of dependence, and here, if anywhere, it might be thought that the primitive man had the advantage over the cultured mind. The most dependent stages of human life are beyond all doubt its infantile stages. The life of the savage and the life of the child, present an aspect of helplessness which, in some respects, contrasts unfavorably even with the limited power of the beast of the field. On this ground it has been plausibly concluded that the infancy of the human race is bound to be an age of faith. And yet a keener observation of human experience will convince us that the actual state of things is exactly the reverse. The infantile stages of humanity are, indeed, stages of dependence, but they are not stages of the *sense* of dependence. The *state* of dependence belongs to an age of primitive culture; the *sense* of dependence is only found in an age in which culture is ceasing to be primitive. The savage prays to his fetich to bring rain, but if the rain does not come he beats his fetich; the inference clearly is that his prayer is dictated rather by a belief in magic than by a feeling of personal dependence. The truth is that the periods

of the world which exhibit this feeling in its deepest intensity are precisely those periods in which the human mind has caught the glow of a high civilization. There have been three forms of thought which have exhibited man's sense of dependence—the philosophy of the later Stoics, the theology of St. Paul the Apostle, and the scientific spirit of the nineteenth century. These have all been forms of the most thoughtful culture. The sense of dependence which they have expressed has been in each case the product of one and the same theory—a theory which could only emanate from the humanity of a philosophic age. Stoicism, Paulinism, and the science of the nineteenth century, on whatever other points they may be divided, are agreed in this: that the life of each individual man is but a fragment of the whole, that no man exists as an isolated or independent unit, and that every life is nourished by a sustenance and a support to which its own being would be inadequate. To the follower of the Porch, to the follower of the gentile apostle, and to the follower of the gospel of evolution, there is one doctrine which, under slightly modified form, preserves its essential unity—the doctrine of membership in a common body. The gospel of science teaches humility on the same ground as the gospel of Christianity—the ground that we are not our own; that no man liveth unto himself. It tells us that our individual organism is but one member of a vaster organism which unites our life to the lives of our brother-men. It tells us that any effort on our part to break away from the organic whole is an effort at suicide, and can only end in destruction, that the secret of all personal power is the loss of personal consciousness, and that the only chance of finding our individual life is to lose it in the life of humanity. It tells us that we exist for the sake of the whole, and that until we have realized this fact our existence must be chaotic and meaningless. It gives prominence to that experience which the primitive man has not felt at all—the necessity of a sense of dependence to the higher life of the soul; and in giving prominence to that experience it has vindicated for the religious instinct that essential element of its nature which the primitive age refused to yield.

Thus far, then, we have arrived at this conclusion, that if the age of modern science exhibits any decline of the religious instinct it does not originate in any transformation of the religious instinct itself. We have seen that the three elements of natural religion—the sense of wonder, the sense of reverence, and the sense of dependence,—so far from having been weakened by the transition from barbarism into culture have received from the age of culture their legitimate and normal development; they have found for the first

time their full and free expression in the scientific conception of the universe. We have seen in short that there is nothing in the *fact* of evolution which is fitted to diminish the intensity of the religious instinct. But there is something more than the fact of evolution to be taken into account ; there is the *doctrine* of evolution. It is quite conceivable that the religious instinct may in itself be stronger than ever, and yet that its influence may have been dwarfed by some outward and contending influence. And this is indeed precisely what is alleged by a large section of the religious world of to-day. They affirm that they have still as ardent a longing as ever for communion with another and a higher life. They deny that the development of humanity has brought to them any decrease in the warmth of religious emotion or any lowering in the flight of divine aspiration. But what they contend is, that the religious development which is unimpeded from within, is opposed and limited from without. They say that, while the process of evolution, proclaimed by modern science, has not been detrimental to the growth of the desire for God, it has been highly prejudicial to the gratification of that desire ; evolution itself has favored its development, but the *doctrine* of evolution has denied it an object after it has *been* developed. The ground of this charge is a very specific one, and if substantiated would be final. It is said that the doctrine of evolution is the opposite of the doctrine of creation, and therefore practically the denial of a divine agency in the universe. The language of the popular mind is somewhat to this effect : I was once a religious man because I was once taught to believe in the fact of creation. I was told that God made the stars in their courses, and the different orders of life in their species ; I believed it and felt devout. I am now, however, told on the highest authority a very different gospel. I am told that the stars in their courses have not proceeded from the imperative command of God, but have emerged quite naturally from the evolutions of a fire-cloud, that the orders of animal life have not been created in the demarcations of their different species, but have been evolved slowly and progressively from the existence of a single germ-cell through the agency of natural selection, heredity, and environment. Can the first gospel subsist side by side with the second ? Can the doctrine of evolution coalesce with the doctrine of creation ? I still desire the presence, the agency, the communion of a living God ; I still feel that without such communion the highest stage of human development is a lame and impotent conclusion ; but what matters my desire if it is opposed to philosophic truth, what avails my feeling if it is at variance with established law ; can I retain at one moment both the old faith and the new ?

For our part we say, yes. We deny that the doctrine of evolution is the antithesis to the doctrine of creation. We say that even the extreme view of that doctrine—the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer—does not exclude the idea of creation. Mr. Spencer denies that the world had an absolute beginning; we hold that the beginning or non-beginning of the world has nothing to do with the question. What do we mean by the formula that the world is created by God? Do we mean that once upon a time it sprang into life by the word and will of a divine being; in other words, that it had *once* its origin in God? If our doctrine of creation be simply the doctrine of a divine power exerted on the world some million of ages ago, there is, strictly speaking, no rational ground for the existence of religion at all. What is our evidence that the being who made the world is not now dead? or what would it matter on such a view to be told that he was still alive? If his creative act was a mere historical act which was begun, continued, and ended within a definite point of time, then for all practical purposes he died when the creative act was completed. The moment he was able to say, “It is finished,” he ceased thenceforth to have any relation to this universe; he became a fact of history, a shadow of the past, liable like all other such shadows to fade even as a memory. However interesting such a contemplation may be to the historian, it has no interest whatever for the religious man; it comes to him as the negation of his religion and the denial of his right to worship. What the devout heart understands by the formula that the world is created by God is something very different from that. It is not the statement that God *once* originated the world, but that he is *always* originating the world. It is the declaration that there is not a moment of life in which the system of existing things subsists apart from God, that there is not a process of nature which owes its being purely to the seen and temporal, that there is not a movement of force which does not in every rhythm of its movement presuppose the power and the agency of a Force behind the scenes. That is the doctrine of creation as understood by the devout souls of all ages, and that is the doctrine of creation which modern science has been ready to accept. Mr. Herbert Spencer denies the beginning of the world, but he denies it that he may give us not less, but more of the divine. Mr. Herbert Spencer has been called a materialist; the charge can only proceed from those who are unacquainted with his works at first hand. He reduces the phenomena of life to matter and force, but with him matter and force are themselves only phenomena. They are but the symbols of an unknown quantity, but the manifestations of an un-

searchable Power. That Power is to Mr. Spencer the real essence of the universe ; in language which concentrates the whole Calvinistic force of the Old Testament, he startles us by the cry, "I recognize no second causes."* The one and only cause he recognizes is that inscrutable Power which is everywhere present and everywhere operative. To him the process of evolution is really tantamount to a process of continuous creation. We feel instinctively that however inadequate, from a Christian point of view, may be his idea of *God*, he has a thoroughly adequate view of the mode of God's working. We feel that with such a view as his the denial of the world's beginning is no heresy, because in lieu of that beginning we have received a vision of divine agency which is equivalent to a perpetual creation, and tantamount to the beholding of the very process by which the heavens and the earth are made.

It seems to us that the religious belief of the nineteenth century is in a position somewhat analogous to the religious unbelief of the eighteenth ; its life is threatened by the alternative of two pistols. The unbeliever of the eighteenth century was asked to choose between the self-deception or the conscious imposture of the early Christians ; these were held to be the only possible alternatives compatible with the rejection of the supernatural. No apologist of our age would now present two such pistols to the head of an opponent, and the reason is plain : our century has discovered in the mythical theory a third possible alternative whereby, without being either conscious deceivers or spiritually deceived, the first Christians might still have reared an unhistorical fabric. But our century has in turn discovered two pistols of its own, which are pointed no longer at the head of the naturalist, but at the head of the supernaturalist. A man is asked if he believes that all the forms and varieties of nature have been evolved purely and entirely out of matter and force ; he answers, no. Immediately he is confronted by another alternative. What, then it is said, will you accept the doctrine that all these forms and varieties are separate and independent manufactures exhibiting in a series of unconnected acts the skill of an almighty workman ? The man is staggered, and well he may be. Two alternatives have been presented to him, either of which is a pistol, and either of which, if accepted, will cause the death of his spiritual nature ; between the worship of a material force which has blindly evolved all things, and the worship of a materialistic workman who has physically manufactured all things, there is, from the religious point of view, little to choose.

* See the letter appended to the first part of his "Principles of Biology."

But now let us see if these alternatives are exhaustive alternatives. Am I bound to be shot by one or other of the pistols; is there not a road of escape between them? It is clear to us that there is. If the mind were shut up to one or other of these alternatives, the religious instinct would be in a very critical condition. But we deny that the mind is thus shut up. We deny, on the one hand, that the only form of evolution is a material evolution; and on the other, that the only form of creation is a manufacturing creation. We assert that at one and the same time any process of nature may be both a special evolution and a special creation. We say that evolution is the opposite of *separate* creation, but not of special creation. Let us try to illustrate our meaning by an imaginary example. Here is a musical box which has been constructed to perform twelve tunes. Let us suppose that somewhere between the beginning and the end of these vibrations there were to pass through existence the life of an intelligent man. Let us suppose that he came into the world at tune No. 2, and went out at tune No. 11; what would be his verdict on the observation of this phenomenon? Two alternatives would lie before him. He might either say that the one tune had grown out of the other—the hypothesis of evolution—or he might hold that at the close of each tune a reconstructive force was imposed from without to produce a change of melody—the hypothesis of creation. Yet we know that these alternatives are no alternatives. We know that at one and the same moment each change in the melody is both a special evolution and a special creation. On one side it is a process purely mechanical, growing out of physical conditions and able to be accounted for on simply material principles; on the other side, it is a work essentially spiritual, elaborated by the action of intelligence and revealing in all its movements the movement of a living soul; in its last analysis it is the product of life.

Now the question is, are we entitled to transfer this analogy to the musical box of the universe? Are we entitled, on the principles of modern science, to say that life presided at the formation of all things? in other words, that in its last analysis the universe also is the product of a living soul. If we believe the principles of modern science to be immutable principles, we are not only entitled, but we are bound to say so. If we believe that the Law of Biogenesis—the law that life can only spring from life—has been in all ages the rule of the universe, then the eternity of life must to us be an axiom of science. If the living can only come from the living, there never could have been a time in which life was not. We may go back, if we will, through an infinite regress of ancestors, or we may stop short, if we

will, at the existence of an Eternal Spirit ; but whether we seek our infinity in an endless regress or in an endless Personality, we are led to a conclusion that is one and the same. In either case we are brought to see the impossibility of conceiving a time in which the universe was aught but a living universe in which the principle of natural evolution was unsupported by the principle of vital power. It is possible with Professor Huxley, by an act of "philosophic faith," to say that at one time life arose spontaneously ; but let us understand that in saying so we are deserting the principle of modern science. We are abandoning our vaunted faith in the immutability of nature's laws and are supplanting it by a faith which we have always affected to despise—the belief that nature's laws are not immutable. Nature, as she now stands, testifies that life can only spring from life ; if we say that by an act of philosophic faith we can imagine her to have once given another testimony, we are reverting from the belief in an age of law to the belief in an age of miracle. We are, by a simple act of credulity, unsurpassed by the most credulous forms of worship, surrendering ourselves to the persuasion that the laws of nature can be violated, nay, that the principles of nature can violate themselves. We are voluntarily going back to the culture of an older day, to a culture which we have long claimed to have surmounted, and on which we have long looked down with patronizing contempt. But if we shall refuse thus to go back, if, in the interest of modern science and in pursuance of the modern spirit, we shall hold fast our belief in the integrity and in the permanence of natural law, we shall be led to the inevitable conclusion that spirit is as old as matter. We shall be led to the conclusion, to which, by another road, philosophy has already come, that at the back of the material there lies the immaterial, and that behind the visible process there lurks a vital power. That is our basis for a religious science, or, which is the same thing, for a science of religion. We feel that there must be a Life of the universe which is at the same time a Life *in* the universe—a Life which is not ourselves, and yet of which ourselves are part. The musical box of the universe has the musician *within*. Its mystery is not its making, but its music. The proof of its unbeginningness would not prove it uncreated. Its evidence of design is not the manufacture of its atoms, but the presence of its harmonies. Design is *now* helping to make the universe. What is the survival of the fittest but the struggle of design ? What is the natural selection by which the bird chooses her mate of beautiful plumage but the action of design ? What is the phenomenon called instinct but the petrification into habit of design ? What is the evolution of history but the

order and arrangement of design? All forms of partial life have consciously or instinctively an end for which they live; shall the universal Life alone be denied an end? It is vain to cry out, anthropomorphism! It is not anthropomorphism, it is vitalism. The physical science of our age has repudiated all dualisms: it has proclaimed the unity of species, it has asserted the unity of force, it has maintained the unity of law. Shall a science whose watchword has been, one law, one force, one species, recognize no continuity of life between the creative and the created, or deem it unscientific to repeat the venerable argument, "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear; he that formed the eye, shall he not see?"

GEORGE MATHESON.

III.

THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE SYNOPTICAL GOSPELS.

THE Synoptical Problem forces itself on the attention of every thoughtful reader of the first three gospels. It arises out of the striking resemblances, and not less noticeable differences, of the three narratives of the life of our Lord. To the former category belong such facts as the following: all three exhibit a common general plan in the arrangement of the materials. All three contain a common stock of facts which manifestly form a mere selection out of a much larger number of incidents belonging to the public ministry of Jesus; to a large extent the same selection of miraculous cures, *e. g.*, while it is clearly indicated that multitudes of such cures were repeatedly wrought whereof no record has been preserved. Very notable is the common record of a woe pronounced on Chorazin and Bethsaida, because of their unbelief, in spite of many mighty works wrought amidst their populations, taken along with the fact that in none of the three gospels do we find any accounts of the works which justified the woe. Besides these agreements in the substance of the history there are remarkable verbal agreements in the complexion of the respective narratives. Many incidents are related to a greater or less extent in identical terms by all, or by two out of the three evangelists. Citations from the Old Testament Scriptures common to all the three are taken from the Septuagint, while those peculiar to the first evangelist are taken from the Hebrew. Some citations which diverge both from the Hebrew original and from the Greek version are given in the same terms. Words and phrases, otherwise of rare occurrence, are found in all the three writings. Facts such as these make it difficult to believe that these writings arose independently of each other or of common literary sources. To the head of differences, greatly complicating the problem, belong such phenomena as these: In Mark are found few *words* of Jesus, as compared with Matthew and Luke. The latter two evangelists, while possessing in common much material belonging to the teaching

of Jesus, present the common material in very diverse forms, Matthew grouping into discourses what Luke disperses over his pages as isolated aphorisms. The third evangelist adds to the stock of sayings common to him with the first, not a few *logia*, especially parables, peculiar to himself. Often resemblances and differences come into surprisingly close contact: in passages, so like each other as to suggest literary dependence, appear divergences which wear an aspect of contradiction perplexing to harmonists. Once more; each gospel has its own style; while in word and phrase there is close affinity, manifold literary idiosyncrasy reveals itself to close inspection.

The question is, how are these resemblances and differences to be accounted for? Did the writers use with more or less freedom each other's narratives? or had they access to common documents which each used in his own way in accordance with personal peculiarities or distinctive aims? or did all three draw upon a common unwritten tradition which embodied the substance of apostolic preaching, and through frequent repetition had become to a considerable extent stereotyped in form? or are the phenomena to be best explained by a combination of the several hypotheses? All these explanations, under many forms, have been proposed; insomuch that the history of the synoptical problem and its attempted solutions is a very elaborate matter, which of course cannot be gone into here. The first hypothesis raises the question, Which of the evangelists were the users or borrowers, and which of the gospels the used or borrowed from? The second suggests the inquiry: how many sources were at the command of the writers? One document would account for the matter common to all three; but a second document would be necessary as a source of the *teaching* material common to Matthew and Luke, while the group of *logia* peculiar to Luke might point to a third literary source. We should thus have one book containing chiefly *acts* of Jesus, resembling the second gospel wherein is found comparatively little didactic matter; and two books of *logia*, one containing the sayings common to the first and third gospels, the other those peculiar to the third. The third hypothesis, that of moral tradition, dispenses with documents altogether, in so far as the matter common to the three gospels is concerned, deeming it possible that without such the *facta* and *dicta* of Jesus might become well-nigh as fixed in form, through frequent repetition, as they could be in a document. Between the documentary and oral hypotheses opinion is still much divided, German authorities deciding almost unanimously in favor of the former, while British scholars for the most part incline to the latter. The alternative now generally supported by English

opinion found its first prominent advocate and exponent in the German critic, Gieseler,* and after him it was for obvious reasons regarded with favor by the famous author of the mythical theory of the life of Christ. This hypothesis assumes a certain view as to the character of apostolic preaching, viz., that it consisted largely in narratives of stories from the public life of our Lord. This view in itself possesses much intrinsic probability. What more likely than that the eleven in their preaching should relate over and over again to their audiences the *memorabilia* of their Master's wondrous career? How could they be better occupied than in telling the things they had seen and heard, as the Spirit brought them to their recollection? It has been contended, however, that this is an ungrounded though plausible assumption. Ch. Hermann Weisse, in a work on the Gospel History, published in 1838,† maintained that there was nothing in the New Testament to show that the apostolic preaching was actually of this story-telling character, but much that pointed in an opposite direction. He referred in proof specially to the letters of Paul, from which it appears that the apostle of the Gentiles at least was not in the habit of reciting evangelic incidents in detail, but rather confined himself to general views, consisting of doctrinal constructions of the great critical events, such as the crucifixion and the resurrection. This observation is undoubtedly true as regards Paul, but it may be questioned whether he can be taken as a sample. There seems reason to believe that the sparing allusion to particular incidents or sayings from the Personal Ministry was a peculiarity of Paul's due to his intense religious subjectivity; and we can readily imagine that the preaching of more ordinary men, like the eleven, would be of a very different character—less ideal and abstract, more real and matter-of-fact, consisting of vivid reminiscences rather than of theological reflections. While we say this, however, we must add, that it seems to us very doubtful whether oral tradition alone could give the evangelic story such a definite shape as it takes in the Synoptical Gospels. While not excluding this as a contributory source, we agree with those who think that some written form must have intervened between the oral tradition as shaped by apostolic preaching, and our written records.

Among the many various forms of the mutual use or borrowing hypothesis, according to which the evangelists had access to each other's writings, the more outstanding and important are the two

* Gieseler set forth his views in a work entitled "Historisch-kritischer Versuch über die Entstehung und die frühesten Schicksale der schriftlichen Evangelien," 1818.

† *Die Evangelische Geschichte, kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, von Ch. Hermann Weisse.

following: (1) that Mark used Matthew and Luke, associated with the name of *Griesbach*; * (2) that Mark was written before the other two, and either in its present form, or in an earlier first edition, so to speak, what the Germans call an *Urmarkus*, was a source for them. Griesbach's view was in the line of ancient patristic opinion; for the early fathers also saw clearly that there was a problem to be solved. Their solution found apt expression in the words of Augustine, when in his work on the harmony of the evangelists he said, that each evangelist followed his own order in narration, recording what he remembered, briefly, or more at length as he felt inclined, but not as ignorant of what the others had written, and that Mark followed Matthew like a footman (*tanquam pedissequus*).† This innocent opinion of the ancients was eagerly espoused by Dr. Baur, the famous founder of the Tübingen school of naturalistic criticism, who found it fitted best into his Tendency-theory of the origin and character of the New Testament writings. Mark, Baur regarded as a neutral in the great controversy between Judaists and Paulinists, who wrote his gospel on the principle of leaving out of the other two, Matthew and Luke, supposed to be lying open before him, whatever had a bias either way; the Judaistic bias prevailing in Matthew—strong and unmixed in the original form of the Gospel, though diluted in the canonical Matthew, the Pauline bias being equally strong in Luke in its original form (supposed to be that patronized by Marcion). Thus Baur accounted for the absence from Mark of the fore-history of Jesus, the Sermon on the Mount, and all that most distinguishes Luke from Matthew. The pictorial style characteristic of the second gospel he regarded as an attempt to give liveliness to an otherwise dead, colorless narrative.‡

Among the literary characteristics of Mark which lend plausibility to Griesbach's hypothesis, and have gained for it the support of impartial inquirers such as Bleek and others, who, unlike Baur, have no dogmatic scheme to uphold, is the well-known *duality* in expression: that is to say, the combination of phrases for the purpose of description, which are used separately in the other two gospels to describe the same thing. A notable instance occurs in Mark i. 32, where we

* Griesbach expounded his theory in "Programma quo inquiritur in fontes, unde Evangelistæ suas de resurrectione Domini narrationes hauserint," also in "Programmata II., quibus Marci Evangelium totum e Matthæi et Lucæ commentariis decerptum esse monstratur"; both preserved in vol. ii. of his *Opuscula Academica*. Ed. Gabler.

† *Vid.* De Consensu Evangelistorum, Lib. 2, ii. 4. Augustine's full statement about Mark's relation to Matthew is: "Marcus cum subsequens, tanquam pedissequus et brevior videtur."

‡ Of course the attribute of neutrality by itself involves comparative lateness of date. There were no neutrals at first. All were passionately either on one side or on the other of the great controversy. The neutral came in when the spirit of reconciliation began to prevail.

find two expressions (*ὥρας δὲ γενομένης, ὅτε ἔδυσεν ὁ ἥλιος*) combined, to indicate the time when many cures were wrought by Jesus, a certain Sabbath evening; Matthew employing the former of the two alone, for the same purpose, and Luke the latter. Of course two explanations of this curious literary phenomenon are abstractly possible. Mark may have combined two phrases found in two documents lying before him, Matthew and Luke, viz.; or his brother evangelists may have resolved his composite phrase into its elements, each appropriating one half. But in the latter case it does appear strange that the two evangelists who, without knowledge of each other, consult Mark, should thus distribute his phrases between them, and in view of this one is strongly inclined to fall back on the other alternative, that Mark combined phrases which he found in his sources, unless, indeed, an explanation can be suggested which makes the duality compatible with originality. Such suggestions are not lacking. Holtzmann, *e. g.*, finds the combination in question not only compatible with, but an unmistakable evidence of originality, on the ground that the second phrase was necessary to define the time fully, seeing it was *Sabbath* evening. The sick might be brought to be healed only after sundown.*

On the whole, though one hesitates to go against the judgment of such a critic as Bleek, it would appear that some other explanation must be found for the phenomenon of duality than that which assumes that in all such instances, and they are numerous—two more occur in the passage above quoted—Mark united phrases found separately in the other two companion gospels. On the general topic the following observations may be made: (1) The procedure ascribed to Mark by advocates of the Griesbach hypothesis is very frigid. Reference has been made to conflate readings in MSS. of the Greek Testament and the use made of these by Westcott and Hort in justification of the theory.† But the cases are widely different. The parties responsible for conflate readings were engaged in constructing a *text*, essentially a mechanical work. Mark was employed in writing a history full of living interest, and it is surely improbable that his mind should be preoccupied in culling descriptive phrases from writers who had preceded him. (2) It is less unnatural to imagine Matthew and

* The reference here and throughout is to Holtzmann's great work, *Die Synoptischen Evangelien ihr Ursprung und geschichtlicher Charakter*. Von. Dr. H. I. Holtzmann, Leipzig, 1863. *Vid.* p. 114 for the above passage.

† *The first three Gospels in Greek*, by Colin Campbell, M.A., B.D. 1882. Mr. Campbell, now minister of the East Parish, Dundee, was a distinguished student of the University of Glasgow, and shares the critical views of Professor Stewart of that University, referred to further on. The above work is designed to be a contribution toward the proof of the Griesbach hypothesis.

Luke with Mark, or the document on which Mark is based under their eye, abbreviating or condensing by omitting one of two phrases where either of the two seemed sufficient, though we acknowledge, as already stated, that it does seem strange that they should so often distribute the phrases between them. (3) The use of redundant phraseology would be very natural in one who had been an eye-witness of the events, and who described them in a highly emotional state of mind—*e.g.*, such a man as Peter. Suppose that in Mark you have the report of Peter's accounts of the *memorabilia* of Christ's life, either at first hand, or in a tolerably faithful redaction with the original coloring largely retained, then the verbose or redundant style of the second gospel becomes quite intelligible. "At eventide when the sun set" (Mark i. 32); "the leprosy left him and he was healed" (i. 42); "peace be still" (σιῶπα, πεφίμωσο), spoken to the stormy winds; "and the wind ceased and there was a great calm" (iv. 39), describing the result:—how natural this laboring style in a narrator who had seen what he narrates! (4) Numerous cases occur of the same duality where there can have been no combination of phrases found in the other gospels, because the phrases do not occur there at all. The last two cases above cited are instances. Here is another: "Can the sons of the bridechamber fast while the bridegroom is with them? as long as they have the bridegroom with them they cannot fast" (ii. 19). This is no mechanical juxtaposition of two ways of saying the same thing found distributively in Matthew and Luke, for these evangelists say the thing in much the same manner. It is the diffuse manner of one who tries by iteration to do justice to his sense of the importance of the truth declared. "Looking round on them with anger, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts" (iii. 5); here again we have verbosity unexplained by the parallel texts, because very little of all this is to be found in them. Luke simply has "looking round about upon them all"; Matthew has no corresponding phrase. One other instance: "All they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want did cast in *all that she had, all her living*" (xii. 44). This passage is found in one only of the companion gospels, that of Luke, who uses only a single phrase in place of the two printed in italics from Mark—"all the living that she had." (5) There are instances in which the phenomenon of duality occurs not in Mark but in the other gospels. Thus in the narrative of the first stilling of the storm Luke writes, "they being afraid wondered" (φοβηθέντες ἐθαύμασαν, viii. 25), where Mark has "they feared a great fear" (ἐφοβήθησαν φόβον μέγαν, iv. 41), and Matthew simply "marvelled" (ἐθαύμασαν, viii. 27). If Mark was the systematic combiner of phrases the theory

makes him out to be, how did he come to omit the expressive *ἐθαύμασαν*?

In view of all the relative facts, the use of dual expressions in narration, predominantly, though not exclusively, characteristic of Mark, is decidedly in favor of his relative proximity to the oral source of the common material. He writes like one whose style is influenced at first or at second hand, by the emotion of an eye-witness. Other features of Mark's style point to a similar conclusion, such as the marked preference for diminutives expressive of affection,* and the frequent use of the present when the other Synoptists employ the Aorist. Critics have also pointed out the abundance of Hebraisms in vocabulary and style, which create an impression of literary rudeness and helplessness in the diction of Mark as compared with Matthew and Luke, but which also make for his originality.† The style of the latter evangelists, just because it is better Greek, is probably that of men dealing with documents. Paraphrasing out of a hebraising narrative into comparatively pure Greek is much more likely than the reverse‡ process. The style of evangelic narrative would grow smoother as it rolled down the stream of written tradition.‡

Thus far our argument has gone in favor of Mark's originality as compared with Matthew and Luke. But the question stands over, whether the originality be absolute or relative only; whether, that is to say, Mark's gospel be actually the first written account of our Lord's ministry in Galilee, or only a redaction of an earlier written record. C. Hermann Weisse, in the work already referred to, took the former view. The contribution given by this author to the discussion of the Synoptical Problem in the introduction to that work is one of permanent value. Its epoch-making importance is frankly acknowledged by Dr. Bernhard Weiss in the introduction to his recently published *Life of Jesus*; § and we can only say for ourselves that we

* See for instances Mark v. 40, *παιδίον, κοράσιον*; vii. 25, *θυγάτριον*; viii. 7, *ἐχθύδια ὀλίγα*.

† See on this, Holtzmann, *Die Synoptischen Evangelien*, p. 289.

‡ On the subject of Mark's style, C. H. Weisse has some instructive remarks. He says: "It is generally admitted that in his Greek style Mark is the most hebraising of the evangelists. It is not necessary to remind readers how much more natural it is to assume a paraphrase out of a hebraising style into good Greek than the reverse, which, in fact, would be the solitary instance of the kind in the history of literature. But a wider extension may be given to the observation, so as to make it embrace all that makes for the probability of a use of Mark by the others, and the improbability of the opposite. The Hebraisms of our Gospel are a consequence or necessary moment of a general pervading character of its style which bears striking witness to its independence and originality. This feature can from one point of view be regarded as helplessness and awkwardness. But on the other hand it bears the stamp of a fresh naturalness, and unpretending vivacity by which the narrative of Mark is distinguished from all other evangelic accounts. We venture to say that Mark's gospel, in spite of its defect in external literary form, is in regard to all the essential spiritual qualities of style the best written of all the historical books of the New Testament" (*Die Evang. Geschichte*, pp. 67-8.)

§ *Das Leben Jesu*, Erster Band, p. 29.

have met with nothing more interesting and instructive. The substance of Weisse's position is that neither Matthew nor Luke was a source for the writer of the second gospel, but that both Matthew and Luke, while independent of each other, were dependent on the second gospel as a literary authority. This second gospel he regards as the work referred to by Papias under the name of a report taken down by Mark of the evangelic story as it fell from the lips of Peter. In confirmation of this view he adverts to the fact that at the point where the gospel begins to be a narrative based on the report of eye-witnesses, the very first event introduced is the call of the two brothers, *Simon* and Andrew.* All that goes before is of the nature of introduction; here begins the narrative proper of the Galilean ministry, the chief theme of the gospel; and the very first fact recorded is the call of that disciple from whose lips the story is, *ex hypothesi*, taken down. It is certainly a noteworthy circumstance, and the view it is adduced to support is altogether a very tempting one. It would be most satisfactory to be able, on good grounds, to recognize in the second canonical gospel one of the two evangelic sources spoken of by Papias, that, viz.: containing the record of Peter's preaching reported by Mark.

On this question, as to the absolute or relative originality of Mark, opinion is still divided. Weisse himself, in a later work on the *Gospel-question* (Evangelienfrage), while still holding a relationship between the canonical Mark and the Mark of Papias, inclined to the opinion that the two were not identical, in other words, that our Mark is not the very first version of the record of Peter's preaching, but a redaction of it in which, while the substance is retained, some things have been changed. Holtzmann, in his masterly work on the Synoptical Gospels, published some twenty years ago, advocated this view at great length, and endeavored to show in what precise respects the canonical Mark differs from the original form of the work (*Urmarkus*), reckoning among these *omissions*, e. g., the Sermon on the Mount, *additions* (few) and numerous stylistic modifications. He regarded the two works, however, as to a large extent identical in contents. His theory of the relation of the three Synoptical Gospels accordingly, is neither that our Mark used Matthew and Luke, as Griesbach held, nor that the two latter evangelists used our Mark, but that an earlier document (*Urmarkus*) was used by all the three, the canonical Mark keeping much the closest to the original source. Dr. Bernhard Weiss, on the other hand, takes a somewhat different view. He reverts to

* Mark i. 16.

Weisse's original idea that the canonical Mark was a source for the first and third evangelists, and is the storehouse whence was drawn all the historical material common to the three gospels. The two authorities, however, are of one mind in repudiating the hypothesis of Griesbach, and it may be stated generally that there is an increasing consensus among critics of all schools and countries to at least that extent,—the notion that Mark was posterior to, and dependent on, Matthew and Luke, meeting with little support in any quarter. It is satisfactory to observe that the question is being gradually narrowed, and that there is room for the hope that ere long the points still in dispute among those who agree in the main may reach a settlement.*

It may be regarded then as an ascertained result of critical inquiry that either our Mark, or a written or unwritten evangelic tradition similar to it in substance, was one source of the evangelic story, as recorded in our first three gospels, from which was derived the historical material common to the three narratives. It is natural that one should wish to know the exact character and contents of this primitive gospel, and it is equally natural that the attempt should be made to ascertain these by extracting from the three Synoptical Gospels all those portions of their narratives in which they verbally agree. This, accordingly, is the method pursued by Dr. Abbott in his able article on the gospels in the current edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. "What," he asks, "was the original tradition upon which our three Synoptic Gospels are based? Was it Aramaic or Greek? oral or written? single or manifold? Did the earliest of our synoptists receive it fresh from its first source, or after it had passed through many recensions? Few or none of these questions can be answered with absolute certainty; but it is evident that if Matthew, Mark, and Luke are all based upon an earlier original tradition, then those words and phrases which are common to Matthew, Mark, and Luke (to which we have given the name of the Triple Tradition) must have a peculiar weight as approximating to the original tradition itself. If it be found that the scattered words and phrases make up of themselves an almost continuous narrative, we may fairly sup-

* The weightiest name, among recent writers, on the side of Griesbach, is that of *Keim*, who, in his valuable work, *Geschichte Jesu von Nazara* (History of Jesus of Nazareth), decides for the dependence of Mark on Matthew and Luke. In his preliminary review of the sources of the history of Jesus, he thus picturesquely introduces Mark: "Then approaches us the least of the synoptics whose youthful cheerful aspect the latest critics have disfigured by attaching to it a white beard of high antiquity." He assigns the composition of Mark to about 100 A.D., and adduces in proof of late origin the form in which Christ's promise to those who have made sacrifices, uttered in Peraea, in answer to Peter's question, What shall we have? is given in the second gospel: "He shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, *houses and brethren and sisters, and mothers, and children and lands, with persecutions,*" which he says implies the full naturalization (*Einbürgerung*) of Christianity upon the earth, in happy times of peace, occasionally interrupted by persecutions.

pose that we are approximating very closely indeed to the original tradition. We shall not expect to find a perfectly continuous narrative. On the contrary, a perfectly continuous narrative, identical in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, would imply, not a floating, early, variable tradition, but a document simply copied by the authors of our gospels." The prosecution of this study has been facilitated by the publication, on the suggestion of Dr. Abbott, of the Synoptic Gospels in parallel columns, and in variously spaced, shaped, and colored Greek, designed to show to the eye at a glance what is common to the three gospels, or to any two of them, or peculiar to each, the "Triple Tradition," as the most important, appearing in red type.* This beautiful and expensive work deserves all praise as a worthy tribute to the spirit of patient, inductive inquiry so eminently characteristic of English scholarship. It is questionable, however, whether the labor is likely to be rewarded with results of proportionate importance. It certainly does not appear to us that the Triple Tradition in the sense assigned to the phrase by Dr. Abbott—the *verbal* matter common to the three evangelists—can be of much value in connection with the question as to the character and contents of the original evangelic tradition. Agreements as to the substance of the narratives are of fundamental moment; verbal agreements, on the other hand, are of quite secondary moment. With Holtzmann we regard it as an utterly futile idea that the original gospel can be recovered by extracting those portions of the three gospels in which not only the sense, but the very words are the same. The narrative which results from this process is at the best a skeleton; and it is in various places a skeleton with glaring lacunæ, wanting here a rib, there an arm. If this skeleton, even supposing it complete, gives us an approximate idea of the rudimentary gospel, then we must suppose Mark to have taken down Peter's preaching in the form of dry notes,† mere hints, or faint suggestions, and left this as a literary legacy to his brethren. Who can believe the common source to have been of this sort? How much more likely that it was a book somewhat like Mark, full of fresh, lively, graphic narratives, which all three synoptical evangelists used with more or less freedom, each giving the substance in his own style, the words in which all three agree being simply the *accidental residuum which they left unaltered*, if it even amounted to that. It is difficult to see how the verbal agreements

* *Synopticon: An exposition of the common matter of the Synoptic Gospels*, by W. G. Rushbrooke, M.L. London: Macmillan & Co.

† Dr. Abbott makes use of this word. "It is only reasonable to admit," he remarks in one place, 'that the hypothesis of 'notes' taken from oral discourses, and serving as the groundwork for the second gospel, would explain many of its phenomena."

could be anything else or more than that. What end was to be served by working meagre jottings verbatim, with scrupulous care, into such extended narratives? Surely, the sources which enabled the writers to prepare such full narratives would make them independent of the jottings altogether! All that the imaginary notes of Mark say, *e. g.*, about the *temptation* is, "The spirit . . . in the wilderness . . . forty days . . . tempted by." These are all the words common to the three narratives. Even this is an overestimate, for the Greek word for the Spirit is in a different case in all the three narratives; being genitive in Matthew, nominative in Mark, and dative in Luke.

The foregoing topic may appear to some more curious than profitable. It is no merely curious question to which we now pass, *viz.*: in which of the three Synoptical Gospels is the *order* of the common source most nearly reproduced? The question is not necessarily one as to the objective historical order of events as they actually happened, but as to the subjective order which they assumed through the laws of mental association in the primitive tradition. Now, to this question one would, without much hesitation, return the *à priori* answer: that gospel would adhere most closely to the order of the common source in which there is least trace of a disturbing influence. If any of the three Evangelists confines his narrative pretty much to what is common to the three, that is, to the contents of the common source, we should expect him to reproduce the material substantially as he found it. On the other hand, if any of the three makes use of more than a single source, say of a second, containing material of a different sort—words, for example, rather than acts—we could imagine this new source acting as a disturbing influence on the writer's plan, leading him to dislocate the connections of the other source more or less, so as to make room at places judged suitable for the new material. On this *à priori* view the presumption is in favor of Mark as against Matthew and Luke. For we find, we shall not say no trace, for that is disputed, but comparatively little trace of a second source in Mark. The contents of his gospel are in the main just the common stock of evangelic traditions as contained in all the Synoptical Gospels. Nearly all that he relates reappears in Matthew and in Luke, along with much more not found in him. This presumption would be converted into certainty, if it could be shown that the order of the narrative in the first and third gospels coincides with that in the second, except where the divergence can be accounted for by the disturbing influence of a second source. This proof Holtzmann undertakes to give. His theory is that the common source for the three Synoptists, which he calls *A*, is the ground-plan of all the three; that

this source is given in substance and order, in the main, as it was by Mark; that its order is adhered to also by Matthew and Luke except when the influence of a second source, a collection of sayings or *Logia* (called *A*), produces dislocation of the connection. That the three Evangelists do, to a certain extent, follow the same order, is a fact patent to all. There is agreement at the beginning of Christ's Galilean ministry, and again at the end, in the narrative of the incidents of the last journey to Jerusalem. The parallelism between Matthew and Mark begins at an earlier point in the later history, viz.: at the narrative of the beheading of the Baptist.* Now, the question is, why do they agree thus far, and no further? In the case of Matthew the problem is to explain the divergence in that part of his gospel lying between chap. v. and chap. xiii. The solution, apparently, is to be found mainly in these two facts: (1) Matthew's desire to introduce at as early a point as possible, an important sample of Christ's teaching; (2) his purpose to follow that up by a group of miracles supplying an equally good sample of his powers as a worker of miracles. These two motives account for chapters v.-ix., chapters v.-vii. giving the great Sermon on the Mount, chapters viii. and ix. consisting mainly of a collection of miraculous narratives. The heading or rubric for both may be found in the words of chap. iv. 23: "Jesus went about all Galilee teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of disease among the people." The Sermon on the Mount shows to what effect he preached; chapters viii. and ix. show to what effect he worked. The sermon is brought in before its proper historical place, and the miracles are selected without reference to their historical connections; hence dislocation of the original order. In chapters x.-xiii. we have another group of *logia* formed into discourses. Chapter x. contains a discourse relating to the dangers connected with the apostolic vocation, the original occasion being taken from the Galilean mission. Chapter xi. records a group of sayings amounting to a moral criticism of the time, and an estimate by Jesus of the Baptist and himself. Chapter xii. consists of sayings relating to the growing antagonism between Jesus and the Pharisees; while chapter xiii. offers to us a precious group of parables of the kingdom. These *logia* thus disposed of, Matthew can resume the historical thread, and go on his path as an evangelist, keeping company with Mark, comparatively free from the perturbing influence of his second source.

In Luke the problem is more complicated. In his case the per-

* Matt. xiv. 1; Mark vi. 14.

turbing influence of the second source begins to be felt at a still earlier point. He desires to introduce the scene in the synagogue of Nazareth—Christ preaching on the acceptable year of the Lord, and speaking wondrous “words of grace”—a scene which belongs to a considerably later period,* at the very forefront of his narrative, as a kind of *frontispiece*. Hence he does not even tarry to tell of the call of the four fishermen, placed in common by Matthew and Mark at the beginning of the Galilean ministry, but hurries on to that significant, and for him as the Evangelist of the Gentiles, most attractive incident. Matthew goes with Mark as far as to show how Jesus gathered disciples before representing him as discoursing to disciples. Luke does not even allow the formation of the nucleus of a disciple-circle to come between him and the typical prophetic event in Christ’s native town. After he has described that scene he can return to the source A and take up the narratives which he finds at its commencement—the call of the four disciples, the healing of the demoniac in the synagogue of Capernaum, of the leper, and of the palsied man; Levi’s feast, the conversation concerning fasting, the rubbing of the ears of corn on the Sabbath day, the healing of the man with the withered hand—all narrated nearly in the same order as in Mark.† Then follows, in abbreviated form, as compared with Matthew’s version, the Sermon on the Mount, which is supposed by Holtzmann and others to have been in the source used in common by the three synoptics. This Mark omits, but the ordination of the twelve, which in Luke precedes the sermon, comes in in his narrative at the same point in the history as in the third gospel.‡ After the sermon comes in, in Luke’s narrative, a short interpolation consisting mainly of material peculiar to him, extending from chap. vii. 11 to chap. viii. 3, and comprising *the Widow of Nain, the Baptist’s message, and the Woman in Simon’s house*. Thereafter Mark’s order is resumed at chapter viii. 4, where comes in *the Parable of the Sower*, succeeded by *the Stilling of the Storm*, the story of the *Gadarene demoniac, Fairus’ daughter, the woman with an issue, the mission of the twelve, Herod’s alarm, the feeding of the five thousand*, all in the same order as in Mark.¶ After a few more incidents, very briefly narrated, in which the sequence is

* The true historical connection is indicated in Mark vi. Luke’s own narrative clearly implies that the incident happened at a later time, for he makes Christ refer to his own works in *Capernaum*. I have given my view of the significance of the scene in the synagogue at Nazareth, in “The Galilean Gospel.” Hodder & Stoughton, London.

† See Mark i. 16–iii. 6, and compare with Luke iv. 31–vi. 11.

‡ Mark iii. 13, after the cure of the withered hand, a general formula intervening.

¶ Compare Mark iv. 1–vi. 46, with Luke viii. 4–ix. 17.

not observed, mention is made at chap. ix. 51, of Christ's last journey to Jerusalem, as if the evangelic history were drawing to a close. Then, to the surprise of all readers, there follows a long section, extending as far as chap. xviii. 31, consisting largely of material peculiar to Luke, the greater portion being sayings of our Lord, parabolic sayings occupying a very prominent place. Critics and expositors have been much puzzled by this phenomenon of an apparent indication of the end, followed by an excursus as long as that portion of the gospel which goes before. The most probable theory is that at this point Luke resolved to make room for a large mass of material contained in a second source, which he has not yet found opportunity to use, before proceeding to the narrative of the last days of Jesus. Chap. ix. 51—chap. xviii. 31, is a second interpolation into the common source A, the great interpolation it may be called in comparison with the earlier contained in chap. vii. 11—viii. 3. In this part of the third gospel the stream of narrative widens out into a lake with no perceptible onward movement. The evangelist has not a perfectly clear idea how the materials in this long excursus are to be fitted into their proper place in the ministry of Christ. He only knows that they are precious and must not be lost. So he introduces them at this point, after he has gone pretty well through his first source, in so far as it relates to Christ's ministry in Galilee, and before coming to the tragic tale of the Passion. In the words of Holtzmann, chap. ix. 51 forms the boundary between the two main masses in Luke, a point of transition which is chiefly conditioned by the circumstance that now the moment has arrived when he must open his second source, if he is to allow it to speak at all. * This may seem a very indefinite view to take of so large and so important a division of this gospel, but we are persuaded that any attempt to assign to it a more definite character, as, *e. g.*, that of being the record of a ministry in *Samaria*, will be found impracticable. The theory that in Luke's gospel we have the record of two ministries, of a Galilean ministry—the exclusive subject of the source reproduced in Mark's gospel—forming the earlier portion of Luke's narrative, and of a Samaritan ministry to which transition is made at chap. ix. 51, and which forms the main theme of the next nine chapters—this theory, we say, is doubtless very attractive and in full accord with the spirit of Luke as a devoted Paulinist and enthusiastic advocate of Christian universalism, *i. e.*, of a gospel not for Jews only, but for all the nations. Nor is there any need to be jealous of this theory because of the patronage it received from Dr. Baur and the Tübingen school. Nevertheless, we

* *Die Synoptischen Evangelien*, p. 207.

do not believe that the appropriate rubric for chap. ix. 51—chap. xviii. 31 of Luke's gospel is: *THE MINISTRY IN SAMARIA, prelude to the ministry in the Gentile world*. We should prefer the more indefinite one: *A collection of memorable sayings and doings of Jesus, some of which took place on Samaritan ground*. Nor do we think it helpful to the sound exposition of this part of Luke's gospel, to lay much stress on the formulæ of transition from one incident to another, as if these indicated with exactness the historical sequence. The truth is that the connections are often indicated very loosely, and in some instances the headings of sections seem to be taken by the evangelist out of the incident related, as, *e. g.*, in the case of the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. Luke was a trusty, candid chronicler, who faithfully used his sources, and made the most of his materials. When the source indicated the connection of events, he did so too, when an important incident appeared in the source without indications of the surroundings, he introduced it into his narrative as a precious fragment which he found "at the bottom of his portfolio," as Godet expresses it.* No intelligent student of Scripture will imagine that it compromises Luke's inspiration thus to suppose him occasionally ignorant of the historical settings of incidents. As little, we may add, will any competent judge deem it injurious to the evangelist's claim to be an inspired writer to ascribe to him such a conscious departure from the historical order as we suppose to have taken place in connection with Christ's visit to Nazareth. Neither historical sequence in the narrative, nor historical omniscience in the narrator, is necessary to the great end for which the Bible was given. It may, indeed, seem as if ignorance to any extent of the historical order, or conscious departure from it, were inconsistent with Luke's claim (made in the introduction to his gospel) to have written *καθεξῆς*. That claim, however, is valid, if he followed the historical order in the main lines, and as far as possible, which without doubt he has done, even in the section in which historic sequence is least discernible; for we do not imagine that in this section the evangelist was so utterly helpless as to be obliged to adopt the method of arrangement ascribed to him by Professor Stewart, of the University of Glasgow. Dr. Stewart's theory is that Luke, in chap. x. 24—xviii. 14 (who gives the beginning and the end of the section in question), "took up the fragments which remained from Matthew and his other sources, and, having labelled each with a word expressive of the leading idea it contained, he arranged the paragraphs in the alphabetical

* In his Commentary on Luke, chap. xvii. 7—10.

order of these words. In this way sayings spoken at different periods came to be clustered together, and the evangelist has bestowed great care even upon the internal arrangement of each paragraph."* For instance, *συγχάριπεν* is the catch-word in the three parables in Luke xv.—the *lost sheep*, the *lost coin*, and the *lost son*; it occurs in all three, and that is the reason why they are all brought together in one place. This single example may suffice to convince readers of the artificial character of this hypothesis. If the verb *συγχάριπεν* had happened to be wanting in one of these parables, would it have been omitted by Luke, or given somewhere else?

Thus far we have discussed the Synoptical Problem as it affects all three gospels. It remains to make some observations on the relation between Matthew and Luke. There is so much that is common to these two evangelists, additional to what is found in all three, that one of two inferences seems unavoidable: either one of them used the other, or both had access to a common source, consisting chiefly of sayings of Jesus, for such mainly is the nature of the additional material. This common source we readily incline to identify with the other evangelic work mentioned by Papias, that, namely, which he represents to have been written by the apostle *Matthew*. The existence of this patristic tradition respecting a gospel having Matthew for its author lends probability to the hypothesis of a collection of *logia* as a source for the matter common to the first and third gospels. It has been demonstrated that the book written by Matthew cannot have been our canonical Matthew,†—and yet it may safely be assumed that the statement of Papias points reliably to some literary activity of Matthew in connection with the records of our Lord's ministry. And the words of Papias point to just such a book as the common source of the additional matter in the first and third gospels must have been—a collection of *sayings* mainly, if not exclusively. "Matthew," says Papias, "wrote the *logia* in the Hebrew dialect, and each one interpreted them as he was able." It has been much disputed whether the expression *logia* should be restricted to sayings, or may not include *facta*, as well as *dicta*. Without pronouncing too peremptorily on that question, one may at least remark that the term surely points to a work in which sayings formed the leading feature. This collection of *logia*, then, by Matthew was in all probability the source whence our first and third evangelists drew the many words of Christ they

* *The Plan of St. Luke's Gospel*, a critical examination. By Rev. William Stewart, M.A., B.D. Glasgow, 1873. Professor Stewart is one of the few advocates of Griesbach's theory of the connection between the Synoptical Gospels.

† On this point *vid.* Bleek's *Introduction to the New Testament*, vol. i., p. 107.

record in common. It is natural that we should compare the records to see how far the two reporters reproduce the sayings in the same terms. The result of inspection is to convince us that in numerous instances the resemblance is close. Dr. Abbott remarks that it would seem to follow that "in such cases Matthew and Luke used one and the same Greek document, a translation of some Aramaic original, which document had not undergone much modification by oral tradition before passing into the several treatises of Matthew and Luke." * Comparison of the texts in detail, however, shows that neither evangelist can have followed the source slavishly. Characteristic differences appear throughout, and each evangelist may be said to have used the common material with great freedom, and to have reproduced it in his own style. The exhortation against anxiety about temporal things is given in Matthew thus, *μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε λέγοντες Τι φάγωμεν ἢ τί πίωμεν ἢ τί περιβαλώμεθα* (vi. 31); in Luke, *καὶ ὑμεῖς μὴ ζητεῖτε τί φάγητε καὶ τί πίητε καὶ μὴ μετεωρίζεσθε*, (xii. 29), the last word being a very remarkable one, rare in use, and most significant in sense. In the word which assures disciples that God will hear their prayers, for the general expression *ἀγαθὰ* in Matthew (vii. 11, "how much more shall your Father give good things"), Luke substitutes *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* (xi. 13), a case possibly in which we may legitimately recognize the influence of *Paulinism* on this evangelist's style. In the close of the Sermon on the Mount, Luke diverges from Matthew in many details of expression, but especially in this, that he makes the folly of the unwise builder consist not in making a bad *selection* of a foundation, as it might appear in Matthew to be, but in building without even thinking of a foundation, at hap-hazard—*χωρὶς θεμελίου* (vi. 49). In the saying which teaches disciples that even sparrows are the objects of Divine care, Matthew says: "One of them shall not fall to the earth without your Father" (x. 29); Luke, "Not one of them is forgotten before God" (xii. 6). The number of the sparrows is differently given; two in Matthew, five in Luke. Finally, in the strong word demanding that Christ be preferred to all earthly kin, for "loveth father and mother more than me" in Matthew (x. 37), stands in Luke "hateth not father, etc." (xiv. 26).

It is known to all readers of Scripture that in Matthew's gospel Christ's sayings are grouped into discourses, while in Luke they appear for the most part in sporadic form. In Matthew they are precious stones gathered together and classified as in a museum; in

* Article in *Encyc. Brit.*

Luke they are like pebbles scattered on a gravel bank by a river side. Which of the two evangelists comes the nearer to the original order of the source? Probably Luke. In all likelihood the source whence they drew the saying of Jesus consisted largely of a collection of aphorisms. Discourses, however, or groups of connected sayings were, there is reason to believe, not wanting. Of such discourses we have one sample in the Sermon on the Mount, which appears as a connected utterance in Luke as well as in Matthew, though much abbreviated. It is probable that, in the rule, the connected utterances of our Lord were shorter than they appear in the first gospel.

Certain sayings of our Lord are found repeated both in the first and in the third gospels, but chiefly in the first. For an instance we may refer to the saying concerning cutting off an offending member, which occurs first at Matt. v. 29, 30, and is repeated at Matt. xviii. 8, 9. How are such repetitions to be accounted for? Naturally enough by the assumption that they were actually spoken by Christ on two different occasions. Repeated utterance of great moral aphorisms is in itself not only possible but probable. It is the way of the wise. How often is substantially the same idea repeated in the thought of Marcus Aurelius! This simple explanation, however, does not commend itself to German critics. Hermann Weisse suggested that these repetitions were due to the saying being found in the two sources used by the evangelists, in the original of Mark, and also in the collection of *logia* used by Matthew and Luke. Thus the saying concerning cutting off the offending member is supposed to have been taken from the *Logia* when used in the Sermon on the Mount by Matthew, and from the common source of the three Synoptical Gospels when reproduced by the first evangelist in the eighteenth chapter of his gospel. Holtzmann eagerly adopted this ingenious suggestion of his predecessor, and made use of these repetitions, *Doubletten* he called them, to verify the theory of two sources, A used by all three synoptics, and *A* by the first and third. Not only so, but he applied the principle to *deeds* as well as to words, employing it to account for the doubling of the demoniac of Gadara, and of the blind man of Jericho in Matthew's narrative. That is to say, Matthew is supposed to have two demoniacs at Gadara, because he had omitted a similar case found in an earlier part of his source (Mark i. 21-28, in the synagogue of Capernaum), and two blind men at Jericho, because he had omitted the cure of a blind man at Bethsaida reported in the same source (Mark viii. 22). Our readers will probably think that we have here an illustration of the "rigor and vigor" which Mr. Matthew Arnold sarcastically ascribes to German critics generally.

Having had occasion, at a certain point in the foregoing statement, to contrast the views of Dr. Holtzmann and Dr. Bernhard Weiss, it may be well, before closing, to indicate more fully the precise difference between the two distinguished scholars in their respective solutions of the Synoptical Problem. Holtzmann, as we have seen, contended for two sources: one A (Urmarkus), drawn upon in common by all three synoptical evangelists, the other *A* (collection of logia, Papias' Matthew), used by the first and third evangelists, not by the second. Weiss, as already stated, does not believe in an Urmarkus, but contends that our canonical Mark was itself an original source, whence Matthew and Luke drew the material they have in common with the second evangelist. On the other hand, he believes that the other source, whence, according to Holtzmann, Matthew and Luke drew the material common to them, was accessible to Mark also, and was used by him, though much more sparingly than by his brother evangelists. This second source Weiss describes as an apostolic document, no longer extant, having, according to patristic tradition, Matthew for its author, and consisting mainly, though not exclusively, of sayings of Jesus, embracing, along with the weightiest sayings, the most prominent events. Mark first undertook the task of writing a full narrative of the memorabilia of Christ's ministry, and for this purpose employed this apostolic document, drawing besides on the oral traditions of an eye-witness, Peter. This work of Mark, our second gospel, the compilers of the first and third gospels had before them, and with the aid of it and of the other (apostolic) document they constructed their respective narratives independently of each other. An Urmarkus source for all the three synoptics, a collection of logia source for the first and third only; our Mark a source for Matthew and Luke, and an apostolic document chiefly consisting of logia, a source for all the three—such is the state of the question as between the two authorities. The decision of the question turns ultimately on a careful examination of the texts, phrase by phrase, to discern, if possible, what is primary or original, and what secondary. The commentaries of Weiss on the first two gospels were written not merely for the purpose of expounding each gospel by itself, but also with a view to the solution of the critical problem by a continuous process of comparison. Any one desiring to obtain insight into the whole bearings of the question, and the detailed criticism on which its settlement depends, cannot do better than read those two works of Weiss along with that of Holtzmann so often referred to in this article, whose epoch-making value Weiss frankly acknowledges.*

* At the commencement of this article I hinted at a possible *third* source for the numerous passages peculiar to Luke. Such a hypothesis Holtzmann regarded as unnecessary. He *thinks* Luke

Some may be disposed to excuse themselves from the laborious task by asking, Is the game worth the candle? What end can these critical inquiries serve? What can they result in but a *docta ignorantia*? Such invidious questions we are not careful to answer, for the answer is not likely to have much influence on the persons who ask them. But a sufficiently satisfactory reply may be given. In the first place, even if the critical question should turn out to be insoluble, much useful knowledge may be acquired in the attempt to solve it,—knowledge useful even for edification and for homiletic purposes. Augustine relates that when first he went to hear Ambrose preach in Milan Cathedral, it was with a desire to learn not what he spoke, but how he spoke. But as he listened with the ear of a rhetorician to how the bishop spoke, insensibly what he spoke insinuated itself into his mind; till at length curious interest in eloquence gave place to religious interest in the truth. In like manner may critical studies have for their secondary unintended result a much more exact acquaintance with the text of Scripture than is likely to be possessed by one who thinks only and always of mere edification in the narrowest sense of the term. But a more tangible and definite result of the critical study of synoptical problems may be pointed to. We have seen that there is a growing convergence of opinion in favor of Mark's originality, or comparative proximity to the primitive evangelic tradition; insomuch that there is a good hope of this coming, ere long, to be a generally accepted outcome of critical investigation. Will it not be something of real value that the second gospel should be finally delivered from the injurious prejudice inseparable from the hypothesis of posteriority and dependence, viz., that it is a gospel every way inferior to its companions, and comparatively useless—a moon whose light is dimmed by the presence of the sun? This prejudice is as old as the Christian fathers, and found expression in various disparaging phrases, as when Mark's gospel was distinguished as the short gospel, and Mark himself was represented as a *pedissequus* to Matthew, or nicknamed the "stump-fingered."* The prejudice breeds neglect both in the study and in the pulpit, as we can testify from personal experience,—having held the traditional opinion till more careful study compelled us to abandon it. Mark must appear a very poor gospel when it is supposed to be made down from the other synoptical gospels by omission of very important parts. But it is a very

found all those passages in A. Matthew did not exhaust this source, but used only as much of it as his plan enabled him to assimilate. His grouping method hampered him. Luke, on the other hand, could use all because his work was a miscellany that could be extended at pleasure. Every fragment could be introduced into the long interpolation. *Vid.* Die Synoptischen Evangelien, p. 141.

* Μάρκος ὁ κολοβοδάκτυλος quoted by Keim, Jesu von Nazara I., p. 85, note 6.

good gospel to begin with; a most interesting gospel if it stands nearest to the fountain head, and presents to us in its purest form the primitive evangelic tradition. As a secondary derivative gospel compiled by one who had Matthew and Luke before him, Mark may well appear altogether a puzzle and a mystery. How could any one, we are prone to inquire, with these fuller records before him, omit such precious material as the many sayings of Jesus recorded in varied forms by the first and third evangelists? This may, indeed, be regarded as a difficult problem on any view of the origin and date of the second gospel. But it is much easier to suggest a satisfactory explanation on the view we have advocated, than on the opposite hypothesis of Griesbach. There is force, *e. g.*, in the suggestion of Weizsächer that the absence of the didactic element from Mark's gospel is to be accounted for by the consideration that the specialty of Jesus was not that he was a *Rabbi*, but that he was the *Messiah*, and that to prove the latter position miracles were of more importance than wise sayings. "Had Jesus," this writer remarks, "been nothing more than a great Jewish teacher, the only records concerning him would have been a collection of *logia*; at most, along with his sayings, would have been combined the anecdotes which explained the occasion of their utterance. But Jesus was from the first more than this to his followers: He was to them the Messiah whom God had shown to be such by his deeds. . . . And so arose the problem not only to preserve his wise sayings, but also his deeds, and through these to justify this faith in his person, and this was the proper gospel, the gospel of the apostolic mission."* The second gospel had for its object to supply this proof; and in the fact that it confines itself to this task, and to a large extent omits the words of Jesus, Weizsächer finds, and not without reason, strong evidence of its very early origin.

ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE.

* *Untersuchungen über die Evangelische Geschichte.* 1864.

IV.

THE TRANSITION IN ENGLISH POETRY FROM POPE TO BURNS.

THE history of a nation's literature may be justly divided into periods of comparative permanence and periods of transition. As far as the history of English Literature is concerned, the first series of periods may be said to include the eras of Chaucer, Spenser, Pope, Burns, and Tennyson.

They are, in every true sense, *established*. As to their historical limits, the authors who adorn them, the forms of poetry which they respectively exhibit, and the causes of their permanence, they may be studied as periods complete in themselves. Whatever their relation to that which precedes and follows, they are so fixed in character and outline as to admit of careful investigation on the part of the literary student and yield invaluable results for scholarly reference. They have, therefore, been made the subject of critical study on the part of all who have taken in hand the explanation of our literary history, and may be said to be substantially understood. Not so, however, with the periods of transition, which in many of their aspects are as full of interest and valuable suggestion as the more permanent ones. Why they are so numerous and, often, so protracted; why they so often occur simultaneously in different nations; why they are now from the worse to the better and now the reverse; why with all their want of regularity they seem to proceed somewhat by historical and logical method, and why, though generally explainable, some of them defy all attempts at solution—such are some of the many questions that arise as we study them. While from the very fact that they are transitional, they have been neglected, it is also because of this very fact that they have a peculiar attraction and import. Transitional as they are, they have a character, content, and history of their own, whose careful study will amply repay us. So important, moreover, are they in their historical and philosophical connections with the eras before and after them, that they often hold in possession the only key which will open the full explanation of

these eras. This is signally true in our own literature, and just here lies at present one of the most attractive lines of study for the English scholar. The judicious and critical Hallam, in referring to the general history of the European mind, is speaking of these very transitions in literature when he says: "There is, in fact, no security, as far as the past history of mankind assures us, that any nation will be uniformly progressive in science, arts, and letters."* Such a remark is made from no improper views as to the reign of Providence or the ultimate triumph of truth in the earth, but rather from the undeniable fact of change in all that is human. These transitions are as natural as life itself, and must be taken into account by all who hope to give a true interpretation of the human mind as expressed in literature. They serve to illustrate what Mr. Disraeli has called "Crises and Reactions";† and did they not occur, would seem to point to something abnormal in the growth of Letters.

As to English Literature, and with special reference to our present purpose, these transitional epochs down to modern times may be thus stated: Chaucer to Spenser and Milton; Milton to Pope; Pope to Burns.

The first extends over two centuries, from the reign of Edward II. to that of Elizabeth and James I., and was a transition from the highest form of descriptive verse as given in the "Canterbury Tales," to the highest form of creative verse, as given in the dramas and epics of Shakespeare and Milton.

The second extends through the larger part of the seventeenth century, from the reign of Charles I. to that of William and Mary, and was a transition from the creative to the critical, as seen in the writings of Dryden and Pope.

The third extends from the reign of Anne far into the reign of George III., and was a transition from the critical to the impassioned, as seen in the poetry of Cowper, Thompson, and Burns.

It is to this last transition, from Pope to Burns, that we propose to give special attention, noticing in order its *character*, its historical *causes*, and some *suggestions* of interest to which the discussion gives rise.

I.—THE CHARACTER OF THE TRANSITION.

This may be briefly expressed in the fact that it was a change from form to feeling, from the artificial to the natural. Prof. Conington, in his scholarly essay upon the Poetry of Pope, remarks: "It is a

* Hallam's "Literary History," Vol. I., p. 130.

† D'Israeli's "Amenities of Literature," Vol. I., p. 286.

curious circumstance that the advice which was given by Walsh to Pope—"to be correct in his writing"—was precisely the advice which Horace gave to his countrymen."* The thought is, that the Horatian idea of poetry was different from that which had preceded it in laying more decided emphasis upon the external form of literature. The Roman satirist cautions his countrymen against what might be called, a wild profusion of ideas at the expense of literary finish, and holds it to be the mark of a genuine poet to express himself with elegance. He rebukes the pride of Lucilius in boasting that he had produced two hundred verses in an hour. In this particular, the analogy between the age of Horace in Latin Letters, and that of Pope in English, is somewhat suggestive; while the title—Augustan—applied to the latter, is thus far appropriate in that special reference is made to the outer structure of verse. It was the age of the English Academy, as that of Richelieu was of the French. For this corrective work Dryden prepared the way. To it Pope was born and bred. Never were the historical tendencies of an age and the natural tendencies of a poet more accordant. Pope knew his one best talent, and interpreted aright the meaning of the time, so that he was the one undisputed master, in his day, of poetic form. "We had some great poets," said Walsh to Pope, "but we never had one great poet that was *correct*."† The critical versifier at once accepted the suggestion, and devoted himself to verse as an *art*—to the study and practice of versification. He showed the timeliness of his newly accepted mission by noting the absence of this element in former poets.

" For Otway failed to polish or refine,
And fluent Shakespeare scarce effaced a line;
E'en copious Dryden wanted or forgot
That last and greatest art—the art to blot." ‡

Pope insisted that in every literature there is the need of a critical era. If such an era cannot coexist with the creative, and authors of high inventive power cannot sit in judgment upon their own writings, then, as he argued, other minds must appear, less gifted in genius, but more gifted in critical judgment, and do the work of literary censors. He held that there was such a thing as genius in poetic art, and could not endorse the remark so often made by literary historians, that a critical age is a necessary prelude to the decay of literature. If the critical era be subordinate to the original era of which it is the judge, if the criticism itself gathers its principles from nature and aims

* Carruthers' "Life of Pope," pp. 33, 299.

† Carruthers' "Life of Pope," p. 33.

‡ Pope's Poetical Works (Globe Edition), p. 313.

at the highest ends, then, he argued, the results could not but be beneficent. Such formal ages as these, he added, would seem to have their place in literature as restraints upon the excesses of more imaginative periods. A purely original age altogether devoid of the restraints of art may be said to have within it, according to Pope, some of the elements of its own destruction. Though in themselves they are epochs of inferiority, they still have a function to perform in the general development of letters.

Critical periods, however, we submit, as all others, come to the limit of their usefulness in due time, and must give place to better things. If Pope was doing a safe and necessary work in literature, scores of second and third rate imitators were bringing the very name of criticism into disrepute, and awakening the just indignation of all true minds. Diction was magnified above thought, and method took the place of inspiration. Much of the poetry lost its distinctive character as such, and descended to an inferior quality of prose. Verses were trimmed and fashioned to order in accordance with the latest dicta of the schools. There was a drama extensive enough to absorb the attention of pleasure-seekers, and yet nothing to remind one of Marlowe or of Johnson. There was an abundance of descriptive poetry, but nothing above the commonplace. All was correct enough, and too correct. Dryden well expresses the vice of the time, as he calls it the age—

“ When critics weigh
Each line and every word throughout a play
Our age was cultivated, thus, at length
But what we gained in skill we lost in strength,
Our builders were with want of genius cursed,
The second temple was not like the first.
Poets, like lovers, should be bold and dare,
They spoil their business with an over-care.
And he who servilely creeps after sense
Is safe, but ne’er will reach to excellence.
Time, place, and action may with pains be taught,
But genius must be born, and never can be taught.” *

In the nature of the case, such a literature could not be permanent. If passion were at all evinced it was on the basis of some prescribed formula, so that the heart of the passion was taken out of it. In fact, the Augustan Age was not an age for poetry in its best form, but for political and periodical prose, so that when poetry was attempted it was didactic rather than lyric, and vigor departed as correctness entered. Hence, the few ambitious poets of the time were in eager search for poetic freedom. They felt that the strictly critical period,

* Scott's edition of Dryden, Vol. XI., Epistle 12.

even at its best, had done its appointed work, and that the call for a different order of things could not pass unheeded. Light descriptive sketching must take the place of studied monotony in verse, as expressed in satire. There must be the yielding of precedent to progress, and the language of the heart must assert its supremacy. On all sides there must be flexibility, new and wide departures from traditional restraints, a standard of poetic excellence sufficiently adaptive to give the fullest scope to the personality of the poet. The main error by which this transition was occasioned, and against which it protested, was the imperious demand that the poet should surrender his individuality to the rules of this or that poetic teacher, and be anybody but himself.

The heart, after all, is the central power in human history, in life and in literature, and though for a time suppressed in its action, is sure at length to assert itself, and even more vigorously than before. It is of this reaction to poetic freedom and feeling that Mr. Taine speaks: "At length poetry has again become life-like; we no longer listen to words, but we feel emotions. It is no longer an author but a man who speaks." * They could not, and would not, longer side with those who steadily set themselves against the natural expression of emotion in verse. They sighed for the child-like simplicity of Chaucer's time, and could not but remember with regret the uncurbed liberty of Elizabethan days. Even in the interval between Milton and Dryden, a true literary freedom was more or less enjoyed, and as the bounds of human progress were widening in all directions, and the human mind was freer than ever, they felt that the poetry of the immediate future must be in sympathy with the time and become a true exponent of its innermost character and life.

II.—THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE TRANSITION.

Among these causes, as more specific, we notice briefly: (1) The Influence of Germany upon England. With the first classical period in German Literature (1190-1300)—the period of the *Minnesänger*—we have little, if anything, to do, inasmuch as it occurred previous to the settlement of our literature as national. The second classical period (1760-1830) is almost identical in its limits with the Impassioned Era in England. Hence, its influence would be marked as to degree and character. Here we find the six most illustrious names of German poetry—Klopstock, Lessing, Wieland, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe. Their most notable followers also are found here—Lavater, Nicolai

* Taine's "English Literature," Chap. XVI., p. 415.

Müller, Richter, Uhland, Tieck, Novalis, and the brothers Schlegel. Such an order of poetical talent as this would create its own most fitting opportunities, and taking into account the historic relations of the two nations, nothing is more natural than the results that we see. English authors, fully aware of the literary treasures across the channel, eagerly resorted thither to bring them to Britain. Thus we find Coleridge, in 1798, a member of the University at Göttingen. Returning to England, the influence of German study is sufficiently attested by his translation of Schiller's "Wallenstein," and by his calling the special attention of British scholars to the prevailing philosophy of Germany. We find Sir Walter Scott also thoroughly aroused by the newly awakened interest in German literature prevalent in Edinburgh. Becoming versed in the language, he applied himself at once to the work of translation in the "Lenore" of Bürger; the "Erl König" and "Götz von Berlichingen" of Göethe. Among the works of Shelley, we note translations from Faust, while upon Southey and Wordsworth the same influence is evident. This being so, the question of special interest is, how this became a help to English poetry in the sphere of passion. The answer is partly found in the fact that English thought in all departments was quickened by contact with Germany. The German mind, even in its criticisms and speculations, is creative and original rather than imitative, calling into play at every point all the discerning and suggestive powers of the soul. The influence was thus stimulating, calling the poets of the time away from slavish adherence to any school or literary formula, and bidding them seek a wider and freer range. The effect was all in the direction of feeling rather than form. This love of the emotional is clearly seen in the conflict waged between the schools of Gottsched and Bodmer in Germany, with their centres respectively at Leipsic and Zurich. The one contended for the poetry of form, the other for that of spirit and power. The one was the school of imitation and of culture based on Gallic models; the other, the school of passion and imagination, based on natural feeling. It was the old historic struggle of the letter and the spirit, and the fact of interest is, that as in England so in Germany, the literature of the spirit prevailed. The lyric beauty of the early Minnelieder reappears in Schiller, gives an impassioned character to the poetry ever after, and impresses itself upon the poetry of England. The formal laws of the schools had given place to nature and human life, and the literature of Britain was just ready to receive what Germany was ready to give—a poetry of the heart.

(2) A second and more potent cause of the new awakening is found, as we think, in the Revolutionary character of the times. The erratic

Rousseau did not have reference to his own country simply when he wrote, "We are drawing near to a state of crisis—an age of revolution." Such a period was far too practical in its working and far too evident in its origin to be concealed. All Europe was more or less interested in the issues. As far back as the downfall of the Roman Empire its history is traceable. At the opening of European civilization after the Middle Ages, its presence is apparent, while all along the line of English development it is also visible. In the struggle between Saxon and Norman; between the Barons and the King at Runnymede; in the times of Elizabeth and of Charles we see it, until, in the Revolution of 1688, royal prerogative yields to popular privilege, and English liberties are, for the first time, permanently adjusted. The benefits, however, thus secured were too pronounced to be enjoyed with moderation by England. She soon begins the abuse of her freedom, and once more, at least, a revolution is needed to impress upon the British mind the true relation of government and people. The question of moment, therefore, is, How was the poetry of the time, as impassioned, affected by the history of the time? That English poetry was greatly modified by such a history cannot be doubted. We find Wordsworth a traveller in France at the very time of the Revolution, coming fully into sympathy with the popular movement and evincing in all his subsequent writing the effect of the contact. Coleridge is at Bristol lecturing on politics. Southey, radical and conservative in turn, wrote and spoke on the questions of the hour. In noting the more particular features of this influence in the line of the emotive we remark—

(a). That the issues now at stake were urgent and practical. We read in the biography of Wordsworth the interesting fact that while sojourning in France in revolutionary days, the special motive of his change from English conservatism to republicanism was, that he seemed to discern in this French national movement the ardent desire of the people for political liberty. There was a something here that appealed to all the sympathies of the poet's nature. Forgetting, for the moment, the wild excesses to which the nation was advancing, he is glad to lend his personal indorsement. In this cry for freedom, and struggle toward it, there was a deep and genuine emotive element, and its effect upon poetry was most significant. The voice of the people must ever be heard above the counsels of kings and cabinets. The authors of the age apprehend, at once, the meaning of the hour, and English poetry is henceforth to be of and to the people.

(b). By far the most important benefit accruing to the reviving lit-

erature from the political agitations of the time is seen in the fact that it was a time of *change*. The spirit of inquiry was awakened in all the departments of human thought. In Natural Science the work of the Royal Society was being zealously done. In Theology, there were special discussions by Clarke, Butler, and Warburton. In Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," Social Science may be said to have taken its origin, while it was closely followed by the "Fragments" of Bentham, and later by the works of Malthus and Ricardo. In Jurisprudence, Blackstone was preparing his great commentary on the Laws of England; Burke and Blair, Alison and Jeffrey were discussing the principles of æsthetic art, while Hume and Robertson and Gibbon were writing civil history. It was, however, in the domain of mental and moral philosophy that this spirit of inquiry was specially manifest; Hume wrote his "Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding." A few years later, Reid followed with his "Inquiry into the Human Mind," while he is ably supplemented by Stewart and the Scottish school. From France, Locke's philosophy is returned with foreign perversions, to which are added the dangerous theories of Bolingbroke and Rousseau. Early in the century, Berkeley had given to the world his Ideal Philosophy. Toward the middle of the century Hartley appeared with his Philosophy of Association, while near its close we see the skeptical philosophy of Gibbon, the rationalism of Paine, and the gross materialism of Priestly. In the line of foreign philosophy as bearing upon British thought, there are two sets of influences. The one was started and maintained by the critical discussions of Kant, and the other, by the encyclopædists of France, who began in doubt and ended in the bold denial of all moral truth. Catching its spirit from the teachings of Voltaire, it desired to construct a system fully in keeping with the reorganizing spirit of the time. It was successful in this, in so far as its prominent idea was the discovery and diffusion of knowledge. Such, in brief, was the age—an age of bold and rapid experiment, an age of revolution and excitement. The poets were seeking what all others were seeking—a breaking down of the old landmarks, and an establishment of new standards. The change in literature, and more especially in poetry, was as great as in any other sphere—the change from criticism to passion.

(3). We may mention as a third and suggestive cause of this transition—

THE REVIVAL OF EARLY ENGLISH POETRY.

Such an attempt to reingraft the older poetry into the body of the later was not confined to the closing years of the eighteenth century, al-

though it was now, for the first time, fully successful. Chaucer looks back of English literature as national to the days of Layamon. Spenser glories in drinking deeply from the well of Chaucer. In Milton's "L'Allegro" and "Comus" the influence of the olden time is most manifest, and he goes so far as to write a history of Saxon England. John Dryden, critical and classical as he was, is never weary of commending to his readers the pages of the earlier authors, while to many of our minor poets it was nothing less than their poetical education to study these primitive bards. In 1765, Percy's "Relics of Ancient English Poetry" was published. A few years later, Thomas Warton issued a "History of English Poetry," which, as it ends before the close of Spenser's time, may justly be called a History of Early English Poetry. Later still, Ritson produced his "Ancient Popular Poetry," while various authors of lesser note were busily at work in the same direction. Allusion may here be made to the celebrated forgeries by Chatterton and McPherson, since these were partially induced by a growing interest in the older poetry. These over-ambitious writers felt that if they were to be in sympathy with the age and secure a general patronage, the old must be revived. This explains, in part, why such a gifted intellect as that of Chatterton should be under the necessity of borrowing the name of Rowley, or McPherson that of Ossian. Readers were waiting to be carried back to the days of Celtic and Scottish song. The Athenian cry for something new gave way to the British cry for the old, and the merry minstrels of yore once again went about with harp and song. The people listened to the romantic story of Sir Cauline and Christabelle, and to the daring exploits of Robin Hood against the exactions of the Norman Lords. Those quaint old tales are revived on the basis of which Shakespeare has constructed some of his works. The "Gentle Herdsman" is reproduced in the "Hermit" of Goldsmith, while we hear such familiar snatches as, "The Nut Brown Maid," "The Wandering Jew," "St. George and the Dragon," and "Fair Rosamond." Most especially, the old religious or reformation ballads in the life and passion and death of Christ were reproduced, and the people hailed their reappearing. We can but slightly appreciate in these times the charm connected with these earlier poems. Even the statesmen of the day were affected by the enthusiasm. Referring especially to the work of Percy, Wordsworth writes: "I do not think there is an able writer in verse of the present day who would not be proud to acknowledge his obligations to 'The Reliques.'" Of the same volume Scott confesses that it awoke within him an insatiable passion for the old, and at no period in our history have the

poets and the people of all classes been so essentially one in their literary likes and dislikes. The era was in every respect a true Renaissance in English Letters, as much so as that of the fifteenth century in general knowledge. It was the Golden Age of impassioned verse, so fully in accord with the temper of the time that we might gather from a perusal of the poetry the substantial history of the era. The movers in the great revival felt as if they had been ignorant of the lyric resources of English, and that the time had come modestly and, yet, decisively to assert the independence of British Letters and the vital connection—historic and moral—of the earliest and the latest ages of our literature. It is to the genuine poetic passion of this school of poets that Mr. Whipple refers in his able review of American Letters in the last century, as he says: "Most of these eminent men were not only writers but powers; they communicated spiritual life to the soul, touching the profoundest sources of reason and emotion." *

With them poetic feeling was, to the last degree, natural and not feigned; it was simple, deep, and fervent. Because it was in them as a part of their very life, it must be uttered to the people. Out of the fullness of their hearts they sang as they sang, and no literature of ancient or modern times can exhibit a more vigorous expression of true poetic passion than that which we see in English Letters from the days of Burns on to the opening of the more recent school of metrical and verbal finish. Robert Burns was himself the central figure of the romantic era, and marked in his verse the highest point which genuine poetic inspiration can reach. He wrote no epic, and, perchance, could have written none. He had not the "vision and faculty divine" in the same sense in which Milton had it, but still he had it. He was a genius in lyric song as Milton was in epic, and in so far as natural, poetic instinct and genuine poetic emotion are concerned, has no peer in English verse. He could not but be natural.

In closing this discussion, a suggestion or two of interest arises:—
a. We note the importance of the *impassioned element* in poetry.

It is safe to say that the lyric element is as essential to the inner character of poetry as metre is essential to its form. Even in the highest examples of creative verse, so necessary is the presence of this element that it makes the dividing line between the two orders of verse an extremely delicate one, and, at times, well-nigh invisible. In fine, if we reduce terms to their last analysis and mean precisely what we say, we must regard poetry as essentially impassioned. The differentia of verse as to its quality is, that it is *emotional*. Hence,

* "First Century of the Republic—Essay on American Literature."

it is not strange that so many critics have defined poetry in terms of the impassioned element. Byron speaks of it as the "feeling" of past and future worlds. Milton terms it "sensuous and passionate." Aristotle calls it an imitative art, imitative of the manners and "passions" of men; while John Stuart Mill, viewing it as the influence of feeling over thought, holds that feeling is the prime element in all poetry. In the light of such criticism it is naturally an open question with some as to the comparative importance of the epic and the lyric. It is urged by them that the precedence of the creative has been accepted rather than proved; that as the lyric is the oldest, simplest, and most frequent form of poetic expression, so it is the most characteristic and, in that sense, the highest form; that Milton's *L'Allegro* answers more fully to the true ideal of poetry than either of his epics. If it be objected to such a view that the door is thus opened for the indulgence of vapid sentiment and the subjection of intellect to impulse, it is answered that if the emotion be simple, genuine, and profound, there can be no danger in the line of the purely sensational. It is not our purpose to endorse this extreme view as to the rank of lyric verse. As long as the intellectual is superior to the emotional, any form of discourse in which it is prominent must, for that reason, claim superiority. It is especially important to maintain this position in the present age when the tendency to meaningless verse is so strong. There is another extreme, however, against which we are to guard. It is too often assumed that in lyric poetry feeling and intellect are always in the inverse ratio; that lyric verse is thereby devoid of mental life and has no higher purpose than the expression of shallow emotion for trivial ends. The school of poetry before us is a sufficient answer to this superficial theory. Arising at a time when the thoughts of all men were necessarily turned to living issues and indifference or unnaturalness could not be brooked, there is the utter absence of the conventional and superficial. The poetry of the era is as fresh and tonic as the air of an October morning, and the master bards of the time are examples of all that is healthful and stimulating. The difference between creative and impassioned verse is not that the one is intellectual and the other emotional, but that each being under the supremacy of mind, there is a freer play of the emotional in the latter, a more direct expression of heart-life and a somewhat wider departure from established literary law. So long as the lyric portion of our poetry is what it is, and the impassioned lines of Burns and Scott are kept vividly in mind, the different forms of poetry will be assigned their proper respective rank, and the charge of mental weakness be fully met as applied to the poetry of feeling. Oratory has been de-

finied as "Thought with an impulse in it."* If we add the characteristic of metre, the definition will apply to lyric verse. It is the metrical expression of ideas in impassioned forms.

b. What will probably be the next important transition in English poetry? Our poetry may be said still to retain something of its main characteristic as a poetry of feeling, distinct, on the one hand, from the creative school of Elizabethan times, and, on the other, from the critical school of Queen Anne. The true poetic passion which poured into the language through the writings of Goldsmith and Thomson, of Cowper and Burns, is to some degree exhibited in many of their immediate successors. This is especially seen in the writings of Byron, Scott, and Moore. They were impassioned in the same sense and to the same degree in which Burns was—the very name, romantic, as applied to the school of Byron, marking it sharply from all that is conventional and formal. The noon-day glory of this poetry of true sentiment is no sooner reached, however, than we can see the signs of its temporary reign and possible decline. Even the Lake Poets are reflective in their verse rather than emotional. Though it was their purpose and their pride to write in the interests of human life and the beauties of natural scenery, the cast of the lines is too contemplative to admit of the freest expression of feeling or to remind one in any striking manner of lyric ardor. Just at this time, moreover, in the very heart of the era, arose, what with justice may be called, the revival of the poetry of Pope in real Augustan form. We see this in the classical school of Gifford, Rogers, Campbell, and Landor—no one of whom, whatever his lyric fervor may have been, at all approached the natural sentiment of Byron. Glancing down the line of our more modern English poets the same critical order of verse is too apparent to be without its prophetic teaching. The very names applied by literary historians to these modern schools—the Alexandrine, the Androtheistic, the Realistic, and the Art Schools—teach the same lesson. We plainly see this classical bias in Keats and Rossetti; in Robert Browning and Swinburne; in Arnold, and, to some degree, in Tennyson. Mrs. Browning is the only one who, in this later era, reminds us of the deep pathos of the earlier. All this is suggestive, and gives us fair warning, that since the days of Scott a transition has been in progress from the impassioned order of poetry. Is the transition to be toward the creative school of Shakespeare or the critical school of Pope? If to either, manifestly to the latter. Judged on the side of high thinking and deep feeling, Modern English Poetry, it must be confessed, is on the decline, and we sigh in vain

* Theremin's Rhetoric (Shedd), Introductory Essay.

for the return of Milton and of Burns. With all our prejudice in favor of England's Laureate, we cannot rank him among creative bards of the first order, while he too frequently allows the entrance of mere descriptive or verbal art to usurp the place of genuine poetic fervor. As well remarked—"He applies the rule and compass to everything he takes in hand simply because his conceptions are of that sort which depend for their effect on minuteness of detail and elaborateness of finish." * The tendency, then, is straight toward the external and formal, arising, partly, from the actual decrease of poetic power in our leading poets, and, mainly, from the repressive effects of the speculative influences of the time upon the poetry of the time. We have alluded to this subject in a recent article in this REVIEW upon a kindred topic.† It is here in place to reassert it, that the prevailing skeptical thought of the day, in so far as it affects literature and poetic production, tends to deaden rather than to develop genius and fervor. It calls for an order of verse in which criticism is to take the place of originality, and external form that of inward power. The transition going on before us is from the impassioned through the descriptive back to the textual and verbal. When the days of Elizabethan verse, strangely prophesied by Morley as near at hand, are again to dawn upon England, no human ken can foresee. There will be the dawning, first, of a more healthful popular philosophy and a more unselfish loyalty to the dearest and deepest moral instincts of men. It may be that this new and better era will make its literary record in America's second century and on American soil.

T. W. HUNT.

* Devey's "Modern English Poets," p. 282.

† PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, July, 1881.

V.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PURITANISM.

PURITANISM was the great religious force of the seventeenth century, the most powerful influence in British thought and life since the Reformation. It was indeed the Protestantism of the Reformation in a new form,—in a higher and grander manifestation. The Reformation in Great Britain was an irresistible movement of the people. It was combated by monarchs, princes, and prelates. It was restrained, so far as possible, by the authorities in church and state. Every effort was put forth to constrain it into prescribed channels. There was a long and intense struggle between the new life and the old forms it was forced to wear. That struggle grew fiercer and fiercer. It became a life-and-death combat. The monarchs and their prelates raised their determination to the pitch of tyranny and despotism. They undertook to crush evangelical liberty and to clothe the Protestant spirit in a semi-Papal uniform. But when patience ceased to be a virtue and endurance reached its climax, the youthful energy and indomitable life of Puritanism burst the bands, cast off the compromising dresses, and monarch and prelates went down in the common ruin.

As a mountain stream springing forth from a deep perennial fountain, strengthened in its progress by numberless brooks and swollen by oft-repeated rains, rises higher and higher, becomes stronger and stronger; the narrow banks press its waters more compactly together; the barriers erected by man to check its flow and utilize its powers, mass its energies for the supreme moment. The last effort of resistance has been made. The flood laughs at any further restraint. It leaps upon the barriers and throws them aside with irresistible onset. It rejoices in its freedom. It spreads an overwhelming flood in all directions. It spends itself and subsides in its original and proper channel. It has wrought ruin to all that has resisted it. But it has enriched the land over which it has flowed with new life and vigor. Such is Puritanism in British History. It has ever been a life-giving stream from God. It has rejoiced in freedom as its birthright.

It has a religious energy such as can be found nowhere else. It has been a devastating force when men have presumed to check it. It was a wild, stormy flood in the times of the Commonwealth. It spent its strength in the enrichment of the national life. It made Great Britain and her colonies the grandest nation, yes, we may say the grandest nations of the world. For it made them above all things a bold, brave, God-fearing people. It enabled them to lead the van in civilization, in commerce, in the arts and sciences, in literature, and above all in social reform and in religious life. The Puritan era is the heroic age for Great Britain and for America. In it were the foundations laid for all that is noblest and best in subsequent times.

It is true it gave birth to a large number of conflicting sects which waged an unrelenting warfare with each other. A gangrene of heresies spread all over England. The stately robes of Anglo-Roman conformity were torn in shreds and every fragment gave birth to a new sect. But out of this vast complexity, this marvellous variety of Puritanism, the stately structure of British and American Christianity has been rising in higher and grander stages; for the unifying principle of Puritanism has been at work as the most potent force in Anglo-Saxon History; working through many generations of conflict, changing intolerance into *toleration*, and checking separation by *comprehension*. It aims, as we believe, at organic unity,—a unity not of uniformity or conformity; but a unity in variety, a unity such as we find in all the great works of God; a unity of life, of liberty, of progress; a unity which is the organizing force of a vast and complex organism, which will come to manifestation in the apex of a pyramid, embracing all the phases of evangelical Christianity. This organic principle of Puritanism is embedded in the great Puritan Symbol, the Westminster Confession of Faith:

“God alone is Lord of the Conscience and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in everything contrary to his word, or beside it in matters of faith or worship; so that to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commandments out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience and reason also.” (xx., 2.)

This principle of Puritanism was a growth of centuries, and it had to be wrought into the life and experience of the British people. This could only be brought about by conflict and suffering unto death. The history of Puritanism is a history of struggle for religious liberty. Puritanism is rich in martyrs. It has advanced, like early Christianity, through a series of persecutions. It has gained its victories with the blood and the nerves of its noblest and its best.

It has been well said that “England could produce no Luther in

the sixteenth century, simply because it had had its Luther already in the fourteenth.”*

John Wicklif was indeed the morning star of the Reformation, heralding its dawn. He struck at the root of the authority of the hierarchy in his principle of the supreme authority of the Scriptures. He gave us the flaming sword of God with which to conquer every form of Ecclesiasticism and Scholasticism when he said: “The Holy Spirit teacheth us the sense of Scripture as Christ opened the Scripture to His apostles.” Wicklif was sustained by potent influences, and passed to his grave in peace; but his followers, who went up and down preaching the gospel to the people of England, sealed their testimony with their blood, and became the front rank of the martyrs of Puritanism. A forlorn hope in the assault upon the battlements of Rome, they opened the way of liberty through the fire and the blood. The Reformation in England differs from the Reformation on the Continent in that it lacked a great heroic leader. There was no Luther or Zwingli or Calvin to lead the nation to evangelical faith and liberty. But England has the vastly greater honor of finding its chief reformer in a hunted man of the people, who gave himself, with self-sacrificing devotion, to the translation of the Word of God for the British nation,—William Tyndale, the martyr reformer, dying at the stake, October 6, 1536, with the prayer: “Lord, open the King of England’s eyes.” He was the true reformer for Great Britain, the man chosen of God to lead a Reform which was deeper, more thorough, longer in its sweep, higher in its range, grander in its destiny, than those branches of the Reformation which sprang from Wittenberg and Zurich. For Puritanism had in it a principle of Reform which was the most far-reaching of the principles of the Reformation. On this account it was doomed to martyrdom, for a series of generations, in order that by prolonged suffering for Christ and his truth the Puritans might become the more profoundly dependent upon God, the closer in fellowship with their Redeemer, the more resolute and athletic in the centuries of conflict before them. For it was the destiny of Puritanism to bear the banner of Evangelical progress to loftier heights long after the Protestantism of the Continent had become stereotyped in varied forms of Scholasticism.

The British reformation early divided itself into two antagonistic parties, the ecclesiastical or conservative party, and the popular or progressive party; the one would keep as near to Rome as possible; the other sought close conformity with the Reformed Churches of the Continent and a complete reformation.

* See Mitchell’s *Westminster Assembly*, p. 3; London, 1883.

The Puritan party secured the XXXIX Articles, the Prelatical party rallied around the Book of Common Prayer. The XXXIX Articles took its position among the Reformed Confessions. The Book of Common Prayer retained not a few of the forms of Papacy. This double and inconsistent standard became the bane of the Church of England.

The XXXIX Articles assumed the essential principle of Puritanism in the statement :

“Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.” (Art. VI.)

But this principle was outraged and violated by the Prelatical party at every stage of the conflict. For the Book of Common Prayer did require, in the Prelatical demand for uniformity, a large number of things which, assuredly, were not contained in Scripture, and which could not be deduced from Scripture. The Puritans took their stand on the 6th Article, and contended that the Romish and unscriptural things should be removed from the Prayer Book.

Bishops Coverdale, Latimer, Hooper, Farrar, and many others, Puritan ministers and laymen, followed Tyndale in martyrdom; but the blood of these martyrs became the seed of the church. The exiled Puritans went to Geneva, the head-quarters of the Reformation, and studied in the school of Calvin. They returned under Elizabeth a new generation to renew the struggle with fresh vigor. And then the Puritan conflict became intense. In Scotland it triumphed under the leadership of the bold and brave Knox. His Scottish Confession (1560) took the advanced Puritan position.

“As we believe and confesse the Scriptures of God sufficient to instruct and make the man of God perfite, so do we affirme and avow the authoritie of the same to be of God, neither to depend on men or angelis. We affirme, therefore, that sik as allege the Scripture to have no uther authoritie but that quhilk it has received from the Kirk, to be blasphemous against God, and injurious to the treu Kirk quhilk alwaies heares and obeyis the voice of her awin spouse and pastor, but takis not upon her to be maistres over the sammin.” (Art. XIX.)

Here the Scotch Confession advances beyond the Anglican and reaffirms the principle of Wicklif; for the Anglican Confession, while it affirms the sole authority of Scripture, bases the canon of Scripture on the authority of church tradition, and leaves its interpretation undefined; whereas the Puritan position lodges the authority of the Bible in itself. God in it speaks the authoritative voice to believers, determining the canon and its interpretation. The Scottish reformation was carried through in doctrine, discipline, and worship. Knox's

book of Common Order displaced the Mass book; Presbytery took the place of Papacy. The Scottish nation as a nation was reformed. In England it was far different. The leader of the English Elizabethan Puritanism was Thomas Cartwright; and he was required to pursue the path of suffering opened up by the Puritan worthies that preceded him. And yet he waged a brave, earnest, and persistent struggle against arbitrary and tyrannical prelatical rule. The Puritans, with few exceptions, were not put to death under Elizabeth by fire and sword, but they were deprived, fined, imprisoned, exiled, and abused in a fashion that was worse than death. But all this persecution could not accomplish its purpose. Nonconformity increased; the better part of the laity sympathized with their deprived pastors, and declined to conform. The nation was more and more alienated from the Prelates and became Puritan.

It is important that we should carefully note the application of the Puritan principle to the conformity that the Romanizing Prelates strove to force upon them. But we should always remember that a noble line of Puritan prelates continued to protect and encourage Puritanism as much as possible.

Puritanism adopted the three great principles of the Reformation: (1) Justification by faith alone; (2) Salvation by grace alone; (3) The authority of the Word of God alone. These three principles, while held by all branches of the Reformation, were differently emphasized by the different churches. The Lutheran Reformation emphasized justification by faith *alone*, over against justification by works of ourselves or others. A living faith appropriates Christ as Saviour, and thereby receives the gift of justification. Faith *only* was the banner erected at Wittenberg about which the Germans rallied. The Swiss Reformation adopted this same principle, only it did not lay so much stress upon it as upon the second principle, salvation by grace alone. This brought about a difference between the Germans and Swiss in the article of faith. Lutherans made assurance of the essence of faith, but Calvinists distinguished between simple justifying faith and the assurance of faith which is the result of growth in grace.* The Lutherans were ever afraid of the doctrine of good works, lest it should undermine the doctrine of justification by faith only; but the Calvinists insisted upon evangelical obedience in connection with their doctrine of growth in faith. The Puritans agreed with the Calvinists here, only they improved the doctrine of good works in relation to repentance and sanctification. They urged that simple justi-

* Schneckenburger's *Vergleich. Darstell. d. Luth. und Reform. Lehrbegriffs*, Stuttgart, 1855, p. 108 *seq.*

fiying faith should grow to the attainment of infallible assurance of salvation, and that it should be associated with repentance into life. This was not a mere turning away from sin, but an appropriation of holiness; and so justification passes over into sanctification.*

The statements of the Westminster Confession on these doctrines transcend anything produced in the other Reformed symbols. They present the high-water mark of the flow of Protestantism—a grand ideal from which later Puritanism sadly declined, owing to the evil influence of a foreign scholasticism imported into it.†

The ethical element is one of the most characteristic elements of Puritanism. The Puritans were not content with the passive attitude of simple faith; they assumed the active attitude of working out their own salvation rooted in faith. Human life was to them a battle with indwelling sin and with external evil. They went into the conflict equipped with Scripture armor and weapons, and were assured of victory. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and *Holy War* are the culmination of a large number of writings on this subject. They are the most popular because they are in this respect the best exposition of the ethical side of Puritanism.

The ethical battle of Puritanism was fought about the Sabbath as a centre. This was forced by the *Book of Sports*. This book was issued by King James in 1618 "to encourage recreations and sports on the Lord's day." It discriminated between harmless and lawful sports, in which all good churchmen might engage, but from which Papists and Puritans were excluded, and unlawful sports. It seems incredible that Christian prelates should have endorsed such a book, and encouraged the violation of the Sunday in the way they did. The Puritan pastors preferred the law of their heavenly King to the book of their earthly monarch. Rather than transgress the 4th Commandment they gave up their livings and suffered fine and imprisonment. The Sabbath is the citadel of Puritan ethics. It is due to Puritanism alone that Britain and America enjoy the rest and peace and holy worship of the Lord's day. The forced struggle on this and other points gave the Puritan piety an Old Testament cast. They were impelled by circumstances to the brink of legalism. They did not sufficiently apprehend the different stages in the development of Biblical ethics. They imposed upon themselves and others not a few rigorous rules and irksome restraints which have made Puritanism to many a mark of bondage and Phariseism. But such mistakes are common to all great religious movements.‡ They were committed,

* See Lyford's *Plain Man's Sense Exercised*, London, 1655, p. 318, seq.

† *Westminster Confession*, Chapters XIV.-XVIII.

‡ Isaac Taylor, in his *Wesley and Methodism* (New York, 1852, p. 81), makes the following sig-

however, rather by their feeblers descendants than by the Puritan fathers. It is essential that we should distinguish between Puritan and Puritanical, between the original and genuine Puritan holiness and its later stereotyped and mechanical Puritanical caricature.

The Puritans were too much influenced by the Old Testament in proportion to the New Testament. They did not sufficiently apprehend the different stages in divine doctrine and morals; but they were faithful to the Word of God as they understood it. And even here they wrought out the doctrine of the Covenants. They introduced it as the structural principle of their theology. They gave the impulse to the Covenant theology of Holland which was the only means of resistance to the scholasticism of the 17th century, and the rallying point for a revival of theology in modern times.* Indeed, the Puritans could not be scholastics. The essential principle of Puritanism was the foe of all scholasticism and ecclesiasticism. The Puritans sought above all union and communion with God by a living faith and a growing faith. They desired above all things to be conformed to God's will; and so they resisted conforming to the prelates' will. Their ideal was a holy life in communion with God. This was the noble aspiration of Puritanism which has made British and American society the most ethical and upright, the most manly and godly society the world has yet seen. The reality and power of godliness have been displayed in Great Britain and her colonies more than in any other lands under heaven. In them religion has been a reality and a power for practical aggressive work in every department of religious and moral reform, and for the extension of the gospel throughout the world.

II. The essential principle of the Calvinistic reformation was salvation by divine grace alone over against the Sacraments, the church, and human instrumentalities of every kind. The Lutheran church believed in salvation by grace alone, but they tied the divine grace too closely to church and sacraments. The Reformed believed that the word, church and sacraments were ordinary means of grace, but that the divine grace itself was free and not confined to the ordinary means. The Calvinistic reformation, however, laid too much stress

nificant reflections: "But thus it is, and ever has been, that those who are sent by Heaven to bring about great and necessary movements, which, however, are, after a time, either to subside or to fall into a larger orbit, are left to the short-sightedness of their own minds in fastening upon their work some appendage (perhaps unobserved) which, after a cycle of revolutions, must secure the accomplishment of Heaven's own purpose—the stopping of that movement. Religious singularities are Heaven's brand imprinted by the unknowing hand of man upon whatever is destined to last its season, and to disappear."

* See Mitchell's *Westminster Assembly*, p. 377, and Briggs' *Biblical Study*, p. 342.

upon the *divine grace alone*. The Reformed Scholastics neglected to discriminate between its stages as the Lutherans neglected the stages of growth and faith. Their order of salvation, like their order of the divine decrees, was a poor mechanical substitute for it. Hence in the Arminian conflict they sharpened the Reformed position into the so-called five points of Calvinism; and in France and Holland divided the church into two hostile camps,—scholastic Calvinists and liberal Calvinists. They emphasized more and more the *severignty* of the divine grace, and limited it in the direction of arbitrariness and wilfulness.

The Puritans were not as a rule Scholastics, though there were scholastics among them. They were not caught in the meshes of the scholastic formula of Heidegger, Turretine, and Voetius. It was reserved for their descendants to abandon the evangelical theology of British Puritanism for the scholastic theology of Switzerland and Holland. It was a sad day for Puritanism when the systems of Francis Turretine and Markius became the text-books in their colleges and theological seminaries, and the Puritan worthies were displaced by continental thinkers. The Puritans were indeed true Calvinists over against the Arminians; but such leaders as Usher, Reynolds, Calamy, Marshall, Baxter, not to speak of the elder Ball and Cartwright, had the true spirit of the reformation. They did not neglect to lay stress upon human activity in redemption. As they insisted that faith should pass over into repentance unto life, and the full assurance of salvation; so they also urged that the grace of God in the heart should manifest itself in an experience of grace in the life; in a graceful temper and gracious character. They urged the prevenient Grace of God as the sole source of redemption. They magnified the vital energy of the divine grace, and laid stress upon effectual calling and divine adoption, but they carefully guarded the doctrines of predestination and election from abuse; insisting that

“God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.” (*Westminster Confession of Faith*, iii., 1.)

There is effectual calling to Jesus Christ, “yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.” But it is especially in the assurance of grace and salvation that Puritanism in this department reaches its height:

“This certainly is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion grounded upon a fallible hope; but an infallible assurance of faith founded upon the divine truth of the promises of salvation, the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises

are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God." (*Westminster Confession of Faith*, chap. xviii. 2.)

And

"It is the duty of every one to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure ; that thereby his heart may be enlarged in peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, in love and thankfulness to God, and in strength and cheerfulness in the duties of obedience, the proper fruits of this assurance ; so far is it from inclining men to looseness." (*Westminster Confession of Faith*, chap. xviii. 3.)

We shall not presume to deny that the Puritans laid too much stress upon the doctrines of Predestination and Election. This they shared with the entire Reformation movement. It was essential that they should take this point of view at that time. All true reformers were agreed here. But we claim that the Puritans guarded these doctrines from abuse better than the Continental divines, and they advanced upon them in urging growth in grace, and in a progressive application of grace in redemption. It has been the misfortune of Puritanism that the symbols which it framed have been interpreted, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the point of view of the alien scholastic writers of the Continent. The circumstances of their historic origin, and the writings of those who framed them, have been neglected and forgotten. It is astonishing how seldom we find a reference to a Westminster divine, or early Puritan, other than the scholastic Owen, in the theological works of the leaders of orthodoxy in the Presbyterian churches of the past century. One who takes the pains to study the Puritans in their writings soon discovers that the grace of God to them was an intensely practical grace,—a grace of experience, a grace of Christian life. The virus of Scholasticism had not yet inoculated them as it did their feebler descendants when they forsook the favorite Biblical studies of their Fathers for a strife over dogmatic commonplaces.

III. But the chief merit of Puritanism is in the third principle of the Reformation, the authority of the Word of God alone, which they emphasized so greatly as to make it their banner principle of Reform. The Continental Reformers also affirmed this principle, but to them it was subordinate to the other two. The Continental Reformers insisted upon the authority of the Word of God itself, but on the question as to the authorized interpreter of the Word they were not sufficiently definite. The British Puritans were here more practical. Indeed, Wicklif and Tyndale had shaped their principle for them, and they had only to employ and apply it. The Puritans made the Holy Spirit speaking in the Bible the sole authoritative interpreter of the Bible, and affirmed that God alone was the Lord

of the conscience, speaking in his Word directly to the believer as the only sovereign and infallible authority.

Circumstances forced the Puritans to this position; for in Great Britain the authority of the Prelates assumed the place of the authority of the Pope, and presumed to prescribe in matters of faith and worship aside from divine revelation, and to determine the Canon and to interpret the Canon. The issue joined was therefore the authority of the Bible over against the authority of the Prelates. The claim of the Prelates rose higher and higher through Parker, Whitgift, and Bancroft, until it culminated in Laud. But the resistance of the Puritans became stouter and stouter through Hooper, Cartwright, and Bradshaw, until it culminated in the Westminster divines. The Long Parliament decided in favor of Puritanism, and the Church of England was reformed by civil authority and deeds of violence. It will reward us to tarry here and note the chief points at issue in the application of the essential Puritan principle.

(1). The issue was joined at first with reference to ceremonies in the article of worship. It became a battle over the Book of Common Prayer. It should be clearly understood that the Puritans did not object to a Book of Common Prayer. As the Reformed Churches of the Continent all had Prayer-Books, so Knox introduced the Book of Common Order into Scotland, and it was observed in Scotland until the adoption of the Westminster Directory, and has never been set aside by an official act of the Church.* The Puritans desired to *purge* the Book of Common Prayer, established in England. There were indeed several revisions of the Prayer-Book in the battle of Puritanism and Prelacy, in accordance with the changing fortunes of the parties. The ceremonies objected to in the Book of Common Prayer were the *Romish ceremonies*: the priestly garments, the bowing at the altar in receiving the Sacrament, the cross in baptism, the bowing at the name of Jesus, etc. The reason of objection was that the ceremonies carried with them the Popish doctrine of the priesthood, the sacrifice of the Mass and vulgar superstitions—they encouraged secret Papists and Krypto-Romanism in the Church of England. There can be no doubt that this was their original design. Every effort was put forth to conciliate the priesthood of Rome and induce them to conform to the Church of England. The Puritans, as sincere Reformers, protested against this compromise with Rome, and were certainly the real Protestant party. The Prelates were more tolerant with the Papists than they were with the Puritans. It

* See Cunningham's *Church History of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1859, Vol. II., p. 65 *seq.*

is difficult for us in this 19th century to appreciate the seriousness of the struggle and the necessity imposed upon our sires to resist the ceremonies. They felt that they compromised themselves with Roman errors or opened the doors for a secret, subtle Roman propagandism which would eventually destroy the Reformation. Therefore hundreds of Puritans in 1634

"were persecuted, censured, suspended, excommunicated or deprived for praying for the conversion of the Queen [a R. C.], for not bowing at the name of Jesus or towards the high altar, or not consenting to the placing of the communion-table altar-wise and railing it in, or for delivering the sacrament to such as did not kneel, or for preaching against Arminianism or Popery, or for refusing to read the book of Sports. And were many of them forced to leave the kingdom and go into Holland, New England or Florida." (Morice MSS., fol. 7. Dr. Williams' Library, London.)

Those whom Old England refused were welcomed to New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Carolina. They established Puritanism as the religious force of North America. They planted a nation which is now, and always has been, and always will be, a Puritan nation, where Puritanism has had from the beginning a free development, and where it has manifested its excellence and displayed its powers. It has assimilated the weaker forces of other nationalities, or left them in their harmless and uninfluential separation. Puritanism has made the United States of America what it is to-day, thanks to Archbishop Laud and Charles the First, whose folly and madness were destined by heavenly wisdom for the forming of a *great Puritan nation*. The battle over the ceremonies has changed its bearings. Many of those things our fathers objected to as involving Romanism no longer are open to this objection. They have been used by Puritan conformists for centuries and adapted to Protestant conceptions. But the old battle over ceremonies goes on, not so much between the Conformists and Nonconformists in England; or between the Puritan Churches of America and Scotland, and the Episcopal Church, which is a little sister among them; but the struggle is now, as it has ever been in the Church of England itself, between the Puritanism in it and the Krypto-Romanism in it, the same old battle which has been waged since the Reformation, and which must ever continue so long as these heterogeneous forces are comprehended in the same organism.

Our fathers were wise and true in their contentions against the ceremonies. These ceremonies carried with them by association grievous errors, and compromised Protestantism. They encouraged secret Papists; but the Puritan movement was forced by the circumstances of the case to extremes which involved the radical section of it and their descendants in sad mistakes. These entered into

a crusade against other things that were not only harmless but to edification.

The Puritan contest against Popish ceremonies was advanced by the radical party into a Puritanical opposition to all liturgies, organs, instruments of music, hymns other than psalms, pictures, statues, architecture and art of any kind in worship. These were serious blunders which compromised the genuine Puritan party, and crippled and retarded the growth of Puritanism among the educated and cultured classes.

It is very evident that the genuine Puritanism was opposed to *Popish ceremonies*, and that only the narrower section of Puritanism was opposed to prayer-books and liturgies. The opposition was stronger in Scotland than in England among Presbyterians because the opposition in England was rather among the Congregationalists than the Presbyterians. The Westminster Assembly found it impracticable to revise the Book of Common Prayer so as to satisfy both nations and all parties. They preferred to make a new Confession of Faith after spending a long time in trying to revise the XXXIX Articles. Revision is more difficult, when we have to do with historical documents, than a construction of new documents. It was still more difficult to construct a prayer-book for Scotland and England than a Confession of Faith. Indeed, it was seen to be impracticable. A *Directory for the Public Worship of God* was the only thing that was practicable. This was successfully constructed, but with the definite understanding that it was not to be *imposed* in every particular, and that it did not determine between the use of free or written prayer. These matters were left to the several churches as the sphere in which to exercise Christian liberty.

This is so admirably explained by Dr. Mitchell, that we quote him at length :

“The tolerant purpose of those who framed it is fully expressed in their letter to the Scottish General Assembly of 1645, in which they say : ‘We have not advised any imposition which might make it unlawful to vary from it in anything ; yet we hope all our reverend brethren in this kingdom and in yours also, will so far value and reverence that which upon so long debate and serious deliberation hath been agreed upon in the Assembly, . . . that it shall not be the less regarded and observed. And albeit we have not expressed in the Directory every minute particular which is or might be either laid aside or retained among us as comely and useful in practice ; yet we think that none will be so tenacious of old customs not expressly forbidden, or so averse to our good examples although new, in matters of lesser consequence, as to insist upon their liberty of retaining the one or refusing the other because not specified in the Directory.’ The materials for prayer and exhortation provided in the Directory were not meant by its framers, as they explain in the preface, to do more than supply help and furniture, of which the officiating minister might avail himself. It was said, indeed, by Mr. Marshall, when he first brought in the part relating to the ordinary services for the Lord’s day, that it did ‘not only set down the heads of things, but so largely as that

with the altering of here and there a word, a man may mould it into a prayer.' But when reminded of this some months afterwards, when he brought in the first draught of the Preface, bearing a statement that this was not intended, he said: 'Some such expression did fall from my mouth; I said as one reason why it was so large, here he might have such furniture as that with a little help he may do it. But there is no contradiction to say that we do not intend it. It is not a direct prohibition.' [MS. Minutes, Vol. II., p. 286 b.] In other words, those who conducted the ordinary services were not directly prohibited from turning the materials furnished to them into an unvarying form of prayer, keeping as near to the words of the Directory as they could; but at the same time they were not only not restricted or counselled to do so, but they were counselled and encouraged to do something more, according to their ability and opportunities." (Mitchell's *Westminster Assembly*, pp. 232, 233.)

The Westminster divines were unable under the circumstances to prescribe in the minute details of worship, and determined to leave the question of free prayer or written prayer to be determined by the circumstance of the countries and the times. They had been bitten so sharply by prescribed forms and imposed ceremonies, that they were indisposed to prescribe them or impose them upon others. Those who in later times sought to prescribe against the use of written prayers and to impose upon others their view of the exclusion of certain things from worship, went in the teeth of the views of the Westminster divines. It is a strange inconsistency on the part of some parties in our day to object to written prayers, which were left by the Westminster divines an open question, and yet change, without hesitation, the succession of parts of worship in the Directory, which order the Westminster divines regarded as very important to worship. It is really more important that the order of topics and succession of parts should be followed in all of our churches, than that these topics should be delivered from written pages, printed pages or the scheme should be committed to memory and its outlines filled up *extempore*.

We shall add an extract from Francis Makemie, one of the founders of the American Presbyterian Church, as a presentation of a later Scotch-Irish view of the subject:

"I shall begin with Common Prayer and ceremonies, and concerning them, we differ in these particulars, waiving many of our reasons to avoid *offence*: 1. We dare not receive nor comply with studied, composed, and imposed *forms* or *liturgies* of worship because not *commanded* nor *warranted* by the Word of God, nor known in the purest and original centuries of the *gospel churches*, but composed without *divine commission*, and required merely by *men* in the *degenerate* and *latter ages* of the gospel. 2. Though we *deny* not altogether, but *allow* many *forms* of *prayer* in many cases, as studied forms for ones self, and composed easy and plain form for the *ignorant* and *unskillful*, as young ones, early converts, as crutches for the weak and lame; yet we cannot and dare not, *ordain* and call any man to be a *minister* of the gospel, and to take *charge* of *souls*, that hath not given sufficient proof, and demonstration of their *praying* and *preaching* gifts and abilities at all times, and suitably or pertinently for all occasions and conditions, without *prescribed forms* read in a book; and we never denied the lawfulness of joyning with the sound words of others in prayer. 3. Such ministers as have received of God, and have given sufficient proof to many of their *praying* gifts and abili-

ties, dare not ordinarily, and in their ordinary administrations, tye themselves to, and only use these prescribed and *book* forms, least they should be guilty of not using and improving, but hiding or burying their *gifts* and *talents*, and so incur the character of *unlawful servants*." (Francis Mackemie, *Truths in a True Light*, pp. 12, 13, Edinburgh, 1699.)

No parts of worship have been so sharply debated in Presbyterian circles as psalmody and instrumental music. With regard to the latter, it is held in many quarters that it is against the principles of Presbyterianism to use instrumental music in worship. Prof. W. D. Killen, of Belfast, has recently shown in an admirable tract* that this is a mistake. He shows that the banishment of musical instruments from the worship of God's house was the result of a radical movement in Scotland and Ireland, and that the Westminster divines are not responsible for it. This and other such matters they left to be determined in accordance with the Puritan principles of liberty and toleration of difference in non-essentials.

It might easily be shown that it was the radical party among the Puritans which disgraced the great reforming movement by the destruction of images and pictures and the architecture of churches.

But still there can be no doubt that Puritanism as a whole has been compromised by the narrower and more radical party in the movement. It has still the task of relieving itself from the burdens such intolerance and radicalism have put upon it. It must return to the genuine principles of the original Puritanism, and carry out the broader policy of the Westminster divines.

In recent times much of the fault has been retrieved in Great Britain and America, but still more needs to be done. Here is the weakness of the great Puritan bodies of our day. There is nothing in the principle of Puritanism that should prevent any worship of God in forms of Christian art, whether music or painting or sculpture or architecture, provided these are mere forms to give the most beautiful or orderly or grand expression to sincere worship and to common prayer. Puritanism is the foe to all *formalism* in worship, to all *insincerity*, to all *error*; but the experience of two centuries has taught us that even in the simple forms of Puritanism there may be *formalism* and *insincerity* and *error*, as well as in the elaborate ritual of Anglican, Roman, or Greek Christianity. Puritanism will ever be opposed to *prescribed* forms and *imposed* ceremonies; it demands liberty of worship, but that liberty finds its best expression where the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic faculties combine to give the religious energies forms of truth, beauty, and excellence.

* *The Westminster Divines on the Use of Instrumental Music in the Worship of God*. Belfast, 1883.

(2). The next stage of the battle was about preaching and prophesying. The Puritan principle emphasized preaching rather than the sacraments and the public prayer. They accused the vicars who could not preach, but who merely read the service and the printed homilies in the graphic language of ancient prophesying, "dumb dogs." They gave their strength to expository preaching and to exhortation in their meetings for prophesying. This preaching of the Gospel had a powerful effect upon the people. It became the stronghold of Puritanism. The Prelates of the Anglo-Roman cast put forth every effort to suppress it, but there were always pious Puritan Prelates to encourage it. When the preachers were silenced in the churches pious laymen established lectureships, and the work of exposition went on with greater freedom and redoubled energy. The prophesying in public was prevented, but it was conducted in secret and became all the more powerful means of grace. Thus by persecution the Puritans were constrained to be great preachers, and they enjoyed the gift and learned the art of free prayer. Such a band of preaching and praying ministers as gathered in the Westminster Assembly the world had never seen before. Hence the difference between Anglican and Puritan worship which has continued until the present. The preaching of the Gospel and the Prophesying or prayer-meeting have been two leading features in all Puritan regions. These have been only partially appropriated by the Church of England and her daughters. The Nonconforming Churches of England, the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, and the Puritan Churches of America have maintained their pre-eminence in this respect. The gift of prayer has been bestowed in marvellous richness and efficacy in all the free churches.

But we ought not to forget that our Puritan fathers, who were forced to emigration and to separation, were also urged by circumstances to a position which they would not otherwise have taken. It seems to us that in the features of common prayer and the service of song, and in the celebration of the sacraments, we have something to learn from others. If the Established Church of England has to learn from the distinctively Puritan bodies in the items of preaching, prophesying and free prayer, we have also to learn from it in the items of the service of song, in common prayer, and in sacramental observance. There is a liturgical tendency in many Puritan Churches which is really a reaction to the position of the earlier Puritanism, which aimed at a Protestant, Puritan Service Book, with the freedom of extempore prayer; a liturgy which should be a help and guide, and not a master or fetter. The Puritan principle is a principle of freedom in worship. It will work powerfully in the improvement of all forms

of divine service. It has freedom for action. It is without bondage to tradition. It is unfettered by ecclesiastical law. It is free to advance and seek earnestly the best things. It will in the end work out a service which shall be a model of beauty and harmony and grandeur, where preaching and praying and singing and sacramental observance will have proper proportion and harmonious expression in holy unity and variety, where the freedom for the time and place and circumstance will harmonize with the conformity to a common order, in which the communities and lands and countries will realize the communion of saints.

(3). The Puritan battle reached its height in the struggle over the government of the church. The real Puritans were not opposed to episcopacy, as such, if the episcopacy could be reduced to New Testament dimensions of a presiding Presbyter. They were opposed to a prelacy which presumed to govern the church without regard to the Presbyters and the church and people.* The struggle did not become intense here until Bancroft claimed divine right for episcopacy. It was then that the battle of the divine right of the three forms of Church Government,—Episcopacy, Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism,—became serious. All parties now appealed to the Scriptures. It would have been a blessed struggle if they had fought the battle with Biblical weapons; but unfortunately they appealed to the civil power, and the sword was used to overthrow

* We give here two extracts from documents not accessible to the public to illustrate this statement. Calvin has been repeatedly charged with being the author of all the quarrels in British Christianity. Benedict Pictet, the Swiss divine, defends him in a letter to Dr. Nicholls, 1708 :

"If Mr. Calvin had entertained any prejudices against the Episcopal order, or if he had had any thoughts of propagating the polity of the Genevan church among other countrys, or if he had thought that that would best conduce to keep up good order in the church, how comes it that long letter which he wrote to the Duke of Somerset concerning the Reformation of the Church of England, he does not speak one word against the dignity of Bishops? For then he had a very fair occasion of breaking his mind upon this head, and deserving well of the church. How comes it to pass that when he wrote to A. Bp. Cranmer he gives him all the honorable titles which are paid to that character? Nay, be pleased to hear what he says in his book of the necessity of a Reformation in the Church, *Talem nobis*, etc. Let them give us such an Hierarchy in which Bishops may be so advanced that they may not refuse to be subject to Christ and may depend upon him as their only head and refer themselves to him and so cultivate a brotherly fellowship among themselves, that they be not bound together with any other knott than that of the Gospel truth; then we shall confess them to deserve ye Heaviest curse who shall not reverence it; and pay a willing obedience to it. And writing to his friend, Mr. Farell, he observes that there ought to be among Christians such a hatred of schism, that they must, upon all occasions, to the utmost of their power, avoid it."

Francis Makemie, a few years earlier, expressed his view as follows :

"A third thing wherein we differ, is concerning the *government* of the church by *archbishops, chancellors, commissaries, deans, and chapters, archdeacons, &c.*, as not having foundation in the *Scriptures*, nor the government of the *gospel churches*, nor agreeable to the government of the *first centurie* after our Saviour. And though we are for *Scripture Bishops* both name and office, and wish with Dr. Wild in his poetical flight, *where there is one, there were ten*, neither would refuse the government of the first two or three hundred years after our Saviour; and it is known most of the *Presbyterians* in England offered to embrace Dr. Usher, his model of church government; yet there are several things in which *we* dissent, and which many of *yours* dislike in English or *Diocesan Bishops* or *Prelacy*; as, &c." (Francis Mackemie, *Truths in a True Light*, p. 17.)

Episcopacy and establish Presbytery. It was not long before it became clear that Presbytery might be as tyrannical as Episcopacy, and Presbytery was soon crushed between the two other parties, who were determined to be rid of its authority. Congregationalism was never established in old England, but it became the established church of New England; and it was soon evident there that Episcopacy and Presbytery, as well as the Baptists and the Quakers, had no rights which it was bound to respect. Yes, to complete the picture, the Baptists and Quakers displayed their intolerance in other quarters. Thus, by practical experience, all parties have learned that it was the authority of the State that could use any ecclesiastical policy for purposes of intolerance and bigotry. But it has also been learned in the experience of the Free churches of Great Britain and America that tyranny may concentrate itself in purely ecclesiastical bodies,—an Episcopal Convention, a Methodist Conference, a Congregational Association, or a Presbyterian General Assembly or Synod. *Ecclesiasticism* is the bane of British Christianity as *Scholasticism* has been the bane of the Continent Reformation. The principle of Puritanism, that God alone is Lord of the Conscience, and that He speaks from the Scripture alone the authoritative word to the believer in all things, has been a matter of profession rather than of practice. Even the most faithful of the Puritans have not discriminated between the *Word of God* and their expositions and their interpretations of the Word. They have not seen the all-important difference between the *conscience* assured by God and the conscience stiffened by human argument and private wilfulness and passion. In the more radical types of Puritanism mere trifles have become questions of conscience to bring about strife and separation. The conscience of the individual has been used to outlaw the conscience of the Christian world. The Father of Presbyterianism in England, Thomas Cartwright, was compelled to contend against the Prelatical impositions, on the one hand, and the Brownist Separatists on the other. In 1590 he wrote a letter to Mrs. Stubbes, his sister-in-law, “to persuade her from Brownism.” Among other fitting remarks and arguments we find the following :

“Howbeit our Saviour by his callinge not being able to remedy these evils, he chose rather to ioyne himself unto the company of most notorious wicked men, then that he would separate himself from the holy things and in them from God whose they are. And seinge that by beinge of the wicked unwillingly I take noe harme, and am greatly hurte by separacion from the holy things of God there is no cause why I should lose the fruite of the one for the presence of thother. And consider whether by this meanes, you, whose glory is to throwe out of the church, are not yourselves throwne out and after a sort excommunicated from the holy things of God by every particuler man, who either in deede or in your opinion beinge onmeete to communicate, is either not

so iudged by your church, or if he be, yett is in favour or feare supported by it." (Harl. MSS., 7581, British Museum.)

These words are prophetic of the evils of that separation for trifles which has characterized the radical type of Puritanism among both Congregationalists and Presbyterians.

Richard Baxter, in a private letter to Thomas Gataker, in 1653, expresses his view of the evils of disunion in one of the grandest sentences in the English language:

"Alas, that not only godly Christians, but so eminent able preachers of the gospel after such experience of the effects of division as the world scarce ever knew before, that have seen what it hath done in Scotland and felt what it hath done in England, and see what it is threatening to the foreign Reformed churches, and have read what it hath done in all ages since Christ, should yet have so little mind of unity and no more deny themselves to attain it, nor bestir themselves more industriously in following after it. Are such fit for the everlasting peace and unity? Do they consider the sum of the 2nd table of God's commandments? Do they understand and deeply consider the article of the creed, the Catholic church and the Communion of Saints? Are they fit to say aright the first word of the Lord's prayer, which intimates that Christians should worship God as members of the universal body, and not as divided into parties, and should come upon the common interests of Christians and not upon dividing interests." (See p. 687 of this REVIEW.)

It has only gradually been learned that there are many consciences—equally sure that they are right—and that a conscience assured by God will be exacting for itself, but tolerant to others. It is nowhere said, in Scripture or reason, that the conscience of any individual or group of individuals shall be the conscience of a church or of a nation or of the world. When will men learn that the Puritan principle forbids the imposition upon any man's conscience of things which his own conscience will not admit to be the will of God?

In the light of the better study of the Bible and of history we must admit that the contestants were alike in error. Richard Baxter, and a few kindred spirits, were the only consistent Puritans. None of the forms of church government is of divine right. None of them represents the apostolic model as it is presented in the New Testament or the recently discovered "*Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*." Only the simple forms common to all the great religious bodies can claim Scripture authority. The government of the Church must adapt itself to the circumstances of the age and the land and the people. And so it must assume the form that will best express the religious life of the Christian people. Hence we see a gradual assimilation in all the Puritan churches. They have largely the same offices and institutions, under different names. The Protestant churches of the Continent are drawing nearer to the Puritan churches of Great Britain and America. The Puritan element in the Established

Church of England is also under the influence of the same great movement, which is directed by the principles of Puritanism and of Protestantism. We are not surprised that the anti-Protestant and anti-Puritan element in the Church of England should also tend to assimilate itself to Greek and Roman Christianity.

The battle of Puritanism has gone on for centuries. It has not resulted in conquest or in subjugation of any of the great parties. They are as strong to-day as ever, each and all of them. The outcome has been coexistence, toleration, forbearance, and mutual recognition and respect. But this is not all: another and a deeper movement has been in progress in the various churches, and it has become potent in our times. The churches themselves have been long agitated by parties. It has been found necessary not merely to tolerate on the outside in different ecclesiastical organizations, but to tolerate on the inside in the same ecclesiastical organizations, and hence the second great achievement of Puritanism has been *comprehension*. But a third and higher movement is now in progress, and is rapid in its development. Parties leap the barriers of the denominations. The walls of separation have been very largely broken down, or convenient gates of passage have been forced through. Protestant Christianity is constructing itself in two or three great lines on the issues of the day. Progressive men, the inheritors of the true Puritan spirit in all the churches of Protestantism, see eye to eye, and are determined to march forward with mutual co-operation for the attainment of the grand ideal of Christianity. The issues of the 17th and 18th centuries are gone. The issues of our 19th century are upon us, and we are preparing to face the questions of the third Christian Millennium.

The conservatives are no less determined to maintain the traditional types of theology and their varied forms of scholasticism. In the centre are the men of prudence and caution—the ecclesiastics who adhere to the present lines of order and authority. What will the result be? Are we to have a great reform movement to carry on the Reformation and Puritanism to greater heights in Christian theology or Christian life? Is there to be a new and better church of the twentieth century to embrace the best of all the older churches? Or is there not rather to be toleration and comprehension on a grander scale than the world has yet witnessed, in which the essential will be the point of union, the non-essential of tolerated and recognized differences—the assured word and will of God the one centre of unity, and the human opinions about that word ranged about it in infinite variation and variety?

It seems to us the Puritan principle faithfully maintained and

thoroughly followed will accomplish this. For if "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word or beside it in matters of faith or worship" (West. Confes., xx. 2); and "the authority of the Holy Scriptures for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God the author thereof" (West. Confes., I. 4); and "the supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture" (West. Confes., I. 10); then the three principles of Protestantism rise to a higher unity in Jesus Christ in the religious principle of vital union and communion with the living Saviour as the vital source of Christian knowledge and of Christian life; for the faith *alone* of Protestantism is a living faith which enters into vital union with God in Christ; and the grace *alone* of Protestantism is an effectual grace that enters with prevenient energy the soul of man to unite him to God by an irresistible impulse of the Holy Spirit in indissoluble union; and the authority of the Word of God *alone*, is an authority of the voice of God in the Bible to the soul of man, giving infallible assurance in all matters essential to doctrine and life, and which will assure the church in all those things which it is ready to appropriate in constructing that which is better than ecclesiastical organizations or systems of theology, namely; holy, Christlike lives, comprehended in one holy catholic church adorned as a bride for her bridegroom.

C. A. BRIGGS.

VI.

THE SOCIAL IDEA IN THE CHURCH—THE TRUE AND THE FALSE.

ONE of the first things that caught the attention of the heathen world as it came to turn its eye upon the young Christian Church was the spectacle of brotherhood that was presented. "See," it was said, "how these Christians love one another." The facts warranted the exclamation and the astonishment that caused it. The Primitive Church was a genuine brotherhood. We have fresh testimony to this in the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." Thus in one passage we read, "Thou shalt not turn away the needy, but shalt share all things with thy brother, and shalt not say they are thine own; for if ye are partners in that which is imperishable, how much more in the perishable things?" Again: "But let every one that cometh in the Lord's name be received, but afterward ye shall test and know him; for ye shall have understanding right and left." The Christians thus addressed were to be discriminating in their exercise of charity, but the underlying idea of the constitution of the Church was that it was a brotherhood; that the individual Christians were "members one of another."

This was partly the result of circumstances. From almost its beginning the Christian community was "*Ecclesia Pressa*." It was under the hand of persecutors; it was surrounded by dangers which threatened its life. Its members were thus forced closely together. Their interests were all in common. At the first, at least, they were mainly from the same walks in life. Social distinctions, then as now sharply drawn, had, therefore, little influence in making divisions among them. Hence it was natural that there should be at once developed among them a spirit of brotherhood that was a novelty and an utter wonder to the heathen.

But more than from the pressure of circumstances, this spirit had its birth in the religion which these Christians had embraced. Before God all men were equal. The Lord Christ was no respecter of persons. The poorest equally with the richest Christian was saved by

faith in Jesus. The Christian richest in this world's goods could look forward to no larger or better inheritance in the heavenly kingdom than the poorest. Each was a king's son, and in due time would enter upon his celestial heritage. Then, too, their burning love to their crucified and risen Lord—a love more ardent toward Jesus as a person than we usually see now—tended strongly to bind them together. In the midst of the great multitude who jeered at the Man of Nazareth, or haughtily denied his claims, or who, at the best, were but indifferent to all that concerned him or his followers, every one who sincerely trusted and loved this Saviour was indeed a brother. The tie was closer than that of kindred, for in innumerable instances the Saviour's words were literally fulfilled, and men forsook father and mother and sister and brother, yea, wife and children, that they might be his disciples.

These halcyon days, at least in their greatest purity, did not last very long. We have intimations, even in the New Testament Epistles, that human nature at a very early date in the history of the Christian Church took up its irrepressible fight against grace. The perfection of the picture is soon marred. But it still remains true that, in all its earliest history, the Christian Church presents a strong contrast to the heathen world, not only in the fact that it held the truth as against error and superstition, but that it was a closely knitted brotherhood in distinction from the selfish individualism that characterized the heathen.

It is undoubtedly true that the Church has made general progress from those days to these. It is a statement that may not be challenged, that, both in general knowledge and general purity, its latest days are better than its primitive days. But, after all, we may well go back to that morning time for a picture of the spirit of brotherhood in practical operation, which should be at once our model and our inspiration.

For—and here we directly strike the subject under discussion—there is all the difference between a true spirit of brotherhood, a true sense of what it is to be members one of another, and what is commonly called “sociability in the church,” or the social idea in the Church, that there is between a real gem and its counterpart in glittering paste. We are aware that it is sometimes practically difficult to draw the line between the two. We know that, under many circumstances, the one shades off into the other. But still we are very sure that there is a real distinction. The spirit of brotherhood—to call it by that name—is genuine, and may be depended upon. The so-called social spirit is too often arti-

ficial, and is likely to be feeble and fitful, and unworthy when it is not mischievous. When we have reduced the distinction to the lowest terms compatible with truth, we yet find that the spirit of brotherhood is fundamental, while the social spirit is mainly superficial. Surely the gem is worth more than its imitation.

We are, of course, not unmindful that circumstances have greatly changed since the primitive days. The Church does not exist under the same conditions. It is no longer "*Ecclesia Pressa*." Persecution has passed away. As concerns the matter we have in hand, Christianity may be said to be regnant. The Church, in a true sense, is on the throne of empire. It gathers its members from all grades in society, and must of necessity be affected by the complexity of the social order in these modern days. The Church will naturally and rightly take on, in many respects, the complexion of the society of the time.

But the Gospel remains precisely the same that it always was, and human nature remains the same. The mutual relations of the Gospel and of human nature must remain the same. Some of the outward manifestations of the inward spirit must be altered, to be sure. We do not ask, for example, that the spirit of brotherhood be shown by a community of goods, as it was in Jerusalem in the earliest days of the infant Church. That would not only not be practicable, it would not be desirable. The toga long since gave place to the coat—less picturesque, but far better suited to our modern requirements. We do not need to make our houses inns for travelling Christians, as was an absolute necessity in the primitive days. But the duty of hospitality remains. And so in every direction, while the outward manifestation should adapt itself to altered circumstances, we must see to it that the spirit—the same old spirit of brotherhood, the sense of unity in Christ—not only exists but flourishes. The Church will not make that progress it should in gathering in all men for the glory of its Lord, until again it can be said with truth, as in the first century, "See how these Christians love one another!"

It is to be remarked, further, that in determining the true and the false social ideal in the Church, we must make allowances for different present conditions as we find them existing. The new settlement and the old community, for example, are different in many things. Rules that are good for one may need much modification to fit them for the other. Circumstances alter cases, and it is not necessarily a compromise with principles to govern one's self accordingly. The homogeneous community of the village with its surrounding farms, is a vastly different thing from the heterogeneous community of the

large town or the cosmopolitan community of the great city. We cannot expect that precisely the same methods will be equally available in church work under these variant conditions. It may be readily admitted that social standards are quite different in city and country. The mission church calls for the exercise of some methods that may be neither needed nor desirable in the parent organization. The young church whose members are in moderate circumstances, may find itself put to some shifts which an older and more wealthy congregation need never think of employing. We wish it to be borne in mind in all that we say in this paper that we are not imagining that we are laying down an infallible law to which there can be no exceptions. The exceptions, we are ready to admit, may be many. We only seek, in the midst of a difficult and complicated problem, to set forth a principle which we are sure has a wide application, and which we further believe will prove as beneficial in its results as it is broad in its application. The religion of our Lord Jesus Christ is anything but procrustean in its methods. It does not ask to work invariably along the same lines. Sanctified common sense may be depended on to wisely use varying methods, if only there is the underlying and animating spirit of Christian consecration.

But now to proceed on our way, let us set clearly before us the vital distinction that there is between the spirit of brotherhood, which *ought* to exist, and the mere superficial social spirit for which so many in the Church so unthinkingly clamor. One thing that makes this distinction very plain is the fact that there can be and will be brotherhood even in the midst of wide social distinctions. The so-called social spirit, on the contrary, is completely baffled by these distinctions. The best it can do is to maintain a sort of armed neutrality in their presence.

These social distinctions exist. In a true sense they are not artificial, but growths. They are not marked in a primitive community as distinctly as in one more highly organized; but they are to be found, nascent at least, everywhere. They arise in the nature of the case. Wealth, culture, birth sometimes, make distinctions between men. These distinctions operate on both sides of the line. The poor man, for example, finds it harder to be at ease in the presence of wealth, than the rich man in the presence of poverty. Ignorance is uncomfortable when in contact with culture. Birth has comparatively little weight in this country, but the low-born have an instinctive diffidence of those well-descended. Differences of condition, in a word, are more of a barrier upward than downward. We cannot get rid of these distinctions. Society is not a dead level, and there

is no prospect—for a long future certainly—that its valleys will be exalted and its mountains and hills be made low.

But now in the midst of these social distinctions the true spirit of brotherhood can flourish and ought to flourish. Let us make our meaning plain by a very homely example.

Here is a manufacturer employing a number of work-people. He is, we will suppose, a man of some education, and his family has enjoyed advantages which he did not possess in his early years. Owing to his means and his culture and that of his family, there is a distinction between them and these work-people beyond that which exists in the relation of employer and employed. They stand in a higher social grade. Now some of these work-people belong to the same church with their employer and his family. They are in every way worthy people. They merit the name of intelligent. But they are plain, and unused to the ways of culture. They would be ill at ease should they find themselves in the midst of social refinements. Now *because* they belong to the same church, and are thrown together in church relations, shall they claim a social equality with their employer which it is evident they do not possess? Because their employer does not extend social courtesies to them, shall he be judged to be unsocial and proud, and even unchristian? A common-sense view of the matter is that while courtesy, which is inseparable from the true Christian spirit, should everywhere be exhibited when man comes into contact with man, the accidental fact of church relationship should not be held to necessitate social equality. If our manufacturer or his family can find congenial friends among these work-people, they are at full liberty, of course, to enjoy them. But, on the other hand, if they cannot there find these friends, it should give no offence if they look for them elsewhere. The Church, we contend, as such, need have nothing to do, one way or the other, with these social distinctions.

But now, while our manufacturer may look for social pleasures where he deems it best, and while church relations should not be held to necessarily affect social relations, he is not free, and cannot be, from the law of Christian brotherhood. *Because* these people are fellow-Christians, worshippers, it may be, in the same sanctuary, he is bound to have special consideration for them. He must consult this spirit of Christian brotherhood in determining the wages he pays to them. It is a shame to his Christianity if his only standard is the selfish "market price." Being in a position of power and influence, he ought to see to it that all those upon whose labor he thrives have as favorable conditions as possible surrounding them. The

spirit of brotherhood demands of the Christian employer that he avail himself of every suitable method of benefiting those in his employ. Some of these methods may work along the lines of social life, as in proper entertainments; some along the lines of intellectual life, as in the provision of reading-rooms, courses of lectures, etc. In every way possible the spirit of brotherhood should be evinced controlling the relation of the employer to those in his employ.

As the spirit of brotherhood should hold in these general relations, so, and with even greater force, should it hold in distinctively church relations. Social differences should not be allowed to penetrate here any more than a fancied social equality should be demanded. In anything that concerns church services or church work, every Christian stands on an equality, save as one is differentiated from another by greater faith or love or zeal. In the gathered Sabbath congregation it ought to be everywhere literally true among us far more often than it is, that "the rich and the poor meet together." The frequenters of the prayer-meeting may very likely find the voice of the intelligent carpenter more acceptable than that of the merchant who cannot clearly express his thoughts, and he ought to be honored accordingly. The employer may find that the man he employs in shop or mill can minister in spiritual things at the sick-bed more tenderly and efficiently than he himself can. The woman of social position may find that her dressmaker is a good deal better teacher than she in the Sabbath-school. The true spirit of brotherhood, the spirit that says, "ye are members one of another," drops all consideration of social distinctions when church relations are concerned. It holds up the Christian standard, that, in their relations to God, all men are equal. The humblest member of the body of Christ is still a member of *His* body, and therefore in living unity with every other member. The only distinction that can here be permitted to exist is in capacity for service.

In point of fact, however, our churches too often are not much more than religious clubs. They are highly respectable, and are very pleasant to those who can command entrance. But in their real exclusiveness they are very far from coming up to the ideal of that church which is to disciple the nations. Of course there are very few churches that boast of exclusiveness. If there are any, may God pity them! Most churches, even the most wealthy and fashionable, claim that the poor are always welcome. And so they are—to back seats in the gallery! But practically too many of our churches are exclusive. The elegant and costly house of worship, the elaborate music, the high-salaried minister, the fashionable over-dressing of the

women, all tend to exclusiveness. The congregation know it, acquiesce in it, even perhaps advocate it. That this is really the case is patent to every one who will observe any of our so-called fashionable congregations. "Plain" people are conspicuous by their absence.

We are not so foolish as to deny that there are very many most excellent Christians in these same fashionable congregations. We do not for a moment doubt that these wealthy and exclusive churches do much good. Their gifts into the Lord's treasury are often noble. Certainly the rich need the Gospel as much as the poor. But the point we make here is that the removal of the practical exclusiveness which characterizes them would render them vastly more useful. If the spirit of Christian brotherhood had fuller play in them, they would be more really churches, fulfilling their mission of extending the Gospel, and would slough off the character, which ill-becomes them, of wealthy social clubs for the enjoyment of religious exercises.

The evil of confounding the social idea with that of brotherhood works both ways, from above downward and from below upward. We have just had an illustration of the first. But we do not think that blame in this matter always belongs to the rich. The fault is quite as much with the poor. They too often seem to think that church fellowship must involve social recognition. Because that does not come, and in the nature of things, as we have seen, ought not to be expected to come, they hold themselves aloof from that which is really the life of the Church and the ground of its being. If the rich are too much inclined to be exclusive, those in more moderate circumstances are too ready to ask of the Church things it was never designed to give; and failing to receive these, they become bitter and draw off from all church relations. There is a stubborn and unworthy pride oftentimes among the poorer in our congregations as truly as there is a pitiable sense of exaltation among the richer. A true conception of the nature of the Church, as we shall see more at length hereafter, would tend to prevent this.

We turn now from these more fundamental considerations to some of the things that are the outcome of what we must think is a false ideal.

Closely connected here is the idea that the Church, to promote a social feeling which is considered essential, must provide in one way or another a variety of entertainments. The plea that is made to overbear all opposition is, "We must hold the young people." The tie that binds them, it would seem from the practical commentary

afforded by the action of so many churches, is not the fellowship of Christian love, but a string of concerts or fairs or sociables. In his novel, "A Modern Instance," Mr. Howells did not get very far away from the truth when he characterized the state of religion in the town of Equity thus: "Religion there had largely ceased to be a fact of spiritual experience, and the visible Church flourished on condition of providing for the social needs of the community. It was practically held that the salvation of one's soul must not be made too depressing, or the young people would have nothing to do with it. . . . The Church embraced and included the world. It no longer frowned even upon social dancing—a transgression once so heinous in its eyes; it opened its doors to popular lectures, and encouraged secular music in its basements, where, during the winter, oyster-suppers were given in aid of good objects." If this is caricature, it only shades off a very little from the truth.

It has come to be asked often, whether a church is "social"; and the meaning is that to merit this character, it must be much given to encouraging merry-makings of one sort or another. These entertainments run through all grades, from the so-called "sociable"—which is generally anything but really social—to the dancing party or the full-fledged dramatic representation. Then there comes the fair for raising money, a device too often perilously near substituting gain for godliness, a combination of sham business and sham charity which would be ridiculous if it were not sad.

The tendency of all this is to drive out the spirit of devotion. The desire for merry-making and the religious spirit cannot be successful partners in business. We do not mean to say that social life is not desirable, nor that social entertainments should not be sought. We do not deny that, within wise limits, the Church may make a legitimate use of social forces. We know of cases where this is done to manifest advantage. We have a conspicuous example of it in mind as we write. But in this case this social business is held in subordination. The Church does not build its success upon a social foundation, but upon its religious worship and religious work. Its social life is an addendum, not the substratum. This is very different from expecting the Church, as such, to furnish either distinctively social life or social amusements. "Social life arising out of church relations," says one who writes wisely on this matter, "ought to be merely incidental, and not included within the duty of the Church or subjected to its supervision."

It is never found, it may be remarked here, that amusements, or other forms of social life in a church, are much sought during a revival

season. While this by no means stamps legitimate social pleasures as evil, it is clear evidence that the proper work of the Church, and the work that should absorb its energies, is that which in one way or another tends to the promotion of religion. There are many ways of promoting the influence and power of the Church in a community which are not yet by any means worked for what they are worth. They might far better call out the energies of church people than the various entertainments which so often ask for so much labor to so little profit.

Another evil tendency here is to put into often undue and unwise prominence the young when they ought to be learners, and the more light-minded and frivolous when they ought to be kept under the control and care of the wise and earnest. Is it not about time that we ceased running our churches distinctively in the interests of "the young people"? Let us not be misunderstood here. There is a plain difference between being interested in the young people, profoundly and absorbingly interested, and running the church simply with a view of keeping them engaged. The young are indeed the hope of the Church; but it is only as they are grounded in the faith and set their faces toward active life with true principles as their motive and guide. The catering to their unformed and youthful ideas does not tend to ground and settle them in principles which will stand the shocks of life. They do not know as much as they will later. Their parents and elder friends have more wisdom than they, and ought to have more voice in the control of things. To provide for their best possible development is a very different thing from submitting to the dictation of their immature judgments. The Church will hold them best by doing for them that which is wise, and not necessarily that for which they may clamor. And this course will help to make men and women of them rather than outgrown children.

And is it not time that we recognized the fact that if the giddy and worldly are not attracted by the real graces and solid worth of religion, they are not likely to be captured by church entertainments? The offering of social entertainments as a bribe, "to make religion attractive," is too much like the gift of a chromo in a tea-shop to every purchaser of a dollar's worth of goods. In the Church and all that concerns it, let the full, strong throb of vital religion be felt, and then we shall not need to depend on entertainments for a meretricious display of prosperity and a false ideal of success.

We are strongly inclined, moreover, to consider it an almost unmitigated evil that the tendency of this unwise magnifying of the social

life in the use of entertainments is to put the minister often in a false position. We would not press this for more than it is worth ; but we are sure that it is an evil. If the minister in a church given to diversions, does not enter heart and soul into them, he is very apt to be regarded as "unsocial." That, in the eyes of the average church attendant, is far worse than heresy; for a little tang of heresy only gives a sort of piquancy that is considered enjoyable. On the other hand, if the minister does concern himself greatly with these things, his spiritual power and usefulness are diminished. The character of master of ceremonies or of showman does not set itself forth as germane to that of preacher and pastor. Many a good man, at home in the pulpit or by the sick-bed, is only constrained and awkward in the entertainment. But the "young people" and the light-minded who are to be won to religion by these entertainments, judge him by his social qualities and not by those things that fit him distinctively for his office. The voice of the young people and of the light-minded must, forsooth, be heard. The minister, too often, is judged, not on the ground of ministerial qualities, but on that for which both training and taste unfit him. This may be relatively a smaller evil than some that have been mentioned, but evil it is. The standard of judgment is a false one, and mischief must result from its application. We protest against it.

We turn now from this general setting forth of what we deem an evil, to point out some remedies. We trust that two ends will be served as this is done. In the first place, the evil itself will be brought into clearer light, and perhaps indicated with more precision; and then our work will be constructive, and not simply destructive.

First of all, let us insist upon and magnify the true ideal of the Church. Its object is not to amuse men, but to save men. The Church was founded in order to spread true religion on the earth. The injunction of the ascending Saviour to his followers was to "disciple all nations." The aim of the Church, therefore, should be to bring men to Christ ; and this aim ought to color and control every effort put forth. Of course in many cases it is the aim to use what people call "the social forces" to aid in this work. We heartily respect the motive that prompts effort along these channels, even though we think the methods employed mistaken ones. The danger is that the real aim will be lost sight of, and this employment of the "social forces" for nobler ends degenerate into their use simply for having, as it is phrased, "a good time." Social enjoyment is entirely legitimate in its proper sphere. But it is not wise nor right to charm one's self into the belief that you are doing church work when you

are simply having a time of social enjoyment. Nor is it right to think that genuine church work is greatly promoted along these lines of activity. And then it is certainly true that very frequently this course of conduct comes from an utterly wrong idea of the mission of the Church, from a mere fashion which has grown strong, from an unthinking yielding to a worldly clamor. The force of what is here said can be measured by any one who will run over in his mind his acquaintances among church people who are always more ready for a festival than for the prayer-meeting.

A true church is a body of Christian *workers*—"all at it and always at it." The church, as we see it practically realized, is a body in part of workers, but in larger part of hangers-on who do no Christian work. For, we submit, it is not fair to call those Christian *workers*, whose sole title to the name is their facility in the conduct of entertainments or their energy in promoting bazaars. There are wide ranges of real Christian service that open before willing workers in these days. The fields are white, but where are the reapers? The faithful few are overburdened. There are very many who do nothing except along the lines of the social activities of the Church. And here the result is often a double evil—energies are diverted from real needs to those things which at the best are of questionable value; and then those who have been putting forth energy to little real purpose flatter themselves that they have been engaged in religious work, when really it is nothing of the kind. If every professed Christian was a real worker in some useful sphere of Christian activity, what progress the Church of our Lord would make! It would run where now it creeps. It would soon possess the earth.

And so another point is reached, namely, that the evils here complained of would be lessened or removed if a church could be kept busily at work in all practicable channels of real usefulness. It would be found, moreover, that just here true sociability would be promoted while other and higher ends were accomplished. The evil is in making the social life an end, often an important end, of the existence of a church. When it comes as an incident, it is natural and helpful.

For example, the "church sociable," so called, whose aim is to promote the social life of a congregation, so far as the observation of not a few goes, usually fails. It breaks down no barriers. The different tides of social life as they exist among the members of the congregation outside of church relations, ebb and flow here in very much the same channels as without. The effect, indeed, is often needlessly to antagonize social relations. The grades of society remain the same in the church sociable as anywhere else, only the people are forcibly

reminded that these grades exist. Of course this is more strictly true in a heterogeneous congregation than in one that does not take a wide range on the social scale. But it is measurably true under almost all circumstances of congregational life. The church sociable, as a rule, does not to any great extent promote real sociability.

But now let these Christian people come together in different kinds of Christian work, where the object aimed at is not "sociability," but some service for Christ; and while the work in hand is accomplished, there is at the same time a delightful reign of the social feeling. It is the Sabbath-school, for instance; and the question is not in what rank of society the teacher stands, but his ability and consecration as an instructor. It is the prayer-meeting; and the question is not whether the brother be merchant or blacksmith, but whether he can take part to edification. It is a helping-hand association; and the question is not whether the willing worker comes from a home of wealth or from one of very limited means, but whether she can be of service for the task in hand. It is the gathering of tract distributors or of district visitors; and the question is simply how most efficiently to do the work. Under these circumstances of fellowship in service there is real social enjoyment. All artificial distinctions sink out of sight. These Christian workers enjoy each other's society. They are really companions: they are in genuine sympathy with each other. As a writer already quoted says: "This sympathy overleaps social barriers. Christians may heartily sympathize in their highest aims, and cordially share the sweetest and purest joys of church-companionship, though their social tastes are various. Social congeniality is not identical with religious sympathy, nor necessarily involved in it."

And so we come to our final position, that the true idea of the Church as a society is reached when the spirit of brotherhood is cultivated and in every way promoted, and "sociability," so called, left to take care of itself. A social church is greatly to be desired. The reason we do not have more that are genuinely such is simply because sociability is sought as an end in itself. Hence there is sometimes the attempt, from both sides, to break down the social barriers that exist in the nature of things. Such an attempt is likely to be either futile or disastrous. We need the spirit of brotherhood, the recognition of the fact that men are all alike before God, and that for purposes of worship and service all stand on the same platform. The true spirit of brotherhood is perfectly willing to recognize the fact of social distinctions. The man of high standing through wealth or culture, possessed of this spirit, does not feel that he is condescend-

ing when in specific church relations he stands shoulder to shoulder with the man of humble station. He recognizes in him a Christian brother, and their fellowship is good. Equally the man of lowly station who is animated by this spirit does not feel that the Church is a ladder by which he can climb into social prominence. He does not trouble himself, so far at least as the Church goes, with these social differences. He can get the same food from the pulpit as his brother more favored in worldly circumstances. He can work alongside of him in various departments of Christian activity. On his part his heart goes out to his richer neighbor in true and cordial fellowship.

This real fellowship, this true brotherhood, has its roots deep down in the renewed nature. Christians are not joined by any artificial band; they are members one of another. They are parts of the same body. They live in each other's life. Each member has not the same office. There are feet and hands and head. But the head cannot say to the feet, "I have no need of you," nor the feet to the head, "We have no need of thee." Every member is necessary. The welfare of each is the welfare of the whole. The interest in one another arising from this sense of common membership is worth vastly more than that which any mere social contacts can arouse. This membership one in another leads to right relationships under all circumstances. It is rich and fruitful and enduring. More's the pity that we make so little of it. More's the pity that we so often seek to substitute for it what we call "social" bonds, that are artificial and of the smallest worth.

For what we need to see is a Church animated by this real and enduring and potent spirit of brotherhood. Rich men there will be, poor men there will be, but there is no reason why they should stand apart in church matters. Class churches, we must believe, are an utter abomination in the eyes of Him who is no respecter of persons. And class churches, on one side of the line or on the other, come from the failure to lay stress upon the idea of brotherhood and the endeavor to lay stress upon the idea of social equality—a false and futile endeavor to level up or to level down.

We should endeavor to cultivate this spirit of brotherhood that is based in the sense of membership in the mystical body of Christ. It will ignore social distinctions in all that relates to church worship and activity, while recognizing them as existing factors in their own sphere. It will bring forth a church grandly equipped for work, and holding up service as its ideal. It will gather into the Church multitudes who now stand aloof, joining them in one happy company. It will magnify the Church as a field for activity, where great harvests

are to be reaped for God, and will not set it forth as a mere garden of spices where the spiritual senses are to be regaled or somnolency to take the place of service. It will present the attractive spectacle of the company of believers, differing widely in earthly conditions, but walking hand in hand along Christ's ways of pleasantness. It will unfold the still grander spectacle of this same company of believers, standing in serried ranks, shoulder to shoulder, on the field of conflict with the powers of darkness. It will show to men that Christianity is vastly more than a name; that it is a full, throbbing, joyous *life*, that makes men glad and blessed here, and glad and blessed through eternity. The world—this weary, hard, selfish, cruel world, into which the Church has been cast as a power for good, will be forced to say, and saying, will be drawn as by a mighty attraction—"See how these Christians love one another!"

O. A. KINGSBURY.

VII.

NOTES AND NOTICES.

The Third General Council of the Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the world holding the Presbyterian system, assembled in the city of Belfast, Ireland, June 24, 1884, in accordance with the programme of the Committee of Arrangements appointed by the Second General Council, meeting in Philadelphia, U. S. A.

Thirty-nine Presbyterian bodies were represented by 294 delegates, the greater portion of whom were present. The meetings were held in St. Enoch's Church, a large and handsome structure, unusually well adapted for the purposes of the Council. The preparations had been made by an efficient Committee. The funds had been raised by the earnest efforts of the Chairman, Prof. Robert Watts, and the provisions for entertainment were ample and generous. The only defects we noticed were in the protection and delivery of the mail and telegrams of the delegates, and in the neglect to provide private rooms for the Committees of the Council.

The opening sermon was delivered by Dr. Watts, the Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, for which the thanks of the Council were subsequently given. He was assisted in the religious services by Prof. A. A. Hodge, of Princeton. The Clerks, Dr. Blaikie, of Edinburgh, and Dr. Matthews, of Quebec, were re-elected for the present session of the Council, with the understanding that other arrangements for the future would be made ere the Council adjourned.

The Committee of Arrangements reported an elaborate programme of some eighty to ninety different essayists and speakers for eight days' sessions, besides the reports of Committees, and the discussions upon them that were necessary. These speakers and essayists were selected by the Committee of Arrangements from their own point of view without a sufficient apprehension of the topics that were most suitable to a representative body gathered from all parts of the world, and without adequate representation of the variety of opinion on these topics that existed in the Churches, and that was represented in the Council. In consequence of this the programme cannot be regarded as a success. While there were many admirable papers and eloquent and powerful addresses, yet they did not make the same impression as was made by the essayists and speakers at Edinburgh and Philadelphia.

Indeed there was a large number of the delegates who were not pleased with the programme, and who were determined that the reports of Committees

should have the precedence in discussion, and that the Council at Belfast should debate the propositions that were to come from the committees, in order to come to some practical decision upon them. This spirit was predominant in the Council. It manifested itself on the first day in the motion of Prof. Calderwood, to amend the programme, so "that ample time, not exceeding three hours, be set apart for the discussion of the report, standing as the first order of the day." This motion was adopted by a great majority, and it threw the papers and addresses into the background, and made the *reports* the great matters before the Council. This we must regard as a grand advance upon previous Councils. It made this a working Council devoted to business. From it resulted the great achievements that were made.

Dr. Matthews presented an elaborate and carefully prepared report on statistics, which does him great honor. Dr. Blaikie moved the appointment of a Committee for the more efficient organization of the Council. A large business Committee was appointed with the genial and efficient Dr. J. Marshall Lang, of Glasgow, Chairman, to whom the Council is largely indebted for its practical wisdom and success.

On the second day the great matter for consideration was the report of the Committee on the Consensus, Principal Cairns, Chairman. A long and able report was presented with the unanimous conclusion of the Committee that :

1. "It is not indispensable to the Alliance as an organization that the consensus should at present be further defined. In support of this view it may be stated that the Alliance has been founded upon the consensus in its present state. Nor has there been any pledge given to any Church that has entered it that this consensus should be defined more fully. Whatever of usefulness the organization has enjoyed was under its present constitution ; nor is there any reason to fear that the continuance thus far of the *status quo* will lead any Church, or possibly any individual, to retire from its membership. It cannot be said that the existing state of things leaves the Alliance without a creed altogether, and thus is practically intolerable. Any one of the Reformed Confessions is a pledge sufficient to satisfy those who hold any of the rest of these creeds, as the whole are sufficiently known to the world at large to make it, to estimate aright, at least for practical recognition, that type of Christian doctrine which is distinctively called Reformed. The definition of the consensus would not for the first time bring this type of doctrine into prominence. It may even be questioned whether any new document would in some respects so impress the mind with the distinctive features of that type of theology as any one of the ancient Confessions which it sought to compendise. 2. The Committee fully grants that there are advantages which the defining of the consensus would secure as working out the ends for which the organization exists. The past action of the Alliance in dealing with creeds and confessions has served important ends, and a defining of their harmony might be expected to increase the benefit. It might deepen our own hold of the great articles of our faith, and serve as a valuable testimony lifted up amidst the unbelief and negation of the present century. It would certainly tend to remind us of the greatness of our inheritance, and check the disposition to surrender any part of it, which, it will hardly be denied, is a real danger. If at some future day the Alliance should be led to prosecute some such enterprise to its issue, it would be felt by many to be an onward step in its history, and in that of the kingdom of God. 3. The advantages which might arise from a satisfactory definition of the consensus seem to the Committee for the present outweighed by its risks and difficulties. Some of these might be differently estimated by different minds, such as the problem of translating the venerable language of documents that have become almost sacred into the phraseology of the nineteenth century, of curtailing in form without change of spirit, of reflecting creeds that are not in all things identical by a representation in which nothing shall be missed on the one hand and set down to unfaithfulness, or retained on the other and charged to blind traditionalism and insensibility to modern progress. But there are other dangers which are harder to surmount. From the nature of the case, it is not easy to distinguish in idea and in fact two kinds of definition, the one of which would be merely historical, and the other the utterance of a new and living creed by the Alliance. The last kind of definition it would be hard so to limit beforehand in its use and application as to disarm the many feelings of the separate Churches, for such is the earnestness with which each guards its own creed, and its right to alter or interpret it, that the work of the central body in this field, even though its

aim would be different, would almost certainly arouse susceptibilities not easily to be allayed. Had the Churches shown a united and resolute purpose in face of these difficulties to proceed at once to this work, the decision of your Committee might have been different, but in this state of unpreparedness which this report exhibits they do not feel justified in recommending any immediate steps in this direction."

These conclusions were the result of much debate in the Committee and in the Churches. They are eminently wise. The Council were decidedly opposed to any formulation of a consensus, such as a few distinguished brethren desired. The differences in the Council were too great for them to come to an agreement upon a simple and colorless consensus, which could in no sense be regarded as the *historic* consensus of the Churches. It was felt that if a simple creed was desired in place of the more elaborate creeds in force in the respective Churches, it would be more straightforward for those who favored such a creed to move in that direction in their own Churches, and not make use of the Council representing all the Churches, and compromise them all in such a movement. No consensus can be a real consensus, unless it be true to the historic spirit, and the historical teachings of the confessions of the Reformed Churches. It is not so easy to reach agreement on these points in our times as some are inclined to imagine. The Council were not only opposed to the formulation of a consensus, but they were cautious of committing themselves to the reasons presented by the Committee. They therefore adopted the resolution submitted by Principal Caven, of Toronto :

"The Council express its sense of the great care and ability with which the Report has been prepared, and order that it be printed in the minutes; that without committing itself to all the reasonings by which the Report reaches its conclusions, the Council adopt as its finding the conclusion to which it comes, viz., 'that it is inexpedient at present to attempt a definition of the consensus of the Reformed Churches'; further, that in discharging the Committee, the Council tender their warmest thanks to the Convener, and to the different members of the Committee, for their long-continued toil, and the valuable services they have rendered to the Alliance."

This resolution only committed the Council against a *present* and an *official* formulation of a consensus. Prof. Calderwood submitted a motion with reference to a *future* and *unofficial* formulation :

"That the Council declares that it does not desire to have a consensus of the Reformed creeds, either for the purpose of affording a test for the admission of churches into this Alliance, or for providing a creed for the Alliance; but the Council agrees to declare its conviction, that a formal statement of a consensus of the Reformed creeds would render great service to the cause of Christian truth, and would tend to unite under still closer relations all the Reformed Churches, organized under the Presbyterian order."

This was strongly supported, and in itself would seem unobjectionable, but the Council were anxious to stop the agitation in the Churches on this subject, and were afraid of reopening it, or of giving those brethren who favored the formulation of the consensus by the Alliance, a basis for renewed efforts in that direction. This fear was justified by some remarks made in the course of the debate by some of those in favor of the motion. Accordingly it was defeated, and so this difficult and dangerous question, which might have proved a firebrand to destroy the whole movement, has been happily put out of the way.

The third day of the Council was devoted to the question of reception of new churches and to Foreign Missions.

The application of several churches to join the Alliance had been referred to the Committee appointed by the last Council, Principal McVicar, of Montreal, Chairman. It was found that only three members of that Committee were present, namely, besides the Chairman, Principal Cairns and Dr. Watts. The Chairman asked for an enlargement of the Committee. Accordingly, Prof. A. F. Mitchell, Prof. Salmond, Dr. W. J. Robinson, Prof. A. A. Hodge, Prof. C. A. Briggs, Prof. E. D. Morris, Dr. W. J. Junkin, Prof. Charteris, Dr. R. M. Patterson, David Brown, Geo. Junkin, Geo. Duncan, John Cowan, were added.

The Committee made the following report :

"First, as respecting the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., that the following deliverance was unanimously adopted : Whereas the Cumberland Presbyterian Church has adopted the Constitution of the Alliance ; Whereas, it was one of the Churches which was invited to assist in the formation of the Alliance in 1875 ; Whereas, it has now, as on previous occasions, made application for admission, and has sent delegates to the present meeting ; Whereas, further, as declared by the First Council at Edinburgh, the responsibility of deciding whether they ought to join the Alliance, should rest on the Churches themselves.—Your Committee recommends the Council, without pronouncing any judgment on the Church's Revision of the Westminster Confession, and of the Shorter Catechism, to admit the Cumberland Presbyterian Church into the Alliance, and to invite the delegates now present to take their seats.

"Second, respecting the application from the Reformed Church of the Province of Austria, the Synod of the Secession Church of Ireland, and the Presbyterian Church of Jamaica, your Committee unanimously recommend that these Churches be admitted, and that their delegates be invited to take their seats."

The second item of the report was unanimously adopted. The first item occasioned considerable debate. Dr. J. H. Martin, of the Southern Presbyterian Church, moved that the report be not adopted, and argued against the reception of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church into the Alliance. Dr. Talbot W. Chambers moved to amend the report by substituting in place of the phrase "without pronouncing any judgment on," the phrase "without approving." Ex-Provost Campbell, of Greenock, Scotland, moved a postponement of the whole question till the next Alliance. After a long and able and friendly debate, the four motions were put in Scottish fashion. The motions to postpone, and the motion not to adopt the report, found trifling support. The question in debate was really between the report itself and the amended report. The latter prevailed by a vote of 112 for the amendment, against 74 for the report unamended. All those voting for the two motions voted for the admission of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church to the Alliance. They differed only in the single item of phrase, "without pronouncing any judgment on," or "without approving." Those absolutely opposed to the admission of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church had the first chance to vote, but they were so few in number that it was not thought advisable to count them.

It only remains to explain the amendment. The writer agrees with the statement of the Chairman of the Committee who preferred the words of the report ; "and yet he could accept the proposal of Dr. Chambers ; but he did not think it quite as delicate, perhaps, to all the parties concerned as were the words of the report." Indeed the phraseology is ambiguous. It was designed by Dr. Chambers, in the sense that the Council were not willing to compromise themselves by approving the revision of the Westminster Standards as in

accordance with the Reformed Confessions. He did not design that the Council should express their judgment upon that revision in terms of disapproval; and yet the phrase is capable of the latter interpretation, and such an interpretation has already been given it by some parties. The amendment, as first proposed by Dr. Chambers, was "that without becoming responsible for the omissions made in the confession of faith." This was seconded. But it was subsequently modified by him into "without approving." It is clear from his speech that he wished to disclaim any responsibility for the revision, and that he did not wish to assume the responsibility of pronouncing a judgment of disapproval. In our judgment a still better phrase might easily have been found; and if the rules of debate had permitted a recommitment to the Committee, a unanimous agreement might have been reached, so far as the two parties are concerned, who really desired that the Cumberland Church should be admitted. The conclusion of the debate was exceedingly happy. All parties acquiesced, and the Council adjourned in peace and harmony. It is now desirable that the various bodies of Presbyterian and Reformed churches in this country should come to a better understanding at home. If we can meet in cordial co-operation in the Council of the Alliance in mutual toleration, why should we not be able to meet in the same spirit in our own land? We do not propose to minimize differences. It is far better to see them as they are. The one thing needed is more of the spirit of brotherly love, and the recognition of the legitimacy of differences springing from the same stock; and less of the spirit of partisanship and conflict over non-essential variations. The two burning questions of the Alliance having been so happily settled, after full and free and friendly debate, the Council were now able to move forward on the more practical lines.

The next great question was Foreign Missions. This gained a greater prominence than at the previous Councils of the Alliance, and a strong determination was evident that the Council should come to some practical results. After hearing the report of the Committee of last Council, the following resolutions were adopted:

"The Council receive the report, and rejoice in the strong desire of the Presbyterian churches, generally, to secure as much as possible of unity and co-operation in Foreign Missionary work. The Council most thankfully acknowledge the loving-kindness of the Lord in having so largely, and in so many lands blessed the missionary labors of the churches. At the same time, in the view of the many new and remarkable openings throughout the Heathen world for the proclamation of the Gospel of Salvation, they express their earnest hope that there may speedily be a large increase of Missionary zeal and effort among all the churches connected with the Alliance.

"The Council reappoint the committees, with instructions to communicate to the churches the expression of their hope that the desire for union may assume a more practical form. The Council refer to the Business Committee to prepare a Report founded on this Resolution, in which the names of the committees will be suggested."

The Business Committee eventually presented the following report, which was adopted:

"That inasmuch as union and co-operation in Foreign Missionary work are, in manifold respects, of exceedingly great value, the Council rejoices to learn that the churches connected with this Alliance have generally expressed an earnest desire for as large a measure of such union and co-operation as it may be found possible to obtain.

"Further, the Council, having respect to the fact that various topics of great practical importance

in the prosecution of Foreign Missionary work still require earnest attention, appoint two committees for the purpose of considering and reporting on such questions, the committee to consist of the following members: EUROPEAN—*Ministers*: Rev. Dr. J. M. Mitchell, *Convener*, Rev. C. W. Grant, Rev. John Pagan, Rev. Dr. Thos. Smith, Rev. Mr. Buchanan, Rev. Dr. Fleming Stevenson, Rev. Dr. Monro Gibson, Rev. Josiah Thomas, Rev. F. R. M. Wilson, Melbourne. *Elders*: Colonel Young, Duncan McLaren, Jr., Esq., W. Young, Esq., J. P. Hugh M. Matheson, Esq., M. Baptistin Couve, Esq., Bordeaux.—AMERICAN—*Ministers*: Rev. Dr. E. Kempshall, *Convener*; Rev. Wm. Irvin, D.D., Troy; Rev. Dr. W. J. R. Taylor, D.D., Newark; Rev. Dr. J. B. Dales, D.D., Philadelphia; Rev. Dr. J. H. A. Bomberger, D.D., Lancaster; Rev. Ransom B. Welch, D.D., Auburn; Rev. E. H. Rutherford, D.D., Paris (Ky.); Rev. W. Junkin, D.D., Charleston, S. C.; Rev. W. J. Darby, D.D., Evansville, Ind.; Rev. Principal Caven, Toronto. *Elders*: Jas. Croil, Esq., Montreal; J. Wolcott Jackson, Esq., Newark; Truman P. Handy, Esq., Cleveland.

"In particular, inasmuch as there are two questions that appear to be of especial importance in connexion with union and co-operation in missionary effort, viz., the constitution of mission presbyteries, and the relations of the mission churches to the Home churches,—the Council feeling the importance of encouraging self-development and self-government in native churches,—thankfully recognize the amount of union already realized, or in process, in China, Japan, South Africa, Trinidad, and New Hebrides, instructs the committees to approach the various churches connected with this Alliance, with the expression of the Christian and brotherly regards of the Council, soliciting, at the same time, an early expression of their views and suggestions on these important topics. Further, in view of reported restrictions and hindrances to missionary work, in various fields, the Council agrees that in the event of an executive commission of the Council being appointed at a subsequent meeting, it be part of the duty of such executive to adopt means for the removal of hindrances, and for the deliverance of preachers and converts from persecution.

"Finally, the Council, whilst rejoicing greatly because of the accounts brought to them from afar by their beloved missionaries, and acknowledging with heart-felt gratitude the goodness of the Lord in so graciously blessing the efforts already made for the proclamation of the Gospel in all the world:

"The Council would remind their brethren in the fellowship of the Lord, that an adequate response to his call will never be given until every Christian who has received the gospel owns that, in respect of this gospel, he is a debtor to the Christless world, and in a spirit of self-sacrificing love prays, works, and gives for the universal extension of the kingdom of God; and the Council therefore express the earnest hope that, with a new consecration of heart, ministers, office-bearers, and members of churches will endeavor, to the utmost of their ability, to fulfil the commandment of Him to whom all power is given in Heaven and on Earth."

The fourth day was devoted to Continental Churches, the report of the Committees, and the addresses of the representatives from the Continent. The following action was taken:

"The Council receive the report of the Committees on *Continental* Churches, and thank them for their diligence. They reappoint the committees—British and American.

"The Council are gratified to learn that the movement, reported on at last meeting, in behalf of the Waldensian Church has been completely successful. They are deeply interested in the account given of the churches of Bohemia and Moravia (and especially of the celebration of the Centenary of the Edict of Toleration in 1881). They heartily approve of the effort which is in progress to raise a sum of £5,000 in behalf of important objects connected with these ancient churches, and they instruct the committee to prosecute the effort to a close.

"The Council have heard, with lively satisfaction, the addresses of their honored and beloved brethren, representing several churches on the Continent. They assure these brethren of their warm sympathy; and they respectfully commend their cause to the prayers and the generous support of the stronger churches of the Alliance. They charge their committee to do what in them lies to promote the well-being of the Reformed Churches of the Continent.

"The Council remit to the Business Committee to nominate members of these committees, and report at a future session."

The following resolution was also passed, after the addresses from the Continental brethren:

"That it be remitted to the Continental committees to take into consideration the spiritual wants of the large and continually increasing number of British and American Presbyterians visiting the Continent, and, if they think fit, to communicate with the supreme courts of the various Presbyterian churches, with the expression of the hope that they may deem it right to take action in connection with this important subject."

Saturday was devoted to a pleasant excursion to Giant's Causeway. On Sunday the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was observed at St. Enoch's Church, by appointment of the Council. The Presbyterians of the city, in large numbers, took part, and there seems to have been general satisfaction with the services.

On Monday the most important item was the report of the Special Committee on Rules of Order. This Committee was appointed to do the work neglected by the Committee appointed at Philadelphia. Mr. Junkin, Convener of the Committee, gave in the following report :

"That they recommend, That the Council adopt, for the guidance of the present and future meetings of the Council the rules of order in use in the largest church which may be connected with the Alliance in the country where the Council, for the occasion, happens to meet ; and that such rules be printed and circulated among the members of the Council at their successive meetings."

This report was debated for some time, and then it was recommitted, with instructions to prepare rules for the Council. The Committee was a large and representative one, but they were unable to reach an agreement. Subsequently they reported the progress they had made, and the points of disagreement, and the whole matter was referred to the Executive Commission.

It is our conviction that the original report of the Committee is in every respect the wisest and safest course. There is considerable diversity in the rules of order of the various bodies constituting the Alliance. The difference is that of nationality rather than of ecclesiastical organization. The rules of order in the church courts are adapted to the rules of order of the deliberative bodies of the particular country. It is easier and better to adopt, for the time being, the rules of the country in which the Council meets. Courtesy leads to this. Convenience of the audience, of the reporters, of the general public favors it. They would be confused by foreign rules or by mixed rules. It would be easier to follow the fixed rules of another nation than to follow a mixture of the rules of several nations. It will be difficult for the members and the moderators to divest themselves of the rules familiar to them, and assume, for the time being, rules of a mixed system peculiar to the Alliance. It would be easier for the time being to acquire the rules familiar to the country where the Alliance meets. The chief reason that caused the rejection of the unanimous report of the Committee was the feeling excited in the Council by the criticism of some of the daily papers of Belfast, on the action upon the Consensus, to the effect that the Council could agree upon nothing and were sure to disagree. This sentiment recommitted the report, and assigned the Committee a Herculean task—which they could not do. It was then given to the Executive Commission, who will probably fall back on the original report of the Committee.

Wednesday opened with a report by James Croil, Esq., on the Eldership. The report was followed by a number of papers on church work, and discussions. It resulted in the appointment of a Committee "on Woman's Work and Scriptural reference thereto," Prof. Charteris, chairman, and it was resolved to give it a place in the programme of next Council.

In the evening Rev. R. H. Lundie, of Liverpool, after his address on Tem-

perance, moved the following resolutions, which, after they were revised and amended, were adopted as follows :

This Council, having given serious consideration to the subject of Intemperance, express their earnest desire that measures may be taken in all the countries and churches represented in this Alliance, to deal effectually with this great evil : in reference to which they desire to record :

- 1st. That they deplore the prevalence of drunkenness, with its manifold attendant evils.
- 2d. That they believe that drunkenness is encouraged and promoted in the United Kingdom and America by the excessive facilities which exist for obtaining strong drink.
- 3d. That with regard to the United Kingdom they are persuaded that the state of opinion generally, and especially in all branches of the Church of Christ, is such as fully to warrant the introduction, and to assure the passing of, a wise and comprehensive measure of legislation on the subject of temperance.
- 4th. That such measure should secure the entire closing of public houses on the Lord's Day ; and further, should place the issue and control of licenses in the hands of License Control Boards elected by the people.
- 5th. That the Council regard this question as one of such urgency that it should be dealt with at once.
- 6th. That this resolution be transmitted to the churches in the Alliance, with the expression of the earnest hope that in their corporate capacity they will support all wisely considered legislative measures for the diminution of the appalling evils of intemperance, and that ministers and office-bearers and members will do their utmost to promote temperance by their personal example, by moral suasion, and by organizations enlisting the efforts of Christian people in this direction.

On Wednesday Prof. A. F. Mitchell gave in his report on the *Desiderata* of Presbyterian History, and presented to the Council a printed copy of the original citation of Patrick Hamilton for heresy. The report created considerable interest. It resulted in the following action :

The Council authorize the Committee to have the returns bound in a volume for preservation, and also to make such arrangements as they are able for publishing them in whole or in part.

Farther, considering that the quincentenary of the death of Wyclif falls to be celebrated in December next, the Council recommends to the Ministers of the Allied Churches to embrace the opportunity the celebration of it will afford not only to direct attention to the work of the great reformer before the Reformation (to whom both the Anglo-Saxon and Bohemian races owe so much), but also to give what help they can to the movement now being made under the patronage of the Lord Mayor of London and the "Wyclif Society," to raise a fund to defray the cost of transcribing his Latin writings from the MSS. in the libraries of Vienna and Prague, and so to supply one of the greatest *desiderata* in connection with the preliminary history of the Reformation.

It is very desirable that Presbyterians throughout the world should co-operate in this great movement. Wyclif was not only a Reformer before the great Reformation, but he was a Puritan before the Puritans, the one before all others in British history to whom the roots of the British Reformation go back. No one can understand the history of the Reformation in Scotland and Ireland and England, and its wondrous triumphs in America and the British colonies, until he has studied the movements that led thereto, and especially the life and writings of Wyclif, from which these movements sprang. It is a sin and a shame that the churches of Great Britain and America should allow the original MSS. of the Reformer to lie unpublished in the libraries of the Universities of Vienna and Prague. If a considerable number of Presbyterian and Reformed ministers and laymen and institutions of learning would send in their subscriptions to the Wyclif Society, this reproach would be rolled away from us.

The last day of the Alliance was the best day. The Committee on the Better Organization of the Alliance reported the following sketch of an extended Constitution adapted to the present condition and needs of the Alliance. After long and careful discussion and some amendments it was adopted as follows :

I.—THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION.

1. There shall be appointed by the Council at each meeting an Executive Commission, whose function shall be, during the intervals between the meetings of Council, to promote the objects of the Alliance.
2. This Commission shall consist of not fewer than fifty members, and be divided into two or more Sections ;—at present, into a European Section and an American Section, each having power to fill vacancies in its own number.
3. Seven shall constitute a quorum of each section, and at least that number of members shall reside within reach of a convenient place of meeting.
4. It shall be for the consideration of the Executive Commission whether separate auxiliary Alliances shall also be formed for the Continent of Europe and the Colonies of Great Britain, or whether these shall be included in sub-Sections, under the other Sections. The Commission shall report to next meeting of Council, giving an account of the operations of all its Sections.

II.—OBJECTS OF THE COMMISSION.

The objects of this Executive Commission shall, with due regard to the constituent Churches, be such as the following :—

1. To carry out the decisions of the Council.
2. To superintend the printing and publication of its Proceedings.
3. To Communicate with the Churches of the Alliance. All communications of Committees to Churches to be transmitted through the Commission.
4. To collect and publish information respecting the Reformed Churches and their work.
5. To send Deputations to Continental or Colonial Churches, or to Foreign Mission stations when occasion requires and the funds admit.
6. To extend sympathy and assistance to all Missions, Missionaries, and Churches, but especially when these are under persecution.
7. To hold Public Meetings in order to communicate information respecting the Alliance, and to make known and promote its objects as may be deemed expedient.
8. To aid standing Committees by supplementing their number when the services of Convener or members may have been lost through death, sickness, or removal ; and to render to committees such other aid as may be in their power.
9. To prepare the Programme for the next Meeting of Council.
10. To receive the Credentials or Commissions of delegates to the Council.
11. To arrange for the printing, in good time, of papers—especially reports necessary for the use of the Council.
12. To publish, if judged desirable, a journal, as the official record or organ of the Alliance ; the Commission having a right to employ a portion of its income in conducting and maintaining such a periodical.
13. To raise the funds needful for the work of the Alliance.

III.—THE SECRETARY.

The Executive Commission shall have power to appoint a Secretary, who shall assist the Executive in carrying on all its work.

The Secretary shall divide his time between the two Sections of the Commission, and shall act as Stated Clerk to the meetings of Council.

The Secretary shall receive a salary whose amount shall be determined by the Executive Commission.

IV.—FINANCE.

The ordinary revenue of the Commission shall be raised from two sources.

1. The Churches of the Alliance shall be asked to raise the sum of at least One Pound (or Five Dollars) per annum for each Delegate that they are entitled to send to the Council.

2. Donations and Subscriptions. In ordinary years the sum to be secured as the income of the Alliance shall be One Thousand Pounds, or Five Thousand Dollars; and in the year when the meeting of Council is held, Fifteen Hundred Pounds, or Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars. Out of this fund shall be paid all those expenses of the meetings which are not strictly connected with the accommodation of the Council and its members.

V.—COMMITTEES.

In the appointment of Standing Committees care shall be taken that a quorum of members reside within reach of the Convener, who shall obtain, by correspondence, the opinions of members residing at a distance.

Conveners of Committees must forward their reports to the Secretary in time for their being printed and put into the hands of members previous to the meeting of the Council, else the consideration of such report may be deferred till next meeting of Council.

VI.

The Council requests the delegates to lay before the Supreme and other judicatories of the Church to which they belong a copy of this paper.

With reference to the Secretary the following instruction was given to the Executive Commission :

Such Secretary, however, shall not be appointed until,

1st. The Executive Commission shall have given to the present clerks a sum of Three Hundred Pounds in consideration of services hitherto unremunerated,—and

2d. Until arrangements for a stated income are so definitely made as to warrant the appointment. In the meantime the business of the Alliance will be conducted by the present clerks.

We have not been able to learn the names of the British, Continental, or Canadian members of the Commission. The American members are the following: Talbot W. Chambers of the Reformed (Dutch) Church, chairman; A. A. Hodge, C. A. Briggs, S. M. Hamilton, W. M. Breed, C. A. Pomeroy, Dr. Wiswell, ministers; M. K. Jessup, Geo. Junkin, and Daniel P. Eells, elders of our own Church, Dr. B. Bausmann and Dr. E. P. Herbruck of the Reformed Church (German); Dr. McBride and Elder A. C. Stewart of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Dr. James Boyce of the Associate Reformed Church of the South, Alex. Kerr of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, N.A., M. W. Henry of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in U. S. A., Dr. Junkin and J. H. Smith of the Southern Presbyterian Church, Dr. Wm. Roberts of the Welsh Presbyterian, Dr. W. J. Robinson and Dr. Dales of the United Presbyterian, and Elder Wm. Clark of the Reformed (Dutch).

This Executive Commission has an important work to perform during the interval of the meetings of the Council. It is designed to have the same relation to the Council as the Commissions of the Scotch Presbyterian Churches have to the General Assemblies. It is clothed with all the authority of the Alliance during the intervals, and it will be able to act with great weight in questions of moment.

The first thing to be done is for the Alliance to pay its debts to its clerks. It was determined as a simple matter of justice that this should be accomplished before the Secretary can be appointed. It is greatly to be desired that these funds should be immediately forthcoming ere the Executive Commission holds its autumn meeting. £300, or \$1,500, are due. We hope that

Dr. Chambers will receive the \$750 due from our American churches ere he call the Commission together. It is understood that \$3,000 are needed from the American Churches during the coming year. Until a reasonable prospect of raising this appears, the Executive Commission will be powerless, and the important work it has to do will remain without initiation. The sum is infinitesimal when compared with the magnitude of the body and the vast possibilities before it.

The Council adjourned after resolutions of congratulation and thanks. It has risen to a greater height than the previous Councils in the amiable solution of questions of grave difficulty, in the determination to advance in Foreign Missions, in work on the Continent, and in all practical church enterprises; and finally in the unanimous reorganization of itself, and in the provision for its continued life in an efficient Executive Commission. Indeed, the Council squarely confronted every practical question, and came to harmonious and adequate solutions of them all. It has not accomplished so much for *doctrine* as the previous Councils, but it has accomplished vastly more for Christian practice.

The next Council is to meet in London in 1888, on the two-hundredth anniversary of the British Revolution. That will be a fitting opportunity for a rally of the Puritan and the Reformed forces, such as will be distinctly recognized and adequately improved. To this Council the Presbyterian and the Reformed hosts may look forward with glad anticipation and with courage and without regret for any action of the past Councils. The Alliance had its birth in London. It has passed through its childhood at Edinburgh and Philadelphia. It has shown its youthful vigor at Belfast. We may expect its full maturity in London.

C. A. BRIGGS.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN RICHARD BAXTER AND THOMAS GATAKER WITH REFERENCE TO THE SALVATION OF BAPTIZED CHILDREN.

The library of the late Dr. Williams, Grafton Street, London, is very rich in books and manuscripts of the 16th and 17th centuries, relating to Puritanism and its history. Among the manuscripts are several volumes of the unpublished correspondence of Richard Baxter. While engaged upon these manuscripts last May, for another purpose, I discovered the two letters given below. They are Nos. 39 and 40 in Vol. III. of the Baxter Letters. Permission to copy them and publish them was kindly given by the Rev. Mr. Hunter, the courteous and attentive librarian, and faithful transcripts of the originals were made. The matter contained in these letters will be interesting and valuable to all those who value the views of these two great Puritans upon the important theme discussed by them. I have given a few brief annotations in order to explain certain statements which might otherwise be obscure to the general reader. There are many other early manuscripts and tracts of exceeding rarity, illustrating the early days of Puritanism and its doctrinal history, which we are willing to give to the readers of the REVIEW, if they should express the desire for them.

C. A. BRIGGS.

(1). *Letter from Richard Baxter to Thomas Gataker.*

REVEREND AND MUCH HONOURED FATHER:

Though your fame and labours caused me to expect as much candour, condescension & christian love from you as from any man whose face I never saw; yet was I so conscious of my owne unworthiness that I durst not have presumed to expect neere so much expression of your estimation, respect, & extraordinary favour, as in your welcome lines I founde; for likely the remnants of my pride may somewhat excite me to a gladder reception of your Kinde expressions; for it cannott be altogether void of temptation that soe judicious a man should manifest such respect, & one so able to honour, should doe it in so great a measure, but yet I hope the predominate affection is my hearty love to your excellent judgment, great learninge, Piety, Humillity, christian Moderation, & other graces of Christ for which you are famous, for which as your publick labours are pretious to me, so must these private Testimonies be; your Kinde acceptance of my poore labours is much different from the angry expressions of some others, whom as I would not willingly offend, soe I am out of hope to please, & the blame its like may be divided between us, for I am too conscious of frailty to justify my selfe (to some of them I have writt an Apologie in the end of my method for peace in this 2nd edition.) As for the later (tendinge to Concord) though God hath given me in this County amonge those Brethren that I have opportunity to converse with, unexpected successe, yet truly the face of the divided church is soe dolefull to me & the implacableness and generall aversness from reconcilliation is soe greate even amonge the ministry yea the learned and the Godly that it almost overwhelmes me with sorow to think of it, when we have done all that we can, we cannott get men soe much as to set themselves resolvedly, dilligently & with unwearied patience to consult among themselves to finde out termes of Accomodation, ffarre are we from being soe arrogant as to expect that all or any other should be tyed to our proposalls; Could we but get them to consult of better, or any that will doe the thinge, we have our ends. But, alas! even the leaders of Christ's flock doe some of them only quarrell with words, & carpe at other mens' endeavours; others are soe passionately adicted to their parties & particular opinions that the zeale for these consumeth all motions & inclinations to reconcilliation, others look soe much at the wills of men in power, & others soe much at their worldly Interests, & others are contented to looke on & do noe harm & be silent spectators of our callamitous devisions, & the number of the zealously, industriously peaceable is soe small that I can hardly forbear of despairinge of our recovery, lookinge on our wounds as incurable in this life, & sayinge I shall never see unity untill I come to heaven. Truly these thoughts doe daily break my heart, & almost make me weary of this world.

Alas! that not only Godly Christians, but soe eminent able preachers of the Gospell after such experience of the efforts of division as the world scarce ever knew before, that hath seene what it hath done in Scotland, & felt what it hath had done in England, & soe what it is threateninge to the forreigne

reformed churches, & have read what it hath done in all Ages since Christ should yet have soe little mind of unity, & noe more deny themselves to attain it, nor bestirre themselves more industriously in followinge after it. Are such fitt for the everlastinge peace and Unity? Doe they consider the sum of the 2nd table of God's commandments? Doe they understand and deeply consider the articles of the Creede, the Catholic Church, & Comunion of Saints? Are they fitt to say aright the first word in the Lord's prayer, which intimates that Christians should worship God as members of the universall body, & not as devided, and of parties, & should come upon the comon Interest of Christians, & not upon devidinge Interests. But I overrun my selfe in loquacity to you, the comon fault of troubled & querulous men.

A grieved mind findes ease in Lamentations especially when to a freinde. It is a kinde of disburdeninge, that through God's mercy I understand that there are in most parts of the Land some sons of peace that are excited extraordinarily to the healinge of the breaches; we had pious congratulatory letters the last weeke from an Association in Cumberland that had begun longe before we published our Agreement,* but soe deserted by the Congregationall Brethren whose Comunion they desired, that they would not once vouchsafe to reade their proposalls. (Oh how unlike to the spirit of Christ)! Soe from other parts we have letters from some learned pious Brethren & some that were of your late Assembly,† that are zealous for their worke of unity & reformation, but Alas! borne downe by the multitude of dissenters or utterly discouraged by the stifness of some, the pride and selfe seekinge of others, & the contempt and negligence of the rest. But this is not my present buisness which imboldeneth me againe to interrupt your more serious thoughts; But it is: 1st To returne you the thankes of my brethren of this Association for your free & ready comunication of your advice in the matter propounded to you. 2nd. To returne you my owne most hearty thankes, as for your former booke, & your undeserved respect for me therein manifested, soe for your last which you were pleased to send me (which yet I confess at the first sight did move in me much indignation against the vile wretch that was the occasion of your trouble, & a little that you would soe vallue and honour him as to take any notice of him, & bestow soe much of your pretious time on him; till upon perusall I founde he had occasioned you to draw forth soe much usefull matter). 3. But my great buisness with you, I know not how to express. I finde in your epistle to your discept: de Baptism: that you have answered Bishop Davenant's Theses De Baptism. & are inclined to publish them.‡ I confess my selfe very much at a loss in that point [Whether the Covenant to the Faythfull & their seede sealed by Baptisme doe not put the children of all true beleivers into a state of certaine Justification by remission of originall sin, & soe have present right to Salvation] which yet is a loseable right though true

* *Christian Concord*; or, the Agreement of the Associated Pastors and Churches of Worcester-shire with R. B.'s explication and defence of it, and his exhortation to Unity, etc. 1653.

† This was the Westminster Assembly of Divines.

‡ *De Baptismatis infantilis vi efficacia disceptatio privatim habita, inter virum celeberrimum Deum Samuel. Ward. et Thomam Gatakerum, etc. Londini, 1652.*

sanctification & the remission accompanyinge it be never lost, which is the summe of Davenant's Theses except one darke word which he addeth about givinge of the holy Ghost to them, wherein I leave him, & he professeth his uncertainty. On the one hand, it sticketh much with me, as seeminge unlikely, that God should give Remission & right to Salvation without givinge the Spirit for sanctification (which you here dispute against). On the other side these things trouble me. 1st. Is it not the same covenant that is made to the faithfull & their seede, which therefore, givinge present remission to the one, doth allsoe give it to the other, seinge the parent's faith is the sole condition for them both & their child taken in as a Member of the parent. 2nd. If the Covenant give not remission of sin to our infants, then they are as unpardoned as Infidells, seeinge God giveth right to impunity only by the Covenant, & what is not promised or given we cannott beleive, nor must presume to affirme. 3. If the Covenant doe give remission to them, it is either to all or some, if to all, that is that is disputed for: if but to some, either it is knowne who they are, or not, if it be, it must be by name, or some description, but such a thinge is noe where to be founde: to say it is to the Elect: 1st gives us noe more knowledge who is the person than if they said nothinge. 2nd. And it seemeth without Scripture, which sayeth not soe. 3rd. And against Scripture which giveth not Jus ad Impunitatem vel dissolutionem obligationis ad poenam (which is remission) to any quatenus elect, but quatenus beleivers & their seede (though it tell us God's purpose of pardoninge all the Elect). If it be not knowne who the persons are then. 1st. Soe leave the parents of them as hopeless as Mr. Tonibes & the rest of the Anabaptists doe, who make it a meere unrevealed thinge.* 2nd. Soe can urge them to noe duty in beleivinge or hopinge the Salvation of their dyinge infants, seeinge faith & hope are not larger than the promise: 3rd. What is it more to be amonge Infidells without the Church, than to be without hope, & strangers to the covenants which promise remission. 4th. How can ministers tell whom to baptize? 5. It will force us to the device of makinge two Covenants on God's part; An Internall [which we know not whether they are in or not] & an Externall [which we say they are in] as if God had made a distinct Covenant from that which promiseth Justification, that all the children of Christians shall have right to the seales, & soe one Covenant havinge it selfe noe seale doth promise right to the seales of the other covenant, but not to the thinge sealed, or given by that Covenant: when Script. speaketh but of one Convenant conferringe both outward & inward, comon, & speciall blessings. 6th. It will exceedingly harden the Anabaptists, it beinge allready their maine Argument, that we know not of any one infant that they are Elect, & soe forgiven, & therefore may not seale forgiveness to them. If we shall say that we baptize them for other ends & not for obsignation of remission, it will make thousands more Anabaptists, when they observe that both in the precept & promise & nature of the signe & the appli-

* John Tombes was a famous Baptist of the times, author of *Two Treatises and an Appendix* concerning Infant Baptism, London, 1645, and numerous other works on the same subject which were subsequently gathered into three large quarto volumes or Three Parts of the Full Review of the Dispute concerning Infant Baptism. London, 1645-1657.

catory Act, and the Covenant sealed, remission of sin is soe evidently the maine thinge intended, or at least essentiall to the Ordinance that they will be confident it will be good. Argueinge [such a man hath noe promise of remission, ergo he is not to be baptized] or [he may not be baptized for the remission of sin, ergo he may not be baptized]. It seemes to me that you judge as Dr. Twisse. That is in futuram ponatorum remissionem that they are baptized; If soe, then it will make thousands turne Anabaptists & say: 1st the seale should not soe longe anticipate the benefit. 2nd That Scripture never instituted or mentioned baptisme in futuram remissionem only, but in præsensem. 3. At least it doth the Infant noe good till then. 4th When is the time of that future remission; I suppose it will be said when themselves beleive, if soe, then it seemeth they have noe right to remission on the condition that their parents be beleivers, & soe are not in the Covenant that promisseth remission & therefore have noe right to the seale of the Covenant, & then if it be only their owne actuall beleivinge that is the Condition of their pardon, it standes with them before as with Infidells & it must be only their owne beleivinge that must give them right to the seales. 2. If it be only in futuram remissionem (when they beleive themselves) that they are baptized, then what more comfort hath the parent concerninge his dyinge Infant from any promise of God, than an Infidell, or at least than the Anabaptists give. Is faith itself promised to them at age, doubtless not to any but the Elect, & none knoweth who those be, & therefore none knoweth who shall be baptized in futuram remissionem. 3. The Synod of Dort sayeth Quandoquidem de voluntate dei ex verbo ipsius nobis est Judicandum, quod testatur liberos fidelium esse sanctos, non quidem natura, sed beneficio foederis gratuiti, In quo illi cum parentibus comprehenduntur, pii parents de Electione et salute suorum liberorum quos deus in infantia ex hac vita evocat dubitare non debent. But a man may well doubt of that which God never promised: 4. Antiquity seemeth wholly for this. 5. Doth not the words [I will be thy God, & the God of thy seede] assure it? for can God in a Covenant-sense be said to be their God whom he hateth, & who are unpardoned & have noe right to life? These arguments I confess sway me much towards Davenant's opinion, & the rather because the contrary arguments, though difficult seeme not soe difficult to solve as these are. 1. That of the loosinge of Justification I thought Davenant had tolerably answered. 2. That of Justifyinge those that are not really sanctified, I answered in my Accomodation with Mr. Bedford, annexed to the 3rd edition of my booke of Baptisme page 357. 358. 359.* yet I am still in doubt & dare not conclude which is the right, both because of the said difficulties & because of the contrary Judgment of your selfe & many more reverend Divines. I have told you my straites, but what releife to desire, I know not. I longe to see your Answer to Davenant, & yet dare not provoke you to publish it, lest he should prove in the right. All that I would request therefore, shalt be this: that if it be not loss of time to you nor hinderance to your more weighty employments, you would please to vouchsafe as

* *Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Churchmembership and Baptism.* 4th edition, 1656.

short an answer as you please (if plaine) to the foregoeing Arguments, if it be but one page. Indeed I apprehend soe much bold presumption in my request, that I had never had the courage to have preferred it to you, but that : 1. I see soe much love & condescension in your letters, & 2. I see you could spare soe much more time for Lilly.

Deare Sir : I dare noe longer detain you, but to tell you that I (who have longe been kept allive by prayer) doe heartily pray the Lord of the vineyard to lengthen your daies & strengthen you for his service & that there is noe Englishman livinge more revered & honoured then your selfe by

Your unworthy fellow-servant

Octr. 17th, 1653.

RICH^d: BAXTER.

(2). *Letter to Richard Baxter from Thomas Gataker.*

WORTHIE SIR :

Yours of the 17 of this instant, arrived with me the 26 of the same, in the forepart whereof I meet with those high and large elogies heaped by you upon me, which I may in no wise own or admit (being conscious to myself of so manie wants & weaknesses, encountred daylie with so manie dificulties in points deemed generallie plain & obvious evèn to ordinarie capacities, and both seeing and admiring those things in & from others, wherein so exact handling I find myself utterlie unable to come near them, among which some of you, especiallie from one, that hath ben from time to time so variouslie tossed to & fro, & exercised so incessantlie with such cruciating maladies, in neither kind whereof I must needs confess and acknowledge to the praise of God's great goodnes toward me, that I have ben ever much indebted), and my desire therefore is, that, if occasion of further enterours by writing between us shal be offered, such expressions for the future may be wholie forborn.

In your deploration of the greivous distractions and dissensions among the professed Ministers of Christ among us, I cannot but concur with you, as deeming it an evil wel worthie the bewailing even with an Ocean of tears : nor am I able to entertain hopes to see union settled among us, til we meet in another world.

For the main matter you insist upon, concerning mine *Animadversions* upon B. D.'s* *Theses* : it is tru, that I have ben and am still not unwilling to publish them, having ben earnestlie solicited, as wel by word of mouth, as by letters also, from divers Reverend Brethren so to do ; yea, indeed, had not the Stationer failed me, it had long ere this ben done.

And had God so disposed it, that your seat were neerer to my place of confined abode, I should not have ben nice of imparting them unto you, as I have done unto others, nor unwilling to receiv from you anie *Animadversions* upon, or exceptions unto anie particular therein contained.

* This was published in 1654 under the title : Reverendi viri Dom. Joannis Davenanti, . . . ad . . . Samuelem Wardum. . . . In qâ de Infantuum qorumvis rite Baptizmatorum statu disseritur nec ad controversiam de sanctorum perseverantiâ atq̃ Apostasiâ pertinere definitur unâ cum stricturis in eandem nonnullis ; authore Thomâ Gatakerò. London, 1654.

In breif, B. D.'s main *Proposition* is this: [Omnes baptizati ab originalis peccati reatu solvuntur: atque hic est primarius ejus [baptismatis, scil.] effectus; ex quo etiam dependet illorum quae dicitur regeneratio, justificatio, adoptio et ad regnum coeleste acceptatio.]

Now, sir, you seem to me to propound a far divers qestion from this, wherein Dr. W. and B. D. concur; to wit, [Whether the Covenant to the faithful & their seed sealed by baptism, do not put the children of all tru beleivers into a state of certain Justification by remission of original sin, and so of present right to Salvation.] And that this is a divers point from the former, is not difficult to discern. Since that the one makes remission of original sin, and consequentlie regeneratio, justificatio, adoptio &c. to be an effect of Baptism; presuming no such thing to be had before baptism: for indeed how can the effect precede its efficient? Whereas in the qestion by you propounded remission of original sin is presumed in the children of all tru Beleivers to precede their Baptism, as being by vertu of the Covenant already collated, and the Covenant onelie in Baptism sealed. So that, Sir, tho al were granted, that is, by you here averred, yet were B. D.'s Thesis no whit at all thereby helpt, nor my dispute against it at all thereby infringed.

Howbeit, because the Point that you propound to be discussed seems a matter of no smal moment, I shal not be backward to consider with you a litle more seriouslie of what you suggest, nor ashamed to discover to you mine eyther ignorance or want of settled resolution thereïn.

Concerning the state of infants, even of tru beleivers, the Scripture is by those here on the other side confest to be verie sparing; and in averring ought therein peremptorie we have great cause therefore to be verie warie, and my desire is so to be.

This premised, I proceed to consider of your Demands and Arguments, which seem intended to confirm the Affirmative of the Qestion above propounded, concerning the state of the infants of all true beleivers by vertu of the Covenant made to them & their seed.

And here your first demand is, whether it be not the same covenant that is made to both.

Whereunto I answer, that the Covenant made with either is the same.

Hence you reason, that the Covenant giving present remission to the one, doth give it also to the other, since that the Parents faith is the sole condition to them both; the child taken as a member of that Parent.

I answer; the Covenant at first made with anie partie, whither then, or after, or never a parent, was but conditional, entred into indeed instantlie on his profession to condescend thereunto & taking effect for remission of sins presentlie upon his faith unfeined, which cannot be without an inward chang of the soul, in which covenant the issu of such an one, if he have anie before or after is comprehended, on the same terms for the efficacie of it as with the Parents. But that the Child is therein considered as a member of the Parents, & is by its parents' faith discharged of the guilt of its sin, & put into an actual state of Salvation, is more, as I conceiv, then can certainlie be avowed, or from Scr. can be averred.

2. If, say you, the covenant give not remission of sins to our infants, then are they as unpardoned as Infidels, &c.

As unpardoned indeed, I grant : (as no les deeplie tainted then the issu of such) yet not as unpardonable, or out of hope of pardon, because foederati, consecrati, et fidei candidati, as Tertullian.

Al therefore that folowes concerning remission of sin given to all or to some onelie, & the restraint of it to the elect, (concerning which I have in divers places treated in my debate with the Dr.) & the uncertaintie thence arising whome to baptise, as also the device of divers covenants, &c. I conceiv to be at once cut of by what alreadie hath ben said ; further then which for my part I can not go.

But if we say we baptise infants for other ends, & not for obsignation of remission, it will make manie thousands Anabaptists &c.

I answer, 1. What is agreeable to truth & God's word, must be acknowledged & maintained whatsoever use men of corrupt minds shal make of it. *παν το αληθες συναληθευει*, from truth nothing but truth can rightlie be enforced or inferred.

2. It is an undeniable truth that baptism doth obsign remission of sins unto everie one that is baptized ; (as circumcision did the like unto each one that was circumcised, even to Ismael as wel as to Isaak, yea to Ismael not of original onelie, but of actual sin also, being as by just calculation is collected, about a dozen yeer old at least, what time he was circumcised) but in no other manner then remission is in the covenant implied & contened, for what can the seal obsign more then the word of the covenant, whereunto it is as a seal annexed. That which I conceiv yourself, do avow in Defence of Mr. Blake in your Appendix to that of Justification p. 65, 67, 70, 71.

As for the Anabaptists Objections. 1. The Seal should not so long anticipate the benefit. Whither it do anticipate the benefit, or no, or how long it doth, neither need we to enquire, nor can we certainlie say ; (some obsignatorie signs have by far longer time anticipated the benefit thereby obsigned, then this in likelihood in most that ever attain it. See Jer. 51 : 63, 64. Ezek. 37. 16, 22.) Yea tho the benefit obsigned be never attained, yet is not the obsignatorie sign therefore, aine whit the les such, as was circumcision such in Ismael as wel as in Isaak. It is enough unto us, that the initiatorie Seal of the Covenant belongs to our children, as wel as circumcision by God's undeniable Institution did to the children of all Israel, so long as their parents renounced not their covenant with God, whither the benefit did anticipate, or come after the admission thereunto, yea or never at al folowed, either in the one or in the other.

2. The Scripture never instituted or mentioned baptizing in futurâ remissionem, but in presentem. If the promises be in Scr. as wel de futurâ remissione, as de presenti, sure the seales annexed to those promises must of necessitie obsign as wel futurâ as presente. The Covenant entred by the ministerie of Moses between God & the whole bodie of the people, the men, women & little ones, was not for the benefit to take effect at present onelie, but long after. Deut. 29. 10-13 & 30. 1-6, as of renewing of circumcision the solemn seal of it by Joshua the same may be said. Josh. 5. 2-7.

3. That it doth the Infant no good til then.

As much good as circumcision did; which yet was deemed a matter of no smal esteem.

4. It is demanded, when the time is of that future remission.

For my part, I dare not say, that anie such ever shal be: since that in the Covenant sealed, as formerlie by circumcision, so now by baptism, no such thing is expressed, to wit, that the partie either circumcised or baptised, either hath alreadie, or hereafter shal have his sins forgiven him; onelie he is thereby solemnlie received into covenant with God on such terms as ar in that covenant contened. Nor doth it folow, that if they have no rights to remission, upon that condition, because their parents ar beleivers, that therefore they ar not in that covenant that promiseth remission, & consequentlie have no right to the seal of it.

For yourself before rejected that device of a twofold covenant. But the Covenant that by circumcision the Jews did & Christians, whither young or old, by baptism do now enter into, is a conditional Covenant; and the seals thereof therefore those may have right unto, unto whome remission is not peremtorile promised. As for those promises, that seem absolute, Jer. 31. 33, 34. Ezek. 36. 25-27. There is no remission of sin so promised, but that a gracious change wrought upon the heart is joyned therewith.

But a parent then can have no more comfort from anie promise of God concerning his child dieng. an infant then an infidel.

It foloweth not. God hath made in Scripture nanie promises of blessing the seed of the faithful for their parents sake, & of his loving affection to them for their godlie progenitors, which yet how far forth & in what manner he may please & shal see good to expres & make good unto the issu of such, we must, for ought I see, leav to his gracious pleasure without peremptorie determination of ought therein. Nor dare I herein speak so peremptorilie as the Synod of Dort doth; nor do Zanchie, Ursine, or divers other of our Divines, of whome see Malderi *Antisquodica*, p. 63, 64. Tho I confes that some of them in their Discourses & Disputes overthrow sometime with one hand, what they seem to build up with the other.

But Antiquitie, you say, seems wholie for this.

For what you mean, I wot not wel, but suppose, that neither yourself more then my self, wil subscribe to what the Ancients have most of them seemed at least to hold concerning the state of infants, the stupendious efficacie of Baptism administred to them, & the desperate condition of them dieng unbaptised, whereof I have spoken somewhat in my debate with the Dr. p. 104. 106. 204. 217. 268. 269. & more at large in my discours with the B.

But how can God in a Covenant sense be said to be their God, whome he hates, & who are unpardoned & have no right to life.

Sir, 1. I love not to speak over harshlie of God's affection to parties, I dare not say, he hates all, whose sins ar yet unpardoned, nor have yet an actual right unto life. The apostle saith of the Ephesians, that they were sometimes children of wrath, not hatred, as wel as the rest.

2. I suppose those words of Moses must be taken in a covenanting sense;

Thou hast avouched Jehova this day to be thy God ; & Jehova hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people. Deut. 26. 17, 18. & those yet more expresselie, Deut. 29. 10-13. You stand all of you this day before the Lord—all the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, or women,—to enter into the Covenant that Jehova thy God maketh with thee this day ; that he may establish thee to be a peculiar people to himself, & that he may be God to thee, or thy God, as he hath said unto thee, & as he hath sworn to thy Fathers, to Abr. Isaac and Jacob. Yet who dare affirm, that all those whome upon those terms God then took into Covenant, had their sins pardoned, or had right to life eternal? Those terms therefore do not necessarily imply or infer such an absolute promise of remission of sins as is pretended : insinuate onelie a solemn entrance into such covenant with God as hath ben before specified, & which alone, your self do seem to acknowledge : in regard whereof as the professors of Christianitie now, so they then were said to be God's peculiar, sacred, sanctified people, & their issue by birth an holie seed, unto whome the Covenants, & promises, & services, & oracles, & adoption appertained, as to children of the Kingdom, & not sinners as the Gentiles. Exod. 31. 13. Deut. 7. 6. Ezra. 9. 2. Rom. 9. 4. Math. 8. 12. Gal. 2. 15.

But these considerations, you say, sway you to B. D.'s opinion, which yet to me seem to bend an other way, clean beside that, which the B. concurring with the Dr. maintaineth, yea, directlie to contradict it.

For as for justifieng such as ar not reallie sanctified, I shew the contrarie determined by the B. himself on Col. 2. 12. Nor can I find what you say of it in my book, being the first edition of yours, & having not neer so manie pages as your letter here quoteth.

And for your solicitude, lest the B. should be found in the right ; for the main point wherein I oppose, as the Dr. so the B. I hope you may rest free as concerning me, when you shal understand on what ground I except, & how far I proceed, mine exception being in these words propounded :

[Nullus planè (quod mirum valdè) scripturæ sacræ textus apexve produci-
tur, quo dogma tam controversum statuminetur], and in my conclusion in these, [Datis concessisque universis, quae ad conclusionem privariâam vel eliciendam vel suffulciendam istic aut sumuntur aut citantur ; nec contraire dogma hoc sententiæ in Synodo Dordrectana stabilitæ de Sanctorum sive fideliam perseverantiâ ; nec licere aut Arminianis, aut Pontificiis, aut nostris etiam adversus sententiam illo tempore aliquod ubive. Mutuari, dato Augustinum, Prosperum, veteres alios, concilium Milevitanum, Valentinianum, et Pontificios omnes nostros plerosque (quod non conceditur tamen) idem censuisse ; dato insuper catenæ Apostolicæ illium nexum nullum hac ratione imminutum haberi ; nec argumentum aliquod aut istic aut alibi usque adducitur, quo dogma istud necessario evertat, sed infirma et futilia esse universa quae in contrariam allata sunt ; datis, inquam his omnibus, nihil tamen videri dictum, quod veritatem dogmatis istius evincat, nisi ex sacris Oraculis, quae sicut sola *θεοπνευστα* ita sola sunt *αυτοπιιστα*, producat, quod assensum vel extorqueat, vel exigat saltem. Hoc autem est hactenus *ανεπιχειρητον* et nos itaque jure merito de hoc dogmate *επεχομεν*].

And thus, Sir, I have as plainlie as I could, delivered you my thoughts concerning those doubts propounded by you about that Proposition, not the B's but your own, wherein yet upon the same general account I can not concur with you, you will, I hope, take in good part my plain and free dealing therein, withal, having this opportunitie & occasion, I shal entreat you to accept of a sorie trifle, which some Helvetian frends have drawn from me, who sent over those Theses de Justificatione, for some special reason, requesting my judgement of them, which to save labour of transcribing, I caused to be printed; that together with sone other things, I might by the Helvetian Ambassador, by whome I received letters from thence, being now upon departure transmit it. I have taken the boldnes withall to adjoin thereunto another not much bigger, containing a breif debate of the same subject, having sone of them by me, & supposing you might not have formerlie seen it, as having not strayed far or much abroad. I had divers years since spent manie sermons on that Argument in general (wherein I had endeavoured also to reconcile the sayengs of those tru Apostles Paul & James somewhat otherwise then the most) out of Rom. 3. 28. having upon a speciall occasion undertaken that task at the request of some of mine auditorie, which albeit I was then afterward importuned to publish, & the rather to encite me thereunto, because I alledged that I had onelie some scattred & confused notes of what I then delivered, was told by a special frend that I should be furnished with a fair copie of what I had delivered, written out for the parties private use by a neer kinsman, and that partie then mine assistant, which would have been a great help and ease to me therein; yet finding in the Assemblie, whereof I was called to be a member, much eager opposition by some against some things therein maintained, & that howsoever divers of them (among whome the Prolocutor Dr. Twisse, & one of the independent partie) concurred with me, yet the major part went the other way, I refused to condescend to my frend's desires therein, tho. having in Latin formerlie manifested my mind in the point then agitated, by debates both with Lucius of Basel and Gomarus about it, because I would not be deemed a disturber of the peace of our church, and the union thereof as wel in Doctrine as Discipline as much then hoped as long desired. But since that, our hopes & expectations being as appears frustrate, & manie strange fancies started by Sectaries in that Argument, I had begun to entertain some thoughts of giving way to the former motion of frends, the rather encouraged thereunto, in hope of help from that fair copie, and the Notes taken by mine assistant. But while I put off this task, in regard of some other things hanging on my hand, it pleased God within a short time to call away no les then three eminent servants of his, who had in the work of the ministerie ben mine assistants, among whome the partie before mentioned not inferior for part or pietie to eyther of the two other; and that fair copie perished by fier together with al the books & papers of the partie for whome it was transcribed, neither can among his papers, since his decease, be found ought save some imperfect notes here & there of some of those sermons.

Nevertheles, if the Lord shal be pleased to lengthen out the time of my life (which is verie uncertain) unto the Spring, together with anie competent

degree of strength of bodie & mind, in either whereof I find a daylie decay, and have little cause therefore to nourish anie strong hope of it ; but if he shal see good so to deal with me, I may then peradventure take some time to peruse what ragged notes I have lieng by me, & assay to peice up somewhat out of them ; not neglecting mean while to furnish my self with such Autors as may anie way further me in the disquisition of anie truth concerning that subject ; in which kind I promise my self much help from your labours, when your Aphorisms shal come forth again revised and^denlarged according to your purpose in that behalf intimated. But, Sir, I fear I tire you out with these tedious discourses amid your weightier affairs, & in your valetudinarie condition, especially with this my rude, ragged, & scarce legible character.

Be pleased yet to reckon them as fruits of his cordial affection, who highlie honoureth God's graces brightlie shining forth in you, & your fervent zeal for his glorie among the rest, which addeth much luster to the rest, & who desires to be esteemed

Your sincere-hearted, tho. feeble-handed frend and fellow-servant,

THO. GATAKER.

Rederith, Novembr. 1, 1653.

VIII.

REVIEWS OF

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

I.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

HISTORY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By EDWARD W. E. REUSS. Translated from the fifth revised and enlarged German edition, with numerous bibliographical additions. By EDWARD L. HOUGHTON. Two vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

The veteran professor of Strassburg is one of the ablest Biblical scholars of the age. He has all the originality and freshness of Ewald, but lacks his wonderful insight and profundity. He has, however, a vastly better style, and whatever he writes is attractive, yes, charming. He has done more than any one else to transform the study of Biblical Literature from a merely dry and technical "Introduction" into one of the most interesting and delightful of all studies by conducting it on historical and critical principles and methods. Like Ewald he is at home in both the Old and the New Testaments, but he is most at home in the New Testament, as Ewald was most at home in the Old. He presents his view of his work in such masterly language that we cannot refrain from quoting him :

"The form which we here give the science is a natural consequence of the historical point of view to which we adhere. Aside from the greater extent of the material, this history is distinguished from the ordinary Introductions in that here the facts are arranged immediately as results of a previous criticism, while elsewhere criticism adapts itself to the arrangement of the facts determined by custom. Our work is not intended as an introduction to something else, but as an independent portion of history, ennobled by the dignity of the subject matter, given coherence by a ruling idea, bounded by its own aim, and complete, if not in knowledge and judgment, of which indeed none may boast of the highest degree, yet in the purpose to combine the manifold and inspire the dry and dead with life and motion." (p. 12).

This work of Reuss has long been known to Biblical scholars, and has passed through five editions in the original German. It is all the more welcome now to American students in a translation of unusual correctness and elegance. Mr. Houghton deserves the thanks of the American public for the excellence of his work, not only in translation, but also in the Bibliographical notes referring to British and American Literature, which are in their proper places throughout the work.

The book is, furthermore, remarkable for its combination of the three departments of Biblical Literature: The Higher or Literary Criticism, the Lower or Textual Criticism, and the Criticism of the Canon, together with an exceedingly concise and valuable history of interpretation. It would be difficult to find a book more closely packed with information with reference to these departments of New Testament study.

The point of view of Reuss, as is well known, is not orthodox. It can hardly be regarded as evangelical. But it is reverent and devout while it is critical, historical and scholarly. While we cannot accept many of his views of the New Testament

Literature, yet we are always stimulated by them to fresh investigation. The book, if used with caution, under the advice and direction of competent instructors, will prove far more helpful than Bleek or De Wette or any other of the so-called *Introductions to the New Testament*.
C. A. BRIGGS.

THE PULPIT COMMENTARY. Edited by the Rev. Canon H. D. M. SPENCE, M.A., and by the Rev. JOSEPH S. EXELL, M.A. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. Exposition and Homiletics by the Right Hon. and Right Rev. Lord A. C. HERVEY, D.D. 2 vols., pp. xiv, xi, 457, 345. About 162 pages of Exposition and 640 of Homiletics.

LEVITICUS. Introductions by the Rev. R. COLLINS, M.A., and Rev. Prof. A. CAVE, B.A. Exposition and Homiletics by Rev. F. MEYRICK, M.A. pp. xiv, xxxi, x, vi, 435. About 78 pages of Exposition and 357 of Homiletics.

NUMBERS. Introduction by Rev. THOMAS WHITELAW, M.A. Exposition and Homiletics by Rev. R. WINTERBOTHAM, LL.B., M.A., B.Sc. pp. xxii, xvi, iv, 461. About 143 pages of Exposition and 318 pages of Homiletics.

DEUTERONOMY. Exposition by Rev. W. L. ALEXANDER, D.D. Homiletics by Rev. C. CLEMANCE, B.A., D.D. pp. xliii, viii, 577. About 101 pages of exposition, and 476 of homiletics.

Of this series, fifteen volumes in all have been noticed in the present or recent numbers of the PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, including the Commentaries on Genesis, Exodus, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1 Samuel, Mark, 1 Corinthians, and one volume on Jeremiah, in addition to those named at the head of this notice.

Like their predecessors, the present group of volumes is characterized by the fact that much the larger part of their contents is in the form of sermons—sermons, sometimes barely sketched, and sometimes pretty fully written, both on particular texts and on connected passages. It follows, of necessity, that the volumes are much richer in the materials which bear on questions of practical edification, than in those which belong to minute criticism; although in critical matters, most of them are respectably full and able. They are further somewhat characterized by the avoidance of difficult questions, and by being written from the point of view of the Church of England. They are generally free, however, from anything that would be offensive to the adherents of the other Reformed Churches.

The book of the *Acts* is the exegetical battle-ground of the contending opinions which are held as to the organization and polity of the Christian Church; and Bishop Hervey has the misfortune to be the advocate of an ecclesiastical system which all Presbyterians know to be mistaken. His commentary on this book is very full and elaborate, and shows ability and industry. Among its commendable features is its comparison throughout of the English of the Authorized and the Revised versions. He is probably not chargeable with turning aside, for polemical purposes, from his proper duty as an expositor. But it is precisely thus that he shows himself judicious and effective in his polemical method. He argues without seeming to argue. Occupying the position of an exegete, rather than that of an advocate, he is at liberty to preserve a wise silence, both as to the positions opposed to his own, and as to the less tenable of the positions held by the men with whom he is ecclesiastically affiliated. But at every suitable point, he affirms the Anglican doctrines as to the rite of confirmation, the perpetuity of the apostolate, the primacy of Peter and other like matters, with a positiveness, and a matter-of-course air, which, to those who hold these doctrines to be true, must seem highly laudable. To men who are familiar with such topics, and on their guard, his arguments are not at all formidable; but this commentary would admirably serve the turn of one who was looking for the best possible book for prepossessing intelligent but inexperienced persons in favor of the Episcopalian form of Christianity.

Mr. Meyrick does not argue the question of the authorship of *Leviticus*. He simply affirms: "The second, third, and fourth of the books of Moses stand or fall together, nor is there anything in the book of *Leviticus* to separate it in respect to authenticity from *Exodus*, which precedes, and *Numbers*, which follows it." He dates the book by saying: "We may regard it as in the highest degree probable that the laws were written down as they were delivered to and by Moses during the fifty days previous to the departure of the children of Israel from Sinai, and that they were subsequently put together during one of the encampments in the wilderness."

After reading these statements, we are not surprised to find that the author has nothing more to say in regard to the literary structure and character of the book. His treatment throughout concerns the theological and practical themes which arise in connection with the sacrifices and other religious observances. The same statement applies to the "Essay on Sacrifice," and the dissertation on "The Levitical Sacrifices Literally Considered," which are prefixed, in this volume, to the commentary proper. All answer the question: What are the theological, spiritual, moral and liturgical lessons, which the Levitical observances taught the men who practiced them, and which they teach us? The vein thus opened is very rich, and has been so little worked for some generations past, that it is now quite fresh.

Of course, there are differences between the different writers engaged on the volume, both as to the answers they give to the question, and as to the quality of their work. But judging from the specimens tested, both will be found, in general, quite satisfactory. The doctrine that the Christian eucharist is of the nature of sacrificial worship is quite strongly insisted upon, as is, more mildly, the priestly character of the Christian ministry; but this is done, less by attacking the doctrines held by most of the readers of the PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, than by so defining sacrifice and priesthood as to render the position taken consistent with those doctrines. Mr. Collins says, for example, pp. xiii, xiv, that the Lord's Supper corresponds, not, indeed, to the offering of the sacrifice, but to the sacrificial meal eaten at some time after the offering. He does not say, however, what seems logically to follow, that there is therefore no room for any distinctively priestly functions in connection with the ordinance.

The typical character of the sacrifices, as foreshadowing the Christ, is made prominent in all parts of this volume. The object-lessons for matters of duty and of religious experience, as found in the sacrificial observances, in distinction from all sorts of allegorical interpretations, are strongly insisted upon. This is the more gratifying because just these lessons, while peculiarly valuable, have been too much neglected. The idea of the divine self-sacrifice for men is magnified, relatively, beyond what the premises will justify. In the introductory essays, and in parts of the other work, there is a failure to bring out distinctly the idea of the divine punishment for sin, as distinguished from that of supposed divine retaliation; of the consciousness that sin is ill-deserving as distinguished from the dread that God will take revenge upon us for it; and of the truth prefigured in the shed blood of the offerings, that the death of Christ is instead of the penalty due the sinner, rendering the remission of that penalty just. Mr. Cave defines sacrifice as the equivalent of *Qorban*, and as therefore including all possible gifts, services, and self-denials which we can offer to God. He has the right, of course, to make his own definitions; but when he takes a word which current usage connects with the altar, and eliminates from it the distinctive truth which usage has thus committed to it, he runs a risk of losing sight of that truth altogether. In the present case, he has not merely run the risk, but, so far as placing any emphasis on it is concerned, has actually lost the truth from sight. Humiliation for sin before God, the consciousness that one must either be justified or punished, the earnest prayer for pardon, have little or no part in his explanation of the meaning of the sacrifices. Most men have understood that the offerer leaned his hand upon the head of the victim as a sign

of confession of sin and contrition. Mr. Cave seems to understand that he slapped his hand down upon the victim's head, as much as to say: This is my animal: it is I who am making the Lord this present.

Much the same is true of the essay of Mr. Collins. Inquiring for the origin of the idea of sacrifice, he rejects the theory which derives it from that of divine retaliation. He holds that it came by primitive revelation both to Israel and to the other religions. He regards sacrifice as the foreshadowing of the divine self-sacrifice, to be manifested in Christ. But he is silent as to any connection it may have with punishment from God, in distinction from retaliation, or with penitence or conscious ill-desert on the part of the sinner.

Both these men, however, use the terms commonly employed in regard to the vicarious nature of the sufferings of Christ. These forms of language abundantly appear in the body of the volume. It by no means ignores this central truth.

In the introductory essay on the authenticity and authorship of *Numbers*, Mr. Whitelaw refers, for the general discussion of the subject, to the previous Pentateuchal Introductions, in the volumes on Genesis and Exodus. In the present essay, he confines himself to questions of detail specifically affecting *Numbers*. He defends the chronology of the book, as now written, defends the statistical numerals, and denies the alleged physical impossibilities in its statements as to the duties of the priests, the assembling of the congregation, the marching of the host, and the victory over Midian. As to authorship, he denies in detail the proofs commonly alleged for a late origin of the book, adduces four groups of phenomena in the book itself which seem to him to date it earlier than the entrance into the Promised Land, and reaches the conclusion: "While there is every probability that, like the rest of the Pentateuchal writings, it has been subjected to one or more revisions, and may even have suffered interpolation in unimportant passages, such as ch. xii. 3; (though this of course is not absolutely certain), yet in the main, and substantially as we still possess it, it proceeded as an original composition from the hand of Moses."

In the introduction to the commentary, which follows this introductory essay, Mr. Winterbotham takes the same ground, both as to the credibility and the authorship of the book, but less confidently. Naturally, therefore, he guards with especial care against the error of holding that the authority of the book, or of the other parts of the Scriptures, depends on these questions. He says, pp. vii, viii, xii: "When we come to examine the evidence for the Mosaic authorship of the whole book as it stands, it is astonishing how little it amounts to. There is not a single statement attached to the book to show that it was written by Moses. . . . It is, however, argued that our Lord himself has testified to the truth of the ordinary Jewish tradition by using the name 'Moses' as tantamount to the Mosaic books. . . . It is answered—and the answer is apparently incontrovertible—that our Lord merely used the common language of the Jews, without meaning to guarantee the precise accuracy of the ideas on which that language was based. . . . The common-sense of the matter seems to be, that unless our Lord's judgment had been directly challenged on the subject, he could not have done otherwise than use the common terminology of the day. To do otherwise had been the part, not of a prophet, but of a pedant, which he assuredly never was. . . . This part of the subject may be summed up by saying, that while the external evidence as to authorship is indecisive, and only obliges us to believe that 'the law' was given by Moses, the internal evidence is strong that the book . . . is substantially from the hand of Moses. The objections . . . are either in themselves captious and untenable, or are merely valid against particular passages."

As to the numerical difficulties, Mr. Winterbotham says, p. xv: "If the numbers recorded were given up as untrustworthy, it is certain that nothing else in the book would be directly affected. The numbers stand quite apart, at least in this sense, that they have no value and no interest whatever of any moral or spiritual kind.

Arithmetic enters into history, but it does not enter into religion. . . . If, then, any earnest student of Holy Writ should find himself unable to accept, as historically trustworthy, the numbers given in this book, he is not therefore driven to discard the book itself. . . . Rather than to do this, . . . he would do well to put aside the question of mere numbers as one which, however perplexing, cannot be looked upon as vital." This conclusion is more tenable than some of the statements on which it is based. For instance, the history of the chosen people is so vitally connected with religion, that religion cannot be indifferent to anything which "enters into" that history.

To discuss further the apologetic methods adopted by these authors, indicating in what respects they seem to be admirable, and in what respects the reverse, would transcend the limits of this notice. The expository treatment of the book of Numbers is much more full than that in most of the volumes of this series, and a cursory examination leads to the impression that it is of a high standard of excellence.

The volume on *Deuteronomy*, by the distinguished editor of Kitto's *Biblical Cyclopedia*, begins with an Introduction, which is mainly devoted to vindicating the Mosaic authorship of the book. This Introduction would fill about fifty-four pages of the body of the PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, and is, therefore, a somewhat full treatment of the subject. It has the compactness and point, though also the incompleteness, which belong to the best class of newspaper writing. The author holds that the last chapter of Deuteronomy was written later than Moses—perhaps by Ezra—but that all the rest, with the possible exception of a few glosses, is from the pen of Moses himself.

In many particulars, this Introduction merits especial approval. For example, the explanation given on pages xxvi, xxvii, of בְּעֵבֶר הִירְדֵן and of נֶגְבָה and other similar geographical terms, is the one warranted by common sense, and is in favorable contrast with the mistranslations adopted by some defenders of orthodoxy, and with the theory of glosses or textual changes held by others. Our author is wise, also, in elsewhere refusing to concede that alterations have been made from the original text; though some concessions of this sort appear in the exposition which do not appear in the Introduction. He displays similar wisdom in refusing to admit, page xxviii, that the historical books attribute priestly acts, in connection with the sacrifices, to Samuel and others, though some of his detailed statements on this point are rather obscure. The list of instances, given on pages vii to xiv, in which the Old Testament writers apparently use the book of Deuteronomy, is, on the whole, particularly well selected.

Less fortunate is the list of alleged archaisms on page xv. Says our author: "To the antique and genuinely Mosaic peculiarities of the Deuteronomist belongs also his love of pictures." Just as if there was any Old Testament writer who is not picturesque! Of the instances which follow, some would be generally admitted, and some would not.

Dr. Alexander, pages xxx, xxxi, accepts the alleged—but purely imaginary—fact that the Sanctuary at Shiloh was destroyed when the Philistines captured the ark; but he does not follow the current traditional fashion, and rest upon this fiction the whole defence of the Pentateuch.

He assumes, in refuting the charges of disagreement with the other Pentateuchal books, pages xx–xxvi, that the others had been written, each in the form in which it now stands, some years before the writing of Deuteronomy. The results of this assumption render this the least satisfactory section in the argument.

To us who accept the whole Bible as the word of God, it is also unsatisfactory that he classifies the testimony of the Old Testament as *traditional*, along with that of the patristic writers, and in a different class from that of Jesus and the apostles, page vi.

The expository parts of this volume have the especial merit of being rich in facts. That the homiletical editors have a broad idea of what constitutes a sermon, appears, for example, in the case of the apologetic lecture of J. O. on Deut. xxxi. 9, 24-26, on page 486. In the matter of defective proof-reading, and of the awkward and confused transliteration of Hebrew words, either the commentary on Deuteronomy is peculiarly bad, or the eye of the critic has happened to fall on the exceptionally bad places.

This volume completes the Pentateuch in the American edition of this series. The six volumes on the Pentateuch contain, in all, nearly 3,100 pages. Probably they contain half more matter than the three volumes of Lange on the Pentateuch, though not quite so much expository and introductory matter as Lange. And as the "PULPIT COMMENTARY" is thus the largest of the popular English commentaries on these books, so it is the latest, freshest, most intelligible, and most readable; while it is by no means lacking in other points of excellence.

WILLIS J. BEECHER.

HANDBOOKS FOR BIBLE-CLASSES AND PRIVATE STUDENTS. Edited by Rev. MARCUS DODS, D.D., and Rev. ALEXANDER WHYTE, D.D. THE LIFE OF ST. PAUL. By Rev. JAMES STALKER, M.A., Kirkcaldy, author of "The Life of Jesus Christ." pp. 149. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1884. New York: Scribner & Welford.

This is undoubtedly one of the best volumes in this excellent series. The purpose it is designed to serve is kept in view from the outset, and the author has been remarkably successful in presenting the salient features of the great apostle's life and work in one continuous description, without prolixity on the one hand, or disconnectedness on the other. To its excellences of substance is added what—in the eye of busy people—will be the further excellence of brevity; of the ten chapters hardly one contains more than a dozen pages, and there is no line which the reader will be tempted to skip. The style is crisp and clear,—rarely awkward,—sometimes even brilliant. Altogether, Mr. Stalker's book is to be warmly commended to students of the Bible, and is, indeed, sure to be widely read.

Its attitude is conservative. It raises no critical questions,—perhaps, indeed, errs a little in this direction; the more intelligent and well-read members of Bible-classes will not always be contented with the ignoring of difficulties. Still, the lack is partly supplied by ten or twelve pages of "Hints and Questions" at the end, and the author has approached the subject with so fresh a mind, and handled it with such vigor, that his work is as far as possible from a mere restatement of familiar narratives and traditional opinions. The reader finds himself constantly at new points of view.

The arrangement of matter might have been improved in some respects. It seems a mistake to give (in Chap. IV.) a detailed outline of the doctrine of the Epistle to the Romans, as the form of Paul's earliest Gospel-message; this is not wholly consistent with what is said (p. 15) on the "progress of his thinking." "His Great Controversy" with the Judaizing Christians (Chap. IX.) would have been more intelligible and impressive if it stood in its right chronological place. Much more, relatively, might have been made of the growth of his Christian experience, as reflected in the later Epistles,—and indeed another dozen pages on his writings would have relieved the chapter which treats of these from the impression of inadequacy.

A few statements compel dissent. It must be thought rash, and wrong, when the author says (p. 13), "beginners may perhaps learn even more of Christ from studying Paul's life than from studying Christ's own." The theory (p. 36 *sq.*) that doubts as to the blasphemy of the Christians, and questionings as to the falseness of Jesus' claims were filling Paul's mind during the journey to Damascus before his conversion, is not supported by a single line of his own writings, nor by the narra-

tive of the Acts. "It is hard for thee to kick against the goad," admits of another explanation. This is not quite the only instance of the author's giving somewhat too free rein to fancy in his vivid and picturesque portrayal of this remarkable life. But even these faults are hardly more than the exaggeration of excellences. To counterbalance them, Chap. II., "His Unconscious Preparation for His Work," may be particularly mentioned. It is in many respects the best in the book,—a fine example of the constructive historical imagination, in legitimate exercise.

FRANCIS BROWN.

THE GREAT ARGUMENT, OR JESUS CHRIST IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, by WILLIAM H. THOMSON, M.A., M.D., Professor of Materia Medica and Therapeutics, Medical Department, University of New York. pp. xlv, 471. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1884.

The author has come into some prominence as an expositor through the Bible-class which he has conducted for several years in this city. The present volume is an additional proof that one may be engaged in a non-clerical and an exacting profession without losing interest in the vital problems of Biblical interpretation. It will serve a useful end, if it turns the attention of others similarly placed to an employment of their leisure hours which may be productive of great practical good to them, and those who come under their influence. But it is not merely from the stand-point of practical edification that the present work claims to be estimated. By its mode of treatment, as well as by the range of problems which it essays, it calls for judgment by a high scholarly standard. From this point of view there is much which offsets, if it does not nullify, the practical usefulness of the book in other phases.

There are, it is true, some good statements, some sound arguments against radical critics, some evidences of careful reflection as well as diligent study, some pointed illustration, much attention to Orientalisms which bear upon Old Testament interpretation. There is, perhaps, an occasional excess of confidence in the reasoning from these Orientalisms, but that is a subordinate matter. The arrangement is, however, somewhat faulty. Why should, *e. g.*, the "Protevangelium" follow the "Prophecy of Noah," and the "Messianic Prophecies in the Psalms" be sandwiched between "Daniel" and the "Prophets after the Exile"?

Much more objectionable is the hard and dogmatic utterance of opinions about which there is room for question among Christian students. There seem to be, in the author's mind, only two possible sets of views,—his own, and those of the scholars whom he is fond of calling by the one inclusive term, "rationalists." Rationalism is bad, but it is not necessarily rationalistic to reject traditional interpretations, and it does great injury to a church to drill into its membership the notion that it is so. Candid outsiders are of course repelled by such assumptions. Moreover, there is a large mass of reverent exegesis and criticism which the author wholly ignores; he therefore not infrequently reaches conclusions from insufficient premises. A considerable number of his interpretations will not—at all events in their present form—bear the application of sound exegetical tests.

A notable defect is the lack of a comprehensive and thorough view of prophecy. Predictive prophecy receives an emphasis which is, relatively, too great, and is itself treated in a mechanical way, with only occasional hints of the psychological and circumstantial conditions which made it possible, and very infrequent allusions to that most essential matter,—the bearing of prediction upon the prophet's special work among his own people. Predictive prophecy is thus torn from its roots in the life of the Hebrew nation, and loses its own vitality. On the other hand, there is an excessive concern for details in tracing out the fulfilment of predictions, whereby the hard-worked numbers of such predictions as those of Daniel are once again pressed into a service under which they, here as always, rebel.

There is no need to enter now upon questions of authorship and date, which the author rightly considers of subordinate consequence, for his purpose. We heartily agree with the spirit which prompts the question (p. viii): "if the prophecies which are to be found in chapters xlii., xlix., liii., and lv. [of Isaiah], . . . do really refer, as the Apostles claimed, to Jesus Christ, are they any the less prophecies by divine inspiration because they were inscribed 500 years B.C. instead of 750 years?" There are other passages, both exegetical and historical, with which we find ourselves obliged to differ very strongly, as unsound in principle or erroneous in fact; such as the symbolical interpretation of Gen. iii. (pp. 81 *sq.*), with the *a priori* grounds on which it is made to rest; the statement (p. 87), that "the effect [of man's first sin] is immediately apparent, not in physical death, but in the *destruction of his spirit*" (ital. ours); or, to instance one of a different sort, the assertion (p. 288) of the monotheistic influence of the Persians on the Jews,—an assertion which, in the light of recent discoveries, must be materially changed.

In short, while the book is written, it cannot be doubted, with an earnest desire to do good, and while it may do good in some directions, it is by no means that thorough, candid, and helpful work on Messianic prophecy which is so greatly needed, and for which students of the Bible in English-speaking countries, as well as in other lands, are eagerly waiting.

FRANCIS BROWN.

ST. PAUL'S USE OF THE TERMS FLESH AND SPIRIT. The Baird Lecture for 1883. By Prof. W. P. DICKSON, D.D. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1883.

It was a bold undertaking to give a Baird lecture upon such a strictly critical problem as the use of the terms flesh and spirit in the theology of Paul. If Biblical psychology or New Testament psychology had been selected there would have been room for the display of constructive genius and of rhetorical organization of the theme; but the necessary limitations of the inquiry drove the author to the use of purely critical methods and patient detailed investigation. In this respect the book is a model of exact scholarship, of conscientious and faithful research, of unwearied diligence, of exhaustive study. It was characteristic of the scholar, that after he had completed his task he should recognize the merits of a more recent investigator (Dr. Wendt), and reconstruct his own work with reference to it at the expense of its literary excellence; and in excessive modesty magnify his merits over against his own. The lengthy Appendix, of more than one hundred closely printed pages, containing full and choice quotations from the more important writers on the subject, will be gladly used by all those who desire to enter more fully into the subject of investigation. The author justifies this course by saying, "I have thought it fair also to the writers whose views I have ventured to combat, to subjoin in the Appendix—even at the risk of some repetition—a fuller statement of their positions, couched mainly in their own language." This expresses quite accurately the design of the author. Yet we are obliged to think that he has carried his spirit of fairness to his adversaries too far. He has overcrowded his book with matter, useful in itself, but unnecessary to his main purpose. This frightens the general reader from the work, and even wearies the professional student, who is more anxious to have a clear presentation of the views of Dr. Dickson than of the views of his opponents.

The two introductory sections are devoted to a criticism of the earlier and later views, the third to a criticism of methods. The author is correct in his criticism of the disposition to trace the influences of Hellenistic philosophy in the anthropology of Paul, and in insisting that the Pauline anthropology is rooted in the Old Testament; but it seems to us that he goes too far in presenting the apostle Paul in such radical antagonism to Greek philosophical terminology. In the fourth section, the author seeks to define the principles of interpretation. He justly remarks that we must here follow the recognized canons of exegesis. The author is his own best

interpreter. Passages less clear are to be interpreted in the light of those that are more definite, explicit, and salient; and he reaches the conclusion that "it is on the Old Testament and Septuagint usage that we may fall back with absolute certainty as the primary basis on which to begin to build." The author thus strictly excludes the influence of the terminology of the Greek philosophy, and limits himself to the Old Testament and Septuagint usage. In this we think he goes too far. We agree that he has chosen the proper basis on which to build, but we ought to recognize that the Greek culture of Paul exercised a mortifying influence upon his Hebrew conceptions.

The author first considers the Old Testament usage. He agrees with Wendt that the Hebrew *lebh* is best expressed by the German *sinn*, and *ruach* by *muth*, and that

"the powers of spiritual or mental life are called *ruach* in so far as they connect the creatures with God and place them in dependence on Him; they are called *nephesh* in so far as they separate the creatures as animate individuals from one another and from the lifeless impersonal world of sense"; "that *ruach* conveys especially the notion of efficacious power, whether it is applied to the life-spirit, constituting and upholding the life of man in general, or to the dispositions and character that mould his thoughts and his action, or to the higher and more extraordinary divine influence that empowers and impels men to the special work given to them to do";

that *basar* means, first, flesh proper; second, the whole human body; and third, earthly creatures generally. Wendt attaches to the latter only the conception of the absolute weakness of their nature in contrast to the power of God; but Dr. Dickson thinks that there is also to be attached the idea of sinfulness. There can be no doubt that Dr. Wendt has advanced in his discriminations to a better position than any who have preceded him. But, on the other hand, we have not been able to find in Old Testament usage such sharp discriminations as are here given. The Old Testament language is popular and varied, and differs in the several writings. In the general usage, *ruach* and *lebh* are synonymous. The four terms are, in general, in an ascending series—from *basar* through *nephesh*, and *lebh* to *ruach*. *Basar* has more reference to man's human nature, *nephesh* to his personal existence, *lebh* to his mental and moral character, and *ruach* to his disposition and temper; but it is impossible to define them in such a way as that they should be mutually exclusive of the others.

Having laid his foundation in the Old Testament, Dr. Dickson proceeds at once to the usage of Paul, without troubling himself with the usage of other New Testament writers. He simply refers to Wendt with the remark that "they scarcely pass beyond the limit of Old Testament precedent." We think, in this respect, our author has not been sufficiently cautious. He considers, first, the *divine Pneuma* and then the *human pneuma*, with the result with reference to the *human pneuma*:

"It is enough to recognize the fact that, when St. Paul has occasion to speak of the inner side of man's nature as the correlate of the body, as the sphere of the religious life, or as the recipient of grace, he prefers to designate it by a name that indicated something of its religious value, that told how it had come forth from God, and thereby suggested it as the sphere of a divine renewal, the vehicle of a higher life, the abiding temple of the Holy Spirit. Here, too, as in other matters, the Apostle faithfully keeps by the lines that Jewish usage had laid down; and we find the use extended, enlarged, generalized, but not substantially altered or transformed" (p. 197).

Under "collateral questions" Dr. Dickson gives an admirable representation of the meaning of *lebh* and *καρδία* as "the seat of all mental action, feeling, thinking, willing." "It is not merely the receptacle of impressions and the seat of emotion, but the laboratory of thought and the fountain-head of purpose." It might also have been said that it is the source and seat of character, good or evil, and upon its condition the issues of life depend.

The author in this chapter defines the *νοῦς* of Romans vii. as "the faculty of moral judgment which perceives and approves what is good, but has not the power of practically controlling the life in conformity to its theoretical requirements"; and holds

that this term was used designedly rather than *pneuma* of chapter vii., and agrees with the great body of modern exegetes in regarding Romans vii. as representing the struggles of man under the law before he has been enfranchised by grace.

Section viii. closes with a keen criticism of the Revised Version :

"It is scarcely matter for surprise that a revision, which, amidst its undoubted excellence in many respects, fails to deal with this and other matters of real importance, while it introduces numerous minor changes of dubious value, should not be accepted by scholars as adequate or final."

Section ix. gives a careful examination of the usage of *σάρξ*. The result of the entire previous study is briefly summed up, thus :

"While *πνεῦμα* has its paramount place in the teaching of St. Paul as the divine power which originates and sustains the new life distinctive of the Christian, *σάρξ* in its most characteristic use denotes the creaturely nature of man, or the creaturely side of his nature, in contrast to the new life which he so receives" (p. 272).

The closing section is an admirable discussion of the relation between flesh and sin, in which it is shown that St. Paul "represents the *σάρξ* as the seat of sin, thereby associating sin with man's creaturely nature or the creaturely side of that nature." "His design was to set forth not the origin of sin *from* the *σάρξ*, but the power of sin *in* the *σάρξ*. He has nowhere pronounced the *σάρξ* in itself sinful; he has nowhere declared it even to be, as such, the source of sin."

The whole book constitutes a remarkably fine specimen of criticism in the sphere of Biblical Psychology.

C. A. BRIGGS.

THE following works in Exegetical Theology may be briefly noticed :

OLD TESTAMENT :—*Die Jüdische Stammverschiedenheit, ihr Einfluss auf die innere und äussere Entwicklung des Judenthums*, von Heinrich Mosler. pp. x, 147. Leipzig : Wilhelm Friedrich, 1884. This is offered as the first part of a large work, dealing with the Jewish tribal differences in their influence on the development of Judaism and Christianity. The author,—not a professional theologian,—is evidently very proud of his theory, which consists in explaining the various factors operating throughout the life of the Israelites, from Jacob down, according to the different characteristics of the tribes which produced them; this theory he applies in somewhat minute detail, and often quite ingeniously. It leads him to a recognition and defense of the authenticity of the Blessing of Jacob, Gen. xlix., and he traces the tribal peculiarities farther back still, wherever the data allow,—even to the circumstances of the birth of Jacob's different sons. An appendix contains a translation of Gen. xlix., as well as other matter.—*Luther als Ausleger des Alten Testaments* gewürdigt auf Grund seines grösseren Genesis-Commentars. Von Dr. O. Zöckler (Sep. Abdruck aus der evang. Kirchenzeitung). pp. 77. Greifswald : Verlag und Druck von Julius Abel, 1884. The first chapter of this interesting little monograph deals with Luther's equipment for exegesis in an acquaintance with Latin, and to a less extent with Greek authors, giving precise references; the second, with his hermeneutical principles and exegetical method; the third, with the dogmatic and polemic elements of his exegesis; the fourth, with its practical ethics; the fifth, with its illustrations, use of proverbs, etc. As the title indicates, the examples are all taken from the Commentary on Genesis, and there is an appearance of detailed thoroughness in the work, within these limits, which adds greatly to one's confidence in its statements. A sixth, and concluding chapter treats of the influence of this Commentary on the later exegesis of the same book. In the same connection we are glad to notice another pamphlet on a closely related topic: *Dr. Martin Luther's Vorlesung über das Buch der Richter*. Aus Einer in der Zwickauer Ratsschulbibliothek befindlichen Handschrift, herausgegeben von Georg Buchwald, Dr. Phil. Cand. Theol., Oberlehrer am Gymnasium zu Zwickau, pp. x, 80. Leipzig : Julius Drescher, 1884. It seems that a treasure has been found

at Zwickau, in the shape of a considerable number of MSS. dating from Reformation times. Among these there are no less than ten specimens of Luther's exegetical work,—not from his own hand, but either the lecture-notes of his pupils, or copies of such notes. The latter is the case with the exposition of Judges, now published, which occupies 52 pages of print (in the MS., fol. 1–50). It was copied by one Georg Röer, from the notes of some student, and bears the heading *Praelectio Doctoris Martini Luteri in librum Judicum*. The most interesting question raised by these lectures,—which have never before been published,—regards their date. The editor puts this at 1529 or 1530, but a preface by Köstlin,—the most prominent Luther-authority in Germany,—contains an acute argument for a much earlier date,—c. 1516, or 1517. This is made to seem very probable, from internal grounds, and in that case we have a new illustration, fit to be placed by the side of the early exposition of the Psalms, of Luther's method as a teacher before he shook off the trammels of the scholastic exegesis, with the fetters of allegiance to Rome. More publications from these Zwickau MSS. are promised.

NEW TESTAMENT: *Das Judenthum und die Christliche Verkündigung in den Evangelien*. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der biblischen Theologie und Geschichte, von *Georg Schnedermann*, Dozenten an der Universität Basel. pp. vi, 282. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1884. An examination of Jewish thought and temper at Christ's time, and of the conditions which these imposed upon his work. The book is written with great care, and is clearly the product of an independent and earnest mind. We do not observe that the author reaches any new and startling conclusions, but he brings to vigorous expression what bears upon his subject, and combines into a strong picture elements before scattered. He writes with warm religious convictions, though not controversially. His further studies in the same general lines are sure to deserve respectful attention from all who are concerned with the theology and history of the New Testament.—*Die Buddha-Legende und das Leben Jesu nach der Evangelien*. Erneute Prüfung ihres gegenseitigen Verhältnisses, von *Rudolf Seydel*, Professor an der Universität Leipzig. pp. 84. Leipzig: Otto Schulze, 1884. In an earlier book ("Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddhasage und Buddhalehre," 1882,—briefly referred to in this REVIEW, July, 1882, p. 614,—the author tried to show the literary dependence of the Gospel-narrative upon the legends and teachings of Buddha. His attempt did not meet with favor, from Orientalists any more than from exegetes. Accordingly he returns to the attack, criticises his critics and argues afresh. He shows great energy and acumen, and has collected much well-sifted material. We do not at all believe that he has made out his case, but he is, in his way, a formidable opponent of the originality of the Gospel-history. He claims, indeed, to be not a foe but a friend to Christianity, and a strong personal believer in the historic Christ.—*Exegetical Studies*, by *Paton J. Gloag*, D.D., Minister of Galashiels. pp. 302. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1884. (New York: Scribner & Welford.) There are sixteen of these studies,—four on passages from the Gospels, seven suggested by utterances of Paul, two by James, one by 1 Peter, and two by 1 John,—each marked by the good sense and caution which characterize the author in all his work. They are, to a certain degree, popular in manner ("several" of them, the Preface tells us, "have already appeared in different magazines"), but they are not superficial, and the author's scholarly arguments, and his candor, make his opinion always valuable;—in a difficult subject, like that of the preaching to the spirits in prison (Expos. xiv.), even his lack of decisive opinion is instructive. Expos. i., on the Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a good illustration of his power in combining hard exegesis with earnest, practical application.—*Johannes der Täufer*, Kritisch-Theologische Studie, von *H. Köhler*, Divisionspfarrer in Magdeburg. pp. 180. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1884. John the Baptist is generally treated in the Introduction to the Life of Christ. He gains in distinctness, and his true position is seen

more evidently, under separate treatment. Köhler has made a discriminating and suggestive analysis of his life and work, particularly of his attitude toward the Messianic kingdom, and his apprehension of it. The author is, however, unjust toward Weiss's theory of the composition of the Synoptic Gospels, and his adoption of Weiffenbach's attempted demonstration, that the Malachi-citation, Ma. i. 2, is a copyist's insertion, is purely subjective and *a priori*.—*Critical and Exegetica. Hand-book to the Gospel of St. John*. By *Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer*, Th.D.; translated from the Fifth Edition of the German by *Rev. William Urwick*, M.A. The translation revised and edited by *Frederick Crombie*, D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism, St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's, with a Preface and Supplementary Notes to the American Edition by *A. C. Kendrick*, D.D., Greek Professor in the University of Rochester. pp. xviii, 565. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1884. Several volumes of this series have already been noticed in this REVIEW. The present one is edited in the same manner with the others. The Edinburgh translation is reproduced (—by what right?—), with the exception that the frequent references of the original are transferred to the bottom of the page. The additional notes of the American editor are placed at the ends of the chapters. They are seventy in number,—for the most part not extensive. The longest is the sixty-fourth, on John xviii. 28, which the editor seeks, as so many before him have done, to harmonize with the Synoptists. The sixth German edition, by Weiss, is not seldom referred to. We are not able to sympathize with some of the strictures upon Meyer's and Weiss' exegetical principles which appear in the Preface. The author speaks, *e. g.*, of "harmonistic presuppositions" as "among the indispensable qualifications of a complete interpreter of the Gospels" (p. vi.). But this seems to overlook the fact that the duty in hand was not that of "a complete interpreter of the Gospels," but that of an exegetical student of the one Gospel of John.—*Akademische Vorlesungen über das Neue Testament*, von *Johannes Wichelhaus*, weiland Professor der Theologie in Halle a. S. III. Band. *Das Evangelium des Johannes*. Herausgegeben von D. theol. *A. Zahn* [Stuttgart]. pp. xviii, 264. Halle: Julius Fricke, 1884. Another result of the rage, quite active in Germany at present, of publishing academic lectures not prepared for publication by the author. These comments are honest and simple, and not unlearned, but the most noteworthy thing is the editor's preface, in which the good man breaks many lances against critical study of the Bible, and in behalf of Zwingli and the Reformed Church.—At the other extreme is the following: *Untersuchungen über das Johannesevangelium*, von *August Jacobsen*. pp. viii., 102. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1884. The author's earlier treatise, *Untersuchungen über die synoptischen Evangelien*, Berlin, 1883, was briefly characterized in this REVIEW for April, 1883 p. 442. His present thesis is that the Gospel of John is simply a late recension, with much new speculative matter, of the narrative of the Synoptists. The thesis is wild, and the argument in its support utterly false in method.—*Der Römerbrief. Uebersetzung und Erklärende Umschreibung*, von *Otto Lorenz*, Pastor prim. in Brieg, Reg. Bez. Breslau. pp. 97. Breslau: Max Woywod, 1884. Designed (1) to make the Epistle more intelligible, as a whole, to ordinary readers, and (2) to serve as foundation for a second work on the theological system of the Epistle.—*A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Colossians*, and *A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians*, by the late *John Eadie*, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis to the United Presbyterian Church. Second Edition. Edited by the Rev. W. Young, M.A., Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1884. (New York, Scribner & Welford.) Two more volumes of this useful reprint. The editor has not changed the author's text, so that we have, essentially, a reproduction of the editions of 1855 (Colossians), and 1858 (Philippians). The exposition is the work of a very faithful and earnest interpreter of the New Testament.—*The Life of Christ*. By *Dr.*

Bernhard Weiss, Counsellor of the Consistory, and Professor of Theology in Berlin. Translated by *M. G. Hope*. Vol. III. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1884. (New York, Scribner & Welford.) This volume completes the English Translation of Weiss' *Leben Jesu*. At the end is an Index to the entire work. We can hardly commend this masterly product of evangelical criticism too strongly, and, in now taking a final leave of it in these pages, we cordially urge its perusal and study upon our Christian public.

FRANCIS BROWN.

II.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

TEXTE UND UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ALTCHRISTLICHEN LITERATUR, von OSCAR von GEBHARDT und ADOLF HARNACK. II. Band., Heft I. LEHRE DER ZWÖLF APOSTEL, nebst Untersuchungen zur ältesten Geschichte der Kirchenverfassung und des Kirchenrechts, von ADOLF HARNACK. I. Hälfte, pp. 70, 100. II. Hälfte, pp. 101–294. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1884.

LEHRE DER ZWÖLF APOSTEL nach der Ausgabe des Metropolitens Philotheos Bryennios, mit Beifügung des Urtextes, nebst Einleitung und Noten, ins Deutsche übertragen von Lic. Dr. AUGUST WÜNSCHE. pp. 34. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. 1884.

FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES NEUTESTAMENTLICHEN KANONS UND DER ALTKIRCHLICHEN LITERATUR, von THEODOR ZAHN, D. u. o. Professor der Theologie in Erlangen. III. Theil: Supplementum Clementinum. pp. iv., 329. Erlangen: Verlag von Andreas Deichert. 1884.

These three treatises have appeared within a very few weeks of each other, and taken in connection with Hilgenfeld's *Novum Testamentum extra Canonem, Fasc. IV., ed. II.*, noticed briefly in the July number of this REVIEW, they indicate the interest and the scholarly acumen which are concentrated in Germany upon the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles."

Two of them—Harnack's and Wünsche's—give the Greek text with a translation. Wünsche's pamphlet is of slight extent. After a preface and brief introduction, the author gives a German translation of the "Teaching," with many references in foot-notes. This is followed by the Greek text, and this by a Greek index. The translation is rather free; τέκνον μου is rendered "Mein Sohn!" Chapter ix. is made to begin: "Was das heilige Abendmahl betrifft," etc. On the other hand we are interested to observe that the *crux interpretum* of Chapter xvi. is translated: "Die aber, welche in ihrem Glauben beharren, werden von diesem Fluch gerettet werden." Much fault has been found with this rendering, but it can be strongly defended.

Harnack's edition is issued with extensive and thorough Prolegomena, and is the most complete work on the subject that has appeared, or is likely at present to appear. The author puts first the Greek text and a German translation, in parallel columns, with copious foot-notes. He divides the several chapters into verses, which has its advantages and disadvantages. Hilgenfeld has done the same; but the divisions, unfortunately, often fail to correspond. Harnack's translation is careful, but open—like all translations—to some criticism: Chap. i., 3 (we give Harnack's verse-numbers), he renders *ποία γὰρ χάρις* by "was ist das für eine Gunst?" i., 5, he says: "denn der Vater will, dass Allen gegeben werde aus den Gnadengaben, die ein Jeglicher empfangen hat." iii., 3, he renders *μηδὲ αἰσχρολόγος κ. τ. λ.*, by: "auch rede nicht Zoten noch schlage deine Augen hoch auf." iv., 4 (*οὐ διψυχίσεις, κ. τ. λ.*), he says: "Zweifle nicht ob (Gottes Gericht) kommen wird oder nicht." iv., 6: "Wenn Du durch Deiner Hände Arbeit etwas besitzest, so gib ein Lösegeld," etc. These translations, and others, may fairly be questioned, on various

grounds. The difficult passage, xi. 11 ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ δὲ προφήτης δεδοκιμασμένος κ. τ. λ.), he now renders: "Jeder Prophet aber, erprobt und wahrhaftig, der in Hinblick auf das irdische Geheimniss der Kirche handelt, jedoch nicht lehrt, alles das zu thun was er selbst thut," etc., and still refers it to celibacy. xvi., 5, he now says: "die aber ausharren in ihrem Glauben, werden gerettet werden von dem Verfluchten selbst" (cf. Starbuck, *Andover Review*, April, 1884). This we cannot regard as either necessary or happy. It is impossible here to enter upon an examination of the notes, which contain a wealth of illustrations from patristic literature; the application of these is sometimes marred by what we are obliged to consider a false view of the relation of the "Teaching" to other early documents. A list of citations from the Scripture, and two Greek indexes, follow the text.

The Prolegomena begin with the history of the "Teaching" in the church, and an account of the MS. The title, address, and purpose of the treatise are then discussed; its arrangement and contents given at length; then the author comes to the important section regarding its sources. These he reckons as (1) the Old Testament,—sparingly used, (2) "the Gospel";—he shows that the language of Matthew frequently occurs, sometimes varied a little, sometimes in apparent combination with that of Luke. He infers that "the Gospel" of the writer was some recension of the gospel narratives and addresses in which the language of these two evangelists was combined, and queries whether it could have been the "Gospel acc. to the Egyptians." But it is easier to suppose that the variations and combinations resulted either from the use of the still living stream of oral tradition, or from defective memory of the text. The author finds no trace of a use of John's gospel, but a certain familiarity with Johannine ideas, in the liturgical parts. (3) As a third source, he names the Epistle of Barnabas, but with a most inadequate statement of his grounds for so doing. At the end of the work, pp. 287 *seq.*, he adds some words on the same topic, but nowhere does he meet and overthrow the arguments of Hatch, Zahn, and Funk on the other side. We are disposed to think that his position is wrong, but reserve a full discussion for another place. (4) Hermas,—not a certain, but a possible source. We incline to reject this view also, but the question is a very difficult one. (See below.)

The fifth section of the Prolegomena is a long and most interesting discussion of the early church organization, as deduced from the "Teaching," when compared with the other documentary evidence, from which the transition is made to an inquiry as to the time and place of the composition of the "Teaching." Harnack thinks it was composed certainly not before A.D. 120, and probably not before 140, and that Egypt, in all likelihood, was the country in which it was produced. To the latter we cannot seriously object; the former position, however (the date), will be materially affected by our view of the literary relation between the "Teaching," Barnabas, and Hermas. The author proceeds to an account of the reproduction of the "Teaching" in other ecclesiastical documents, particularly the Apostolic Constitutions and Canons, with the Greek text, and careful, analytical discussions, some of them of wide scope. He appends an excursus on the "Teaching" and the constitution of the Waldensian church, pointing out a striking similarity.

One of the best and most surprising contributions to the literature of the subject comes quite at the end. This is a fragment (the beginning) of the "Teaching" in an old Latin translation; the MS. containing it, which was formerly in the possession of the library of Melk, in Austria, is unfortunately lost, but v. Gebhardt has succeeded in recovering the text of this fragment from the *Thesaurus* of Bernhard Pez, a former librarian of the library of Melk. It varies somewhat from the Greek, as we possess it, and affords another indication of the existence of various recensions of the "Teaching" in early times. From the stand-point of skepticism as to the extreme antiquity of the "Teaching," this early translation is difficult to explain, and in several aspects its discovery is of great importance.

Zahn gives neither text nor translation of the "Teaching." His discussion is contained in an Appendix to his book and occupies but forty pages. It ranks, however, among the most acute critical examinations of the document. Especial interest in it is awakened by the fact that Zahn is one of the very few scholars who, in previous writings, foreshadowed the discovery made by Bryennios (see his *Ignatius von Antiochien*, Gotha, 1873, p. 583). On an early page of this present volume (p. 69), also, written before the "Teaching" had reached Europe—after remarking, in connection with Krawutzcky's reconstruction, that the earlier document underlying the second part of the Apostolic Canons, or Epitome, is still in obscurity—he adds: "But we shall hardly get farther, on this point, if the *διδαχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων* is not published from the cod. Constantinop., from which Bryennios has given us the complete Clement of Rome." Among Zahn's more important suggestions are the following: Bryennios having already noticed that Clement of Alexandria calls Christ "the holy vine of David" (*Quis Dives*, §26, cf. *Teaching*, chap. ix., l. 169), Zahn remarks (p. 280): "The more obscure the origin of this designation is, the more certain it appears that Clement did not light upon it independently of the 'Teaching,' which for him is holy Scripture. *The 'Fathers,' who, according to Athanasius, prescribed the catechetical use of the 'Teaching' in the Alexandrian Church, belong, therefore, to the time before Clement*" (ital. ours). Pseud. Cypr. *De Alcatribus*, (cf. *Teaching*, chap. xiv., etc.), Zahn believes to have cited some later recension of the "Teaching"; to such an enlarged recension he thinks the plural *doctrinis*, there found, may point. In connection with the meagreness of the "Teaching" on points of doctrine, he says (p. 289): "The 'Teaching' does not aim to be anything of a complete description of Christianity and Church life, but only a book of practical assistance, to be used in connection with other sources of instruction and edification." His analysis of the contents of the "Teaching" (pp. 289-292) is valuable, but we pass it by.

He places the "Teaching" before Barnabas (cf. Funk, *Tübinger Quartalschrift*, April, 1884; Hatch, *Guardian*, June 25, 1884), supposing that Barnabas drew upon it for chaps. xviii.-xx.; his reasons are: (1) The impression of originality in the natural arrangement of the "Teaching"; Barnabas, on the other hand, is characterized by his dependence on earlier writings, canonical and apocryphal. (2) The lack of order in Barn., c. 18, 19, probably due to the author's desire to preserve his (formal) independence by a difference in grouping. (3) The integrity of Barnabas being established, it is evident that c. 18 is based on some new, foreign matter. Chap. 17 has a proper conclusion, and a fresh start is taken with chap. 18 (pp. 312, *seq.*). Perhaps no one of these arguments is conclusive, but, taken in connection with other indications of a very early date for the "Teaching," they form a strong chain of probable evidence. But the possibility should not be lost sight of, that a different recension of the same materials which are found in our "Teaching" formed the basis of these chapters of Barnabas. As to the relations of the "Teaching" with Hermas, Zahn reaches a different conclusion. He puts the date of Hermas at A.D. 97-100 (p. 293), and believes the "Teaching" to be dependent upon it. The chief reason he adduces for this is found in the conflicting views on the subject of fasting exhibited in these treatises. Hermas could not have used the brief "Teaching" with respect, since he must have observed the conflict; the author of the "Teaching" might have used the longer and more involved Hermas, without noticing the divergence of view on this point (pp. 317, *seq.*). The argument is not wholly convincing, especially when the possibilities are considered, that Hermas may have quoted from memory, or from another recension than the one we possess, and if Hermas cited the Old Testament from the version of Theodotion (see Hort in *Independent*, August 14, 1884), all the arguments which tend to show that the "Teaching" belongs to the earliest years of the second century, will be opposed to a dependence of the "Teaching" upon Hermas.

The only other point which we take space to notice is the discussion of ἐμπλοθῆναι, chap. x. (l. 185, ed. Scribn.), (Zahn, pp. 293, *seq.*). Zahn holds that this word cannot refer to the Lord's Supper, but must imply the meal (*Agape*) preceding that celebration. Accordingly, the prayers in c. ix. refer to this Agape, and introduce it; those in c. x. stand in the same relation to the Lord's Supper itself; εὐχαριστία, (l. 167, ed. Scribn.) refers not to the rite to which it was later applied, but to the "thanksgiving" which belonged with Agape as well as Lord's Supper.

An examination of the value of the "Teaching" for the study of the Canon of Scripture is promised for the first part of the author's "Geschichte des Canons" (p. 319).

Were it not for the special purpose of this notice, the investigations of Zahn in regard to the fragmentary writings of Clement of Alexandria, which occupy the main part of the volume, would call for a long and appreciative review. The most interesting parts are those occupied with the "Hypotyposeis," or commentary upon the entire Bible, of which only scattered extracts are left, but the whole work is a product of the highest order of patient scholarship, and is thus a fit successor to the volumes on "Tatian's Diatessaron" (1881), and "Der Evangeliencommentar des Theophilus von Antiochien" (1883).

FRANCIS BROWN.

DER URSPRUNG DES DONATISMUS, nach den Quellen untersucht und dargestellt. Von Lic. Dr. DANIEL VOELTER, Repetent am. evang. theol. Sem. in Tübingen. 1883. New York: B. Westermann & Co.

The interest and value of this work results from the careful inquiry it exhibits into the guilt or innocence of Felix of Aptunga, charged with being a Traditor during the Diocletian persecution.

The history of the Donatist schism, which struck the first blow fatal to the prosperous and strongly established Christianity of Northern Africa, is well known to students of ecclesiastical history.

The seeds indeed of the dispute were planted much further back by the hands of Tertullian in the soil of the Afro-Roman colonies. Strange as it must seem, that eminent Christian apologist not only fully adopted and enforced the Puritanical principles of the Montanists, but expressly admitted the claims of Montanus himself to be a divinely-commissioned prophet and reformer of the church. The Montanist partisans in Northern Africa bore from him the name of Tertullianists, and the enthusiastic Tertullianists developed a hundred years later into the fanatical party of the Donatists. The consecration of Caecilian, by Felix of Aptunga, was merely the immediate occasion of the outbreak of the long-gathering schism between the moderate and the rigoristic parties in the church. The latter seized on the charge that Felix had been a Traditor during the persecution, to reject the consecration of Caecilian. A Traditor had lapsed from Christ and lost all power to confer the grace of the ministry. Party lines were strongly drawn between the Catholics and those who were first called Majorinists and afterward Donatists. Few more melancholy chapters occur in the history of the church. About ten years after the ceasing of the persecution, the case was brought by the Donatists before the new Christian imperial government. Constantine ordered an investigation to be made into the question of the guilt or innocence of Felix. The result of the inquiry was to make it at least highly probable that Felix was the victim of a fraud practiced in the interest of the Donatist party.

Felix having been charged with retaining in his possession and refusing to surrender certain books belonging to the church, applied to the magistrate Caecilianus, who had been engaged in carrying out the persecuting measures of the heathen government, for a certificate that those books had been burned, which Caecilian accordingly gave him. The letter ended in the usual form, with the words, "*Opto te bene valere.*" It appeared on the trial that a certain Ingentius had tacked on a fraudu-

lent addition to the letter, to the effect that Felix himself had consented to the burning of the books, and informed the magistrate where to find them. The whole judicial proceeding, as contained in the *Gesta Purgationis Felicis*, exhibits a curious illustration of the way in which justice was sought to be vindicated in a Roman Christian court. It included among other things the application of torture to a witness in the court-room by hanging him up by the thumbs until he confessed.

Dr. Voelter has investigated the subject in a careful and thorough way, and concludes against the innocence of Felix. The government, he thinks, was strongly pledged to sustain the validity of Caecilian's consecration, and to vindicate the character of his consecrator from the charge of having been an apostate. The magistrate Alfius Caecilianus, who had been active in carrying out the persecuting measures of the pagan government, was willing to recommend himself to the victorious Christian party by falling in with their views. Between him and Felix, as Dr. Voelter thinks, the fraud was concocted, by which a part of the original letter, criminating the Bishop of Aptunga, was declared to have been a forged appendix. The confession of this fraud was wrung from the pretended forger by torture in open court.

A few years ago the present writer submitted a full statement of the case of Felix to one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Judge Dwight, after carefully reviewing the proceedings, concludes that Felix was at least entitled to a verdict of "not proven." "Bishop Felix (he says) can scarcely be said to have had a trial, as he was not present during the investigation, but his acquittal was certainly warranted, as the evidence, such as it was, was all in his favor. The only *evidence* in the case, is that of the ex-Aedile, Cecilian, which is clearly to the effect, that in the instance mentioned, the copies of the Scriptures destroyed were delivered without the knowledge or consent of the Bishop, and that the letter of the witness, so far as it tended to charge the accused, was false and forged.

"The question chiefly mooted was of the genuineness of that letter, but even if genuine it was not evidence against Felix. It was merely the declaration of another person out of court, and though addressed to Felix, was not shown even to have come to his knowledge. On the whole, it must be said that the investigation was not very thorough nor altogether fair, but as the case stood, the Bishop Felix was clearly entitled to the acquittal he received."

We ourselves incline rather to the calm, judicial decision of Judge Dwight, who detects at once the weak points in the charge against Felix, than to the non-professional conclusion of Dr. Voelter.

S. M. HOPKINS.

DIE SAGE VOM EWIGEN JUDEN. Untersucht von Dr. L. NEUBAUR. Leipzig, 1884. pp. vi. 132. New York: B. Westermann & Co.

This monograph consists of four parts: a history of the legend of the Wandering Jew; two texts, the first and second forms of it which appeared in Germany in the 17th century; a catalogue of the different editions of the legend in German, Flemish, and French; finally, notes upon its history. The author has evidently given a great deal of study to the subject, and produced a curious and valuable work. From a bibliographical point of view he has achieved really a brilliant success. We trust that some one will be encouraged to catalogue the English editions of the wonderful legend.

When we compare Dr. Neubaur's book with the chapter upon the subject in Baring-Gould's "Curious Myths of the Middle Ages" we find that while both tell substantially the same story, the former is far more scholarly, and of course more comprehensive. Dr. Neubaur carefully indicates the sources of the legend, and then gives it as originally told by Roger of Wendover in his "Flowers of English History" for 1228. The next record of the legend is by Philip Mouskes, who derived it from the same Archbishop of Armenia Major, who was Roger's authority. Matthew of Paris incorporated Roger's "Flowers" into his *Chronicle*, and so gave the

legend fresh currency. In this first form the Jew is called Cartaphilus (*ἡ. κάρτα φίλος* "dearly loved," in palpable allusion to the beloved disciple; for John xxi. 22 in connection with John xviii. 22 is the origin of the legend), and after his baptism, Joseph. The second form of the legend appeared in 1602 in Germany, at a time when the end of the world was quite generally expected. It is this form and the next, from the same century, which Dr. Neubaur reprints. In these forms the Jew is called Ahasuerus. In another form he is called Buttadaeus, *cf.* French, "bouter" and "Dieu," *i. e.*, one who pushed or struck God; in still another, Isaac Laquedem. In the 17th century the legend as we know it was fairly started upon its extraordinary career, which the author traces. Books in different European languages, originals and translations, appeared in which it was told. Much more extraordinary is the firm belief in the existence of the Wandering Jew, to which even Baring-Gould, whose book already referred to is known to Dr. Neubaur, it would seem only in a *Dutch* translation, gives a qualified assent. So many persons testify to having seen the Jew that there must have been several impostors walking over Europe in that rôle. The legend has been the object of sober refutation by German university professors; and every one knows, at least by title, Eugene Sue's novel built upon it. Gustave Doré's pencil never found a more congenial theme than this legend, which probably will be as deathless in reality as the Jew is said to be in the fiction.

We cordially recommend Dr. Neubaur's book, and would suggest to the author that he turn his attention to some other legend, for he has evinced aptitude in this line of investigation. An excellent magazine article might be made by translating the first part of his monograph.

SAMUEL M. JACKSON.

HISTOIRE DE LA RÉFORMATION À BORDEAUX ET DANS LE RESSORT DU PARLEMENT DE GUYENNE, par ERNEST GAULLIEUR, Officier d'Académie, Archiviste de la Ville de Bordeaux. Tome I.: Les Origines et la Première Guerre de Religion jusqu'à la Paix d'Amboise (1523 à 1563). Paris and Bordeaux. 1884. New York: J. W. Bouton. xii. and 562 pp., 8vo.

This is a history of a part of a great religious movement, written by a layman, indeed, but a layman in thorough sympathy with his subject. M. Gaullieur is a scholar at home in those studies that call for an exact and thorough examination of ancient records, and is surpassed, perhaps, by no man living in his acquaintance with the archives of the city of Bordeaux and the extensive province of which it was formerly the capital. Of the fruits of his investigations he has heretofore given the world a certain portion in a number of pamphlets, and, particularly, in a book of some six hundred pages on the history of the former Collège de Guyenne. But important as is the last-named work, it approaches neither in value nor in general interest the record presented in the treatise now under consideration.

A very common fault in writers of local histories is, that they think it necessary to incorporate in their works so many facts of national importance, as frequently to leave scant space for those special events of the towns or provinces under consideration which the reader justly expects to find developed at length in their pages. M. Gaullieur has not fallen into this error; his history glances at the general progress of Protestantism throughout France, only so far as may be necessary to make the progress of the narrative intelligible; and his work justifies its title by presenting a clear and comprehensive view of the Reformation in one of the most important of the ancient provinces of France. The author is also to be commended for his avoidance of that arrogant system adopted by so many of his contemporaries in France which, by the studied suppression of all reference to the original authorities, effectually prevents the reader from testing the narrative by comparison with the grounds on which it professes to be based, and demands unquestioning credence upon the mere assertion of the writer. M. Gaullieur is remarkably conscientious in this respect, and, as his materials are largely taken—perhaps to the extent of one-half—

from the National Archives in Paris, the Archives of the Department of Gironde, and other similar manuscript collections, he is able to invest his historical structure with an appearance of rare solidity.

Throughout the sixteenth century, Bordeaux, with its vicinity, was a battle-ground between truth and error. The highest judicial tribunal, or parliament, of Bordeaux, was not, indeed, the rival of its nearest neighbor, the parliament of Toulouse, in the ferocity and bloodthirstiness displayed in the pursuit of the "new heretics," as they were called. It is characteristic of the contrast between the two bodies, that, after the assassination of Henry of Valois, in 1589, while the Toulouse judges indulged in thanksgiving and joy at the "miraculous" deed, and renewed their declaration that the Huguenot Henry of Navarre was incapable of succeeding to the throne of France, their brethren of Bordeaux—not less devout Roman Catholics—deplored the event as "sad and lamentable," and ordered prayers to be said for the late monarch's soul. It would not, however, be safe to infer from this that the treatment of the Protestants at the hands of their Bordeaux judges was mild or leaned to mercy's side. One needs only to run over the earlier part of the volume before us to be convinced of the contrary. Nowhere in France was there, if we may judge by the evidence afforded in these pages, more need than in Guyenne of a purification of the morals of the clergy, and especially of the monastic orders. The official records of judicial inquests (still extant) establish the fact beyond dispute that some, if not most, of the "religious houses" had become nests of the most abominable crimes; and, certainly, the Roman Catholic Church itself had reason to be grateful to the Reformation for creating a public sentiment that put an end to the possibility of the continuance of so fatal a state of things. Yet some of the monks were among the first preachers of the Reformation, perhaps because they, if not altogether given over to corruption, were best situated to recognize the necessity of a change. At Bergerac, a Franciscan, sent from Bordeaux to preach Lenten discourses, surprised his hearers by attacking the superstitions of the Church, and closed his ministry with the prophetic assurance that "he had merely passed through the lanes, but there would come after him those that would pass through the streets" (p. 92). The prediction was fulfilled in the speedy advent of three preachers from Sainte Foy, whose words were productive of a mighty commotion.

There is no room here for the detailed examination of a work that must be read to be fully appreciated. The volume now issued carries the story down to the close of the first Religious War in 1563. A second will doubtless bring it to the times of Henry IV. and the Edict of Nantes. If the remainder of the work be as thorough and every way satisfactory as the portion now given to the public, the next instalment will be welcomed by many readers.

HENRY M. BAIRD.

MARTIN LUTHER: a Study of Reformation. By EDWIN D. MEAD. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis. 1884.

This little book has no permanent value. It is of the nature of a pamphlet, called out by the four hundredth anniversary of Luther's birth, but it adds nothing to our knowledge of the man, or of the movement with which his name is associated. It is called "a Study of Reformation," but it shows no special investigation into the conditions, causes, methods, and results of *the* Reformation, and reveals a very imperfect conception of it. It is rather a prolonged and rambling oration on Martin Luther and the various topics suggested by his name, written in the Carlylesque dialect, and abounding in the outbursts of indignation and disgust, the exhortations and appeals, the extravagances and occasional vulgarities of language, which were bad enough in Carlyle and are intolerable in his imitators. The picture which is given of the personality of Luther is, so far as it goes, strong and vivid, and the author is full of a genuine enthusiasm for his hero, which would be deeper still if he had penetrated further into the character of the great Reformer. As it is, we have

all the familiar anecdotes (and no others), a hasty survey of the condition of society and of the church at the moment when he began his career, an analysis of his work, a discussion of his attitude toward the uprising of the Peasants, a slashing assault on Monsignor Capel and the Roman Catholic traducers of Luther, and a great deal of advice to the "brothers and sisters" of the author to be Luthers themselves. The style of the book is sufficiently well indicated by the following sentence (of which the italics are an important part): "Hence imported Monsignors, doughty in dinner-table sieges of dukes and dowagers, threatening us from Palace Brunswicks—as if, in all conscience, we had not enough Madeira-wine Bourbonism of our own to bother us—that by the mere utterance of a word, *sharp as the click of a trigger*, Holy Church can shake our schools from top to bottom, and land us in a *fight!*" The author's point of view is shown by the assertion "that, coming into the science of our time with the same spirit with which he came into the science of four centuries ago, Martin Luther would have been, not Joseph Cook, nor Moody and Sankey but Theodore Parker." To him orthodoxy seems to represent the sum of all villainies and the church is the citadel of hypocrisy. Luther was the prince of comeouters, the father of all such as are emancipated from tradition and have reached the Bostonian altitude of freedom of thought. He "stands for" three things: Rationalism, Intellectualism, Individualism. "Protestantism is not a church, but a spirit." His true successors are Kant, Emerson, Parker, and Carlyle. There is, of course, much of truth in this, but it is superficial and partial. We are told a great deal about Luther's coarseness, but of his deep and intense spirituality little is seen or said. His attitude toward the Bible is described in the words: "Luther made the Bible the rule of faith in the church, because he believed that, for the most part, it supported what, both through Biblical and other influences, he was persuaded was the truth"; and one of the truths for which he contended is stated as "the church's doctrine that all good works done 'out of Christ,' as the phrase is—that is, done by those who do not believe in the creed—are of the nature of sin." The Luther commemoration brought out a good deal of this kind of writing, but "oh, my brothers!" (one is tempted to say) *your* Luther would have made a great splash in the waters of the Red Sea, but he would never have led the Lord's hosts to the promised land.

EDWARD B. COE.

IRELAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY; or, The Irish Massacres of 1641-2; their causes and results. By MARY HICKSON. With a preface by J. A. Froude, M.A. 2 vols. London: Longmans. pp. 399, 408. 1884.

The sixteenth century has been called the great watershed of European history which turned into their modern channels the culture and destinies of all the great nations. But the seventeenth was the century of Irish change. It saw three great confiscations, which fixed the modern structure of Irish society, but not without leaving traces of anarchy in the native mind, which are barely rooted out at the present hour, while they deposited the seeds of almost incurable hatred between the two races which occupy Ireland. In fact, the key to the history of the Irish people lies hid in the chaos of this period. The rebellion of 1641 was a desperate effort to uproot those Scotch and English plantations which promised to lay the foundation of national prosperity, and to naturalize the Protestant religion in Ireland. The question has been long discussed whether the rebellion began with a massacre of the unarmed Protestants, and whether massacre formed part of the original plan devised by the old Irish chiefs in their efforts to throw off the English rule and to secure the complete independence of their country. It is a significant fact that for a century after the rebellion the massacre was never called in question by either Protestant or Catholic, Englishman or Irishman, and that the anniversary of a day which holds a place of infamy by the side of the Sicilian Vespers and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, was observed with peculiar solemnity for a hundred years afterward. About

the middle of last century, however, Dr. Curry, a Roman Catholic physician, denied that there was any massacre in 1641, and Dr. Lingard followed him in the denial without adducing any fresh proofs. All Irish Nationalist writers, such as D'Arcy McGee, Sullivan, Mitchel, Duffy, and others, have built upon Curry, and uniformly proclaimed the innocence of the Irish in the matter of this alleged massacre. For a long time, as Mr. Froude remarks, there was no disposition on the part of Englishmen to criticise the methods or conclusions of these Irish writers, partly through their unwillingness "to keep alive painful memories," at a time when old animosities of creed and race seemed to be dying out, partly because the English had much to repent of in regard to Ireland, and were not, therefore, too anxious to defend themselves against particular charges. But the aggressive attitude assumed of late years by the Irish Roman Catholics in literature and politics has made it impossible for Protestants of any class to acquiesce in the gross misrepresentations of Dr. Curry. Mr. Froude himself was the first historian of mark to emphasize the fact that there was a massacre, and that the terrible retribution suffered by the Irish at the hands of Oliver Cromwell, followed by the confiscations and proscriptions of the next fifty years, was not explainable, much less justifiable, unless on the supposition that there had been a massacre in the middle of the century. The whole tenure of land was changed by Cromwell's procedure, and if there was no massacre, then, says Mr. Froude, "the Long Parliament and their officers in Ireland were the real criminals." It is this fact which invests the inquiry with such importance at the present moment. The Irish people have certainly suffered greatly at the hands of England, but they have not been guiltless victims of oppression. In any case it is necessary at all times to vindicate the truth of history.

The first real attempt to discuss the question of the massacre with fairness and impartiality was made by Mr. Lecky in the second volume of his valuable "History of England in the Eighteenth Century." He held that the civil war of 1641 did not begin with a massacre, though there were massacres in the heat of the struggle, and that massacre formed no part of the original plan of the insurrection. The Irish Catholic historians have since claimed Mr. Lecky as a powerful ally on their side, though it must be confessed that he is less reticent than they are concerning the actual massacres that occurred. Mr. Lecky has now been followed by Miss Hickson, an Irish lady, who has devoted much time and study to historical questions, and is rather inclined than otherwise to favor Irish national ideas. She has spent a very long time in the study of the thirty-two municipal volumes of depositions taken by the magistrates, first of Charles I., then of the Commonwealth, from the lips of the survivors of the massacre respecting the actual facts witnessed by themselves during one of the darkest and saddest periods in Irish annals. Her conclusion is—and she has undoubtedly established her case—that the civil war began with massacres which were planned beforehand, that they continued all through 1641–2 from the day of the outbreak, and that about 27,000 Protestants in all, men, women, and children, perished at the hands of the rebels. She points triumphantly to the depositions as proof of these facts. The Irish Catholic writers, and some Protestant writers, have been in the habit of discrediting these depositions on the ground that they represent mere "parole evidence," and that many of them have cancelling lines drawn across the words "duly sworn," as well as over whole pages of the depositions, as if to show that no value can be attached to them as evidence of facts. Miss Hickson shows that this is an entire mistake. Every deposition has the words *Jurat coram nobis* signed at the foot, and the cancelling lines, which are only drawn across narratives of robbery, but never across narratives of murder, are intended for purposes of abbreviation, that the king or his ministers may see at a glance what is necessary and what is not necessary to be read.

The work before us consists first of a brief and masterly preface by Mr. Froude, in which he states the question in dispute and then sums up the conclusions attained

by Miss Hickson. Then this lady herself follows with an introduction of nearly two hundred pages, explaining the causes of the rebellion, its chief agents, the circumstances of the massacres, the character and worth of the depositions, and her own final conclusions. The remainder of the first volume and more than a third of the second, are occupied with the depositions, which are accompanied by brief notes of explanation. Then the remainder of the second volume is occupied with "Records of the High Court of Justice,"—that is, with the trials of the chief culprits and with original papers—explanatory of the origin of the rebellion. It cannot be denied that Miss Hickson has supplied her critics, as well as the general public, with the most ample opportunities for testing the value of her conclusions, for she has published everything material to the question at issue, whether it bore hardly upon Catholics or Protestants. There is just one thought suggested to us by all this painful reading. It were greatly to be wished that the Irish Catholics would frankly recognize the new spirit of British statesmanship which has done so much to redress their past grievances, and remove the disasters wrought by centuries of proscription and debasement. It would be well above all if the two races in Ireland could begin to forget the injuries they have inflicted upon each other through the strifes of centuries, and to work with more harmony for the prosperity of their common country.

THOMAS CROSKERY.

THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE. Chiefly Told in His Own Letters. Edited by his son, FREDERICK MAURICE. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

Frederick Denison Maurice was born at Normanstone, England, on August 29, 1805. His paternal grandfather was an orthodox dissenting minister of the Presbyterian order. His father, Michael Maurice, was educated at Hoxton Academy and Hackney College, which he left a Unitarian in religious opinion, and an enthusiastic political Liberal of the school of Dr. Priestley. He became a Unitarian minister and a teacher of wide repute, receiving pupils in his own house. He was a man of superior qualities, and his wife, Priscilla Hurry, belonged to that class of elect women who, as Christian mothers, impress themselves indelibly upon the character of their children. Besides Frederick and a son, who died in infancy, there were five daughters in the family, all of them remarkable for their varied gifts. These simple facts, as to his parentage and early home, throw much light upon the life and career of Frederick Maurice. They help to explain what he often called his "Puritan temperament," as also the intensity and high ethical tone of his religious life. In 1823 he entered the University of Cambridge, where he attended the classical lectures of Julius Hare, afterwards his brother-in-law and bosom friend. Among his intimate associates at this time was John Sterling, who used to speak of spending his time "in picking up pebbles beside the ocean of Maurice's genius." While an undergraduate at Cambridge he became a joint editor of the *Metropolitan Quarterly Magazine*; and later he wrote for the *Athenæum*, and edited the *London Literary Chronicle*. The articles contributed by him to these magazines foreshadowed plainly the leading traits of his career as an author. After leaving college he spent some time in legal study, and then for several years devoted himself chiefly to literature, a novel entitled 'Eustace Conway' being one of the results. Not without severe conflict of mind he decided to take orders in the Established Church. He was ordained in January, 1834, and at once took charge of a little parish in the vicinity of Leamington. In 1836 he became chaplain of Guy's Hospital, London, where he labored faithfully for ten years. In 1840 he was appointed Professor of English Literature at King's College; later, Theological Professor in the same institution, and also Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn; still later, a Professor in Queen's College, of which he was one of the founders, and incumbent of St. Peter's, Vere street. He also drew up the scheme of the Working-Men's College,

London, and was one of its leading promoters and lecturers. In 1866 he was elected to the Professorship of "Casuistry, Moral Theology, and Moral Philosophy," at Cambridge, where he continued until his death, April 1, 1872. Just before breathing his last he said, slowly and distinctly: 'The knowledge of the love of God—the blessing of God Almighty, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost be amongst *you*—amongst *us*—and remain with us forever.'

Such is a brief sketch of the outward life of Mr. Maurice. He was one of the most remarkable men of his age, but at the same time one of the most quiet, unambitious, and lowly in his own estimation. No ecclesiastical honors sought or followed him; he shunned them, indeed, as sure to fetter him in what he regarded as his appointed work. What was this work? and how did he perform it? These questions are very fully answered in the volumes before us; and their answer furnishes a key to some of the most important movements of religious thought and social progress in England during the half century preceding Mr. Maurice's death. Every incident of his career is related; every step in the development of his character and opinions is depicted, chiefly in his own words. The story is told without fear or favor; told with manly frankness, and in the spirit of filial affection and reverence. Nor do we see how any one can rise from its perusal without a deepened sense of the divine reality of truth and duty. As a biography it is not faultless. With more background and a wiser proportion in the arrangement of its abundant materials, the work would have gained not a little, it seems to us, in power and distinctness of impression. We believe, too, that had less space been given to the assaults of the *Record* newspaper, and to some other outbursts of the misunderstanding, slander or bigotry of the passing hour, the effect would have been better.

Mr. Maurice could not be called a great preacher or a great theologian, certainly not in the ordinary sense of the term; nor did he belong, perhaps, to the number of great authors. It is doubtful if his works will be much read in the next generation. But in strength and beauty of Christian manhood, in the depth of his spiritual convictions, in single-hearted devotion to the best interests of humanity, he was truly and eminently great. His individuality was so marked that it either attracted or repelled almost all who came within its range. We say repelled, for while exceedingly intense it was, in certain respects, also narrow and monotonous, and on this side it repelled. But to his friends on the other hand, and to all who at heart sympathized with him in spirit and aim, he was sweet as summer. They felt drawn towards him and bound to him by resistless ties. They admired and loved and revered him; and these sentiments were expressed as heartily by the London workmen, whom he gathered about him, as by Julius Hare, Tennyson, John Sterling, and Charles Kingsley. The quality, indeed, of his personal influence was something quite unique, and scarcely to be defined. The following anecdote, related by one of his friends, may serve to illustrate it:

"About forty years ago five Cambridge men were talking over a recent execution, previous to which the chaplain of the gaol had spent the whole day with the condemned man; and all agreed that there were few persons whose presence at such a time, and for such an interval, would not add a new horror to death. The conversation then turned on the choice each would make, in the last hours of life, of a companion to accompany him to its utmost verge, and it was agreed by all five that each should write down the name of the person he would choose. The five papers, when opened, were found to contain a single name—that of Frederick Maurice."

We have alluded to his lowliness of mind. This is by no means a characteristic of the culture of our age, but it was one of Mr. Maurice's most striking and beautiful traits. His self-depreciation was as great as is most men's self-esteem; and even if somewhat morbid, it yet grew so plainly out of his exalted moral ideals, his truthfulness, and his deep self-knowledge, that no one could for an instant doubt its perfect sincerity. It is the more noteworthy because of his fearless decision in asserting what he believed to be true and right. The memoir abounds in illustra-

tions of this trait. It shows itself in varied forms; sometimes as keen sense of sin and personal unworthiness, sometimes as intellectual humility, and then again as sharp self-reproach. In a letter to one of his sons, written in 1866, he says:

"You have often begged me to write down some recollections of the sixty years through which I have passed. A fear of not reporting them faithfully, and of being egotistical, has kept me from complying with your request. But I hope to be tolerably honest. There will be enough in what I say to mortify my vanity if I am. And what I say will possibly be of use in warning you of tendencies which you may have inherited, and in leading you to seek a more effectual way of counteracting them than mine has commonly been. Above all it must show you, if I can but state the facts as they rise before my mind, what an education God is giving every one of us. I say *every one*, for you will see nothing strange or exceptional in my biography. It is thoroughly commonplace, without startling incidents, or peculiar conflicts, or any results which set me above the level of any of my countrymen. I have longed (how often!) in my silly vanity that I could give myself credit for something rare or great. But there has been a continual disappointment of this ambition, till at last I have learnt, in some small measure, to praise God for teaching me that I am one of a race; that He has been guiding me wonderfully, striving mercifully with my stupidity and obstinacy, setting an object before me when I was most turning away from it, because this is His method with all of us; because each may be brought to know that it is His method far more perfectly than I have been brought to know it through my experience.

"My letter to you last week on the 'Ecce Homo' will have prepared you for the prominence which I give to the fact that I am the son of a Unitarian minister. I have been ashamed of that origin, sometimes from mere vulgar, brutal flunkeyism; sometimes from religious or ecclesiastical feelings. Those I perceive now to have been only one degree less discreditable than the others; they almost cause me more shame as a greater rebellion against a divine mercy. For I now deliberately regard it as one of the greatest mercies of my life that I had this birth and the education which belongs to it. It has determined the course of my thoughts and purposes to a degree that I never dreamed of till lately. . . . My father's Unitarianism was not of a fiercely dogmatic kind. But it made him intolerant of what he considered intolerance in Churchmen or Dissenters; pleased when either would work with him, sensitive to slights from them. I have inherited from him some haste of temper, and impatience of opposition to what he thought reasonable. I wish I had anything like his benevolence, generosity, and freedom from self-indulgence. As I grew up I became far too sensible of what seemed to me his narrowness, and of a certain incoherency in his mind; far too little sensible of his very noble qualities of heart. I have since come to the deep practical conviction that this insensibility was a sin against God—a refusal to recognize the operations of His Spirit." (Vol. i., pp. 12, 13.)

We have quoted this somewhat lengthy passage not merely to show Mr. Maurice's humbleness of mind, but as indicating the temper in which he was accustomed to look at religious systems and modes of thought from which he most strongly dissented. Recognizing vital elements of truth in them all, he tried to show that for their full efficiency they needed to be supplemented by other elements of truth; and that these can be found only in the old catholic creeds and order of the Church. This is brought out most distinctly in "The Kingdom of Christ," one of his earliest and ablest works. As might be expected from his humble, reverential spirit, Mr. Maurice was a singularly devout man. Prayer seems to have been to him as the very breath of life. He was always an early riser, and immediately after dressing settled down to work at whatever his special task for the time might be; but God was still in all his thoughts.

"Very frequently, if one came into his room at all suddenly, the result was to make him rise hurriedly from his knees, his face reddened, and his eyes depressed by the intense pressure of his hands, the base of each of which had been driven and almost gouged into either eye-socket, the fingers and thumbs pressed down over forehead and head. The Greek Testament, opened at some special point which had occupied him at the moment he knelt down, lay on the chair before him; but as he rose the spirit seemed to have come back again into his face from the far-off regions to which it had been travelling, and there was just a hint in the face of an involuntary sadness and almost of reproach that the spirit should be recalled from the intercourse it had been enjoying." (Vol. ii., p. 285.)

To this testimony of his son, Mrs. Maurice's note-book adds:

"Whenever he woke in the night he was always praying. And in the very early morning I have often pretended to be asleep, lest I should disturb him whilst he was pouring out his heart to God." "He never began any work, or any book, without preparing for it by prayer."

We have no space to dwell upon Mr. Maurice's theological and philosophical opinions, or to notice the various writings in which he expounded and enforced them. The amplest information on these points will be found, as we have said, in

the Life itself. He discussed many subjects of fundamental importance relating to religious belief, the Church, the Bible, Christian society and the progress of humanity, and always with earnest conviction, often with signal ability—though not always, we venture to think, with such clearness and mastery as to render his views perfectly intelligible. Among his principal works are “The Kingdom of Christ,” “The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament,” “Theological Essays,” “Lectures on the Epistles of St. John,” addressed to workingmen; “What is Revelation?” in opposition to Mr. Mansel’s agnosticism; “Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy,” “Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews,” “The Religions of the World,” “The Church a Family,” “The Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament,” “The Doctrine of Sacrifice, Deduced from the Scriptures.” Although but few of his books have been reprinted in this country, they have been a good deal read here, and have exerted no small influence, especially upon some of the most thoughtful minds in the Episcopal Church. He has been widely regarded as belonging to the so-called “Broad Church”; but, in important respects, he was far removed from this type of opinion. On some points he was really, as it seems to us, more in sympathy with Dr. Pusey, for example, than with Dean Stanley; his conservatism being hardly less marked than his liberalism. No school or party could claim him as exclusively its own; and his best thoughts—above all the bright example of his entire and tireless devotion to the cause of Christian faith and righteousness—are fitted to enrich and bless any school or party. More than forty years ago we heard him preach the gospel to the poor in the chapel of Guy’s Hospital. We also met him, again and again, under his own hospitable roof. The impression then received of the exceeding beauty and nobleness of his character is still fresh and inspiring. There was a rare spiritual charm about both him and his home. His books may lose their interest; some of his favorite theories and opinions may cease to attract attention; but the image of the man himself, as depicted in these volumes, is a precious and lasting possession of Christian biography.

GEORGE L. PRENTISS.

LIFE AND WORKS OF THE REV. GEORGE THEOPHILUS DODDS. By HORATIO BONAR, D.D. Robert Carter & Bros., Publishers.

A precious memorial of a noble, consecrated, and useful life. A host of personal friends in France, Great Britain, and America were waiting to give it welcome. They will thank Dr. Bonar for writing and compiling it. No one else could have done the work so well. He had already told us of the “White Fields of France.” The foremost reaper in those fields had now fallen amid his sheaves. Much ripened grain remained ungathered. The sowing was never ended. There was need to cheer the weakened band of laborers. There was need to sound the call for more. . . .

The book deserves a place in every church and Sunday-school library. It should be in the hands of pastors and Christian workers. Its introduction to any home would prove a benediction. A beautiful character, noble ambitions, and Christlike devotion cannot fail to stimulate and uplift. Many will learn from the narrative of the greatness and promise of the new evangelistic movement in France. Many, we trust, will be prompted to take up and carry on the work to which the devoted evangelist gave his life.

Born at Lochee, Scotland, June 2, 1850, endowed with rare natural gifts, early dedicated to God by pious parents, carefully trained in a Christian home, and thoroughly educated in the best of Scotland’s schools, Geo. Theo. Dodds came to his maturity with talents and acquirements which commanded recognition and qualified him to organize and lead. With an inborn conviction that he must be a missionary, and the acquired conviction that his mission-field was France, in the flush of hope and the strength and enthusiasm of early manhood, he gave his thoughts, his heart, his life to the work of evangelization in that country.

Not quite five years of active service were allotted him, but they were years of rare

opportunity. France had passed through her baptism of fire and blood. She had emerged chastened, humiliated, but not hopeless. The Republic had given to the people enlarged liberty. Shackles had been broken. The domination of the Church of Rome was no more. The Syllabus, with its profane dogma of Papal infallibility, had opened a gulf between that Church and thinking, patriotic, and conscientious minds. In the rebound, many had rushed madly into infidelity and atheism, but that could not annihilate their religious nature and religious needs. Meanwhile, the education of the masses on a broad and national basis engaged the attention of the Government. Men were fast learning to think and decide for themselves. A readiness to listen to Protestant teachers revealed itself. "What have you to offer us," the people asked, "in place of the old superstitions and the new negations?"

By a revision of the laws upon the press and public meetings, the whole country was thrown open to the preaching of the Gospel. You could hold religious meetings, public and private, anywhere. You could distribute in the streets and public places Bibles and Testaments and Christian literature, as had not been allowed before. Even the laws on colportage were revised, so that foreigners could engage, without fear or restraint, in this branch of evangelistic work.

Recognizing their God-given opportunities, the French Protestants were coming out of their entrenchments and fortifications and organizing for aggressive action. England had given to France Mr. McAll and de Bröen, and their bolder methods for reaching the hearts and consciences of the people had been signally blessed.

To this work Mr. Dodds joined himself in November, 1877, becoming, and continuing till his death in September, 1882, the sympathizing friend, the efficient helper, "the right arm" of Rev. Mr. McAll in his "mission to the working-people of Paris and France." For this special work he proved himself possessed of special qualifications. His devotion to it was limited only by physical and mental endurance. From eight to ten times a week he addressed public meetings, speaking, as occasion required, in English, French, or German. He was editor of the *Quarterly Record of the Mission*; he wrote frequently for the religious journals in Great Britain and in America; carried on an extensive correspondence with auxiliary societies and friends of the mission in both these countries as well as in France; had charge of its libraries and its tract distribution, and was frequently called across the Channel to make addresses in its behalf. When the French Protestants were arranging to send a Commission to America to tell our churches of the religious needs of France and the exceptional opportunities for promoting the work of evangelization in their country, and how the Christians of America could help forward the work, this important Commission was not considered complete until Mr. Dodds was associated with M. Réviellaud as his companion and interpreter.

Of the fruits of this mission to America there is not space to speak; but the information given, the interest enkindled, the international Christian sympathy awakened, the tens of thousands of francs collected, and the permanent and helpful co-operation ensured, are all comprised in the life-record of this honored evangelist.

The story of his retirement to the Forests of Buisson Luzas for needed rest, and his sudden and painful death in that lone retreat, is told with all the strength and tenderness, delicacy and pathos which we would expect from the pen of the gifted preacher, and author of "Hymns of Faith and Hope" when writing thus of his own beloved and lamented son.

E. W. HITCHCOCK.

THE following works in the department of Historical Theology demand brief notice:

Scottish Divines, 1505-1872. (Edinburgh: MacNevin & Wallace, 1883.) This third series of the St. Giles Lectures presents us the modern theological history of Scotland in sketches of twelve divines such as would do honor to any nation or any age in Christendom. Knox, Melville, Rutherford, Leighton, Ebenezer Erskine,

Principal Robertson, Edward Irving, Chalmers, James Robertson, Bishop Ewing, Robert Lee, Norman MacLeod, are names that grace the annals of Scotland and constitute the centres of her religious history. These sketches are by twelve different scholars of the Church of Scotland, from varied points of view. There is a disadvantage here in the lack of unity, in constant changes of method, and in unevenness in material; but there is a surprising variety and richness. Every additional lecture is new, not only in subject-matter, but also in its dress. The reader advances through these portraits of Scottish worthies and finds them attractive and instructive from the beginning to the end. The writers all belong to the established church of Scotland. They write with a generous, tolerant, and catholic spirit. Yet, there are occasional traces of denominational rivalry. These are, however, fewer than one might expect, considering that twelve different divines have a hand in the book, and these are all from a single denomination in Scotland. We cannot help thinking how much richer the series would be if a few representative divines of the other denominations in Scotland had assisted in it.—*The Westminster Divines on the Use of Instrumental Music in the Worship of God.* By W. D. Killen, D.D. (Belfast: William Mullan & Son, 1882.) This admirable pamphlet of 95 pages is a product of the discussion of the right to use instrumental music in the worship of God, which has so greatly agitated the Irish Presbyterian Church for some years past. The venerable professor of Church History at Belfast does not advocate the use of instrumental music, but he maintains Christian liberty and charity in this respect. He shows that the banishment of instrumental music was a Scotch and Scotch-Irish tradition, and that there is no basis for it in the Westminster symbols. The argument is a very interesting one. It is an exceedingly able and shrewd use of the argument from silence. There are many who have objected to this argument, owing to its employment by destructive critics, but really it is one of the most useful lines of argument in all historical investigations. Dr. Killen's use of the argument from silence is valid, and is indeed unanswerable. He shows that there was great difference of opinion on this subject at the time the Westminster Assembly was in session; that the Scotch, with few exceptions, were opposed to instrumental music in the service of God; that the English Independents, led by Thomas Goodwin and Ney, agreed with the Scotch in this particular; that the leaders of the English Puritan Presbyterians had never opposed instrumental music; that the chief divines of this school in the Westminster Assembly were in favor of musical accompaniment in the service of God. The matter was discussed by them. They are profoundly silent on this question in the standards where they must have given an opinion if they had one. They were silent because they could not agree, and because they had resolved to leave it an open question for Christian prudence and Christian liberty to decide in accordance with circumstances. Dr. Killen has settled this question. The Presbyterian churches have liberty in this matter, and no ecclesiastical body should venture to interfere with it. Any such interference with church sessions in the past or the present, in our judgment, has been, and is now, usurpation of unconstitutional and tyrannous powers, which should be strenuously resisted by ministers and people. One of the glories of Presbyterians is liberty in worship. But these opponents of instrumental music, and hymns, and liturgies would introduce a bondage far worse than the service book against which our Puritan fathers contended to the death. Prof. Killen has earned the thanks of the Presbyterian Church throughout the world for his patient and careful study of the question, and for the thoroughness with which he has conducted the discussion.—*Irish Presbyterianism; its History, Character, Influence, and Present Position.* By Rev. Thomas Croskery, D.D. (Dublin: Humphrey & Armour, 1884.) This pamphlet of 63 pages condenses a vast amount of information with reference to Irish Presbyterianism. Prof. Croskery has unusual skill in the preparation of historical material in a plain, succinct, practical, and popular form. This tract is a model of its kind. It suggests to us that it

might be advantageous if the other branches of Presbyterianism could be treated in the same way. There are three parts: I. History of Irish Presbyterianism. In this part we regret to note the neglect of the English Presbyterianism of Dublin and the South of Ireland over against the Scotch Presbyterianism of Ulster. This, however, is characteristic of all of the Ulster Church Historians. Part II. The Character and Influence of Irish Presbyterianism. Our author is correct in representing it as "Puritan in its Theology and Religion." There are those who strive to magnify the Scotch and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism as of a higher order than the Puritan—but really the Westminster Standards are Puritan symbols, and they were adopted by the Scotch and Scotch-Irish and are not to be interpreted by traditions and influences that were locally peculiar to Scotland and Ireland, but by the greater breadth of the Puritanism that dominated the British nation in its contest with Papacy and Prelacy. We regret to see that Prof. Croskery represents Francis Makemie as the founder of American Presbyterianism in America. He is pardonable for this, for he follows the example of Irish and American authorities, but really he is in error. American Presbyterianism was founded in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and South Carolina ere Makemie came to America. He built on the foundations of several English and Irish Presbyterians even in Maryland. He was one of the founders of the first American Presbytery, and probably the most influential of the seven founders, but it is hardly correct to give him the credit of the whole of the work which preceded him and of that in which he only took a highly important part. He does not belong in the first rank of the founders of American Presbyterianism. Other Irish Presbyterians preceded him. But he was the most influential of the seven founders of the first American Classical Presbytery. Part III. is devoted to the present position of the Irish Presbyterian Church. It is gratifying to find that this church has passed through its long persecution and has given so many of the best of its children to the United States and the British Colonies, and has endured so many petty meannesses from the Episcopal established church of Ireland and the British Government, and despite all is now so strong in numbers, wealth, and intellectual and moral power. It seems to us that the Presbyterianism of the North has been worse treated by the British Government throughout than the Romanism of the South. It has suffered more than any other class in Ireland for the British Government and has been worse treated by the British Government. But better times have come. Irish Presbyterianism is splendidly equipped for the present and future. It has youthful energy and vitality. It is still too much hampered by insular traditions and conservative tendencies. But we are glad to note signs of progress in theology as well as in religious work. We believe that Irish Presbyterianism will not remain in isolation, but will emulate the sister churches in adapting itself to the problems of the age.—*Bibliotheca Quakeristica*. A Bibliography of Miscellaneous Literature relating to the Friends (Quakers), chiefly written by persons not members of their Society; also of publications by authors in some way connected; and biographical notices. By *Joseph Smith*. Part I. Price 1 shilling. (London, 1883.) The author is a venerable antiquarian bookseller of London who has devoted his life to the collecting of books relating to the Quakers. He has published two invaluable bibliographical works relating to this subject, the first upon Works of Quakers, the second upon Works against the Quakers. This is now the third set to complete the series of works relating to the Quakers, by giving those not included in the previous bibliographies. Any one who has studied the history of the sects which originated in the Commonwealth period, knows how valuable such a bibliography is. The previous works of Joseph Smith are worthy of all praise. The first part gives promise that this third work will equal the others. There is one difficulty in the way, and that is the financial one. There is no prospect of gain by such a publication. It is necessary that it should be published by subscription. All who are interested in its appearance should send their names to Joseph Smith, 6

Oxford Street, Whitechapel, London. It is safe to say that there is no other man who is so competent to do this work, and if anything should prevent him from doing it, it would be a misfortune to all students of British and American Church History and all librarians who have to answer the inquiries of investigators in these departments.

C. A. BRIGGS.

III.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

HANDBUCH DER THEOLOGISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN IN ENCYKLOPÄDISCHER DARSTELLUNG. Herausgegeben von Dr. OTTO ZÖCKLER., ord. Prof. d. Theologie in Greifswald. VI. Halbband (Schluss des Werkes). pp. 772. New York: B. Westermann & Co.

This important work, the publication of which has been in progress during the past three years under Dr. Zöckler's supervision, and with the co-operation of such eminent scholars as Cremer, Harnack, Luthardt, and others, is brought to completion in the present volume. The entire work, when bound, will consist of three large octavos. The present work, though the sixth *Halbband*, is part of the second volume, which will consist of Historical Theology and part of Systematic Theology (apologetic and dogmatic). The value of the work consists largely in the fact that it combines in a very good degree the advantages of a Theological Encyclopædia and of independent treatises on the several theological Disciplines. Theological Encyclopædia is important, inasmuch as it presents a bird's-eye view of all the departments of theological science: but it is apt to be a barren outline where it is not taken up with discussions regarding theological method; or to be valuable chiefly for its bibliography. On the other hand, the theological specialist is in danger of devoting himself so exclusively to monographs which bear upon his own department, as to have little time for extended reading in kindred departments, the result being that he may fail to know his specialty as he should by knowing it too exclusively. It is a positive gain to the specialist in theological study to have before him in moderate compass, and yet with tolerable fullness, a statement of the present condition of other departments; and to the general theological student such a work as the one under notice is simply invaluable.

The fourfold division of theological sciences now almost universally adopted, is the principle of division in the present work, and the convenience of the arrangement in a work of this kind outweighs the objection which will suggest itself to those who may be exacting in regard to the logic of classification. So, too, the division of Systematic Theology into the three departments of apologetic, dogmatic, and ethic, may be allowed to pass without comment on account of the general favor which it meets with among encyclopædists, though good reasons could be given for the statement that the division is faulty and that apologetics is not co-ordinate with the other members of the class in which it is placed. In the present work division D is entitled Systematic Theology. Subdivision 1 is devoted to Apologetics. Here we have first an account of the nature and function of apologetic. The usual distinction between apology and apologetic is made; apologetic is declared impossible, unless there is in the essence of Christianity that which evinces it to be the truth; and apologetic is defined to be the scientific exhibition of the self-demonstration of Christianity as the truth,—a definition, it seems to us, that is needlessly mysterious; for had it been said that apologetic is a scientific exhibition of the defences of Christianity as a Divine revelation, the ground would have been amply covered. The relations of apologetic to dogmatic and to polemic are well put. With the statement that the defence of Christianity has nothing to do with anti-Christians of a decided type, since the hope of winning them is an idle one, we do not concur, any more than we

fall in with a good deal of foolish talking now current in regard to the place of apologetics in the pulpit. Next comes the history of apologetic, which is sufficiently comprehensive in the main, but makes little or no mention of English and American literature in this department.

The next topic treats of the proper distribution of apologetic material, and is an apologetic treatise in itself. According to this arrangement, we have: 1st. Proof that the Christian conception of God is the only one that corresponds to the needs of human life. 2d. Proof that the Christian conception of Jesus Christ alone answers to the sinner's need of salvation. 3d. Proof that the word of God in the Holy Scripture given to the Church alone satisfies man's need of truth.

An important place in apologetics should be given to the correspondence between Christianity and the needs of our spiritual nature. But when this subjective method is followed to the exclusion of the old objective and historical method, a great mistake is committed. The author whose work is under discussion makes this mistake just as Baumstark does in his *Apologetic*. He teaches the orthodox Lutheran view as to the doctrine of Inspiration and the relation of the Bible to the Church. But he has no sympathy with the modern exaltation of Christian consciousness, of which he says that with its enthronization all the strongholds of Christian belief must be given up. The author of this discussion, we should say, is Dr. Robert Kübel, of Tübingen.

The next part of Systematic Theology is Dogmatic, and is treated by Drs. Cremer and Zöckler, of Greifswald. The distinction is made between the dogma of Christianity (viz., the historical fact of the self-revelation of God in Christ), and the dogmas, which are the individual doctrines involved in that fact. "Dogmatic is not the elaboration of dogmas into a system, but the systematic development or scientific exhibition of the dogmas contained in the Dogma." This is an extreme form of the much talked of Christocentric method in Dogmatic, which from a logical and theological point of view has been praised far more than it deserves, and which is erroneously supposed by those who are not professed theologians to have some advantage in the way of practical piety over other methods. The history of Dogmatic which follows the statement of the province of Dogmatic is sufficiently full, except perhaps under section VII., which deals with the latest critico-speculative school, where, for instance, a fuller statement of the Ritschlian movement would have been welcomed.

The discussion is divided into two parts. A, *Prinzipien-lehre*; B, *Glaubens-lehre*. Under the first we have in addition to the topics just referred to, the Postulates of Christianity, the Origin of Christian certainty, the Sources of Christian knowledge. Under the second, the doctrine of God, of Man and Sin, of the Saviour, of Salvation, of the Church and the Last Things. These topics are considered from the stand-point of Lutheran orthodoxy, with little reference to conflicting views. The literature under each *locus* is pretty full, including writers of all confessional affiliations. The subjects embraced in the analysis given above cover the whole field of dogmatics, but they sustain no obvious organic relation to one another, and do not fulfil the promise of architectonic ability which the somewhat strained definition of dogmatic seemed to give.

F. L. PATTON.

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA AND METHODOLOGY ON THE BASIS OF HAGENBACH. By GEORGE R. CROOKS, D.D., and JOHN F. HURST, D.D. pp. 596. New York: Phillips & Hunt.

The department of Theological Encyclopædia is represented by a very limited literature, and Hagenbach's book, especially the latest edition of it, undoubtedly deserves the first place in it—if place is to be assigned on the score of fullness and general utility. There are smaller works which are more suggestive and show more originality of thought and more fertility of invention. The fourfold division which Hagenbach adopts has nothing to recommend it beyond its mechanical con-

venience; but under this division an outline of the method, history and contents of Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical Theology is given, and this outline is supplemented by a full list of titles representing the literature of these departments.

An important service has been rendered in making Hagenbach's book available to English readers. Yet it is only a qualified approval that we can give of the volume now before us. Had the title-page informed us that it was a translation of Hagenbach with additions, it would have been in substantial accord with the contents of the book. And even then the additions should have indicated, so that the reader might know how much he is indebted to Hagenbach and how much to his translators. A comparison of this volume with the original does not justify the assertion of the title-page that Drs. Crooks and Hurst are the authors of an Encyclopædia on the basis of Hagenbach. The additional chapters by Drs. Crooks and Hurst on the relations of philosophy and theology are well written and valuable. The bibliography of the original has been enriched also by the addition of English and American literature. But in French and German literature we find no titles which are not in the German edition of 1880. Thus in the literature of Encyclopædia we miss the names of Rübiger, Lange, Zöckler and Vaucher. Baumstark is not named in Apologetics, nor is Gass in Ethics, and the list of dogmatic theologians does not contain the names of Dörner and Lipsius.

F. L. PATTON.

ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. By the late WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, PH.D., sometime Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, and Professor of Moral Philosophy and Dogmatic Theology at Old Hall College, Ware. Reprinted from the *Dublin Review*. 2 vols. pp. 390, 349. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

Dr. Ward was one of the most astute metaphysicians of this generation. He was also one of the ablest Roman Catholic theologians. He believed in the authority of the Church, but he believed, nevertheless, in the authority of Reason within the sphere of natural Religion. The object aimed at in these essays was the "philosophic establishment of Theism." The volumes before us are a posthumous publication, and the essays contained in them were contributed from time to time to the *Dublin Review*, of which the author was the editor. The discussions are mainly directed against the positions of Mr. John Stuart Mill. Mill died when the controversy between himself and Dr. Ward was at its height. Of Mill's intellectual integrity Dr. Ward speaks in the highest terms, and his death must have made a strong impression upon him, for he refers to it three times in his essays, in precisely the same terms every time, as "a serious controversial disappointment." The publication of these volumes is by far the most important addition to theistic literature of the present year. The essays are fine specimens of controversial writing. The author has the metaphysician's fondness, to be sure, for new words, and after being successively introduced to such strange sounds as "necessist," "phenomenist," "prevenant," and "postvenant," we begin to feel that his vocabulary is becoming unmanageable. But the essays abound in nicely managed feats of psychological analysis, and the dialectic is splendid. Mill was never more remorselessly dealt with than when he made the fatal admission (contrary to his former statement in his Logic that a cause is always a phenomenon), in his reply to Dr. Ward that a miracle would be no exception to the law of causation, since "to all to whom beings with a superhuman power over nature are a *vera causa*, a miracle is a *case* of the Law of Universal Causation, not a deviation from it." Well may Dr. Ward exclaim, "What an astonishing collapse is here both of memory and scientific intelligence!" "Is a volition, then," continues Dr. Ward, "of the Invisible God a *phenomenon*?" Mr. Mill laid down at starting that he recognizes no causes which are not phenomena; and now he tells us that *God's volition* may count as cause."

A large amount of space is given to the discussion of Free Will. The author exaggerates the bearing of this question upon Theism; and though his reasoning is acute, there is nothing in his doctrine of "anti-impulsive effort" which the Determinist could not meet.

Some of the essays in the second volume bear more directly upon points of Roman Catholic theology, and though we have read them with interest we must pass them by. On one matter, however, let us say a single word. With a certain prevalent type of Anti-Roman Catholicism we have no sympathy. There is nothing in good manners or sound theology to make it necessary that a Protestant should always speak of a Roman Catholic as a Papist, or of his Church as Antichrist. And yet it must be confessed that Dr. Ward has made it difficult for a Protestant to defend the Church of Rome against the charge of being Antichrist. For these are his own words:

"There is no fact more profoundly impressed on the Catholic at any time than that the Church claims emphatically to be God's one accredited messenger. . . . Moreover, to put forth such a claim without foundation is nothing less than insolent blasphemy. The Catholic Church is necessarily either Vice-God or Anti-God."

F. L. PATTON.

THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE LOVE; or, Outlines of the Moral Theology of the Evangelical Church. By EARNEST SARTORIUS, Consistorial Director and Senior Court Preacher at Königsburg. 8vo, 378 pp. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New-York: Scribner & Welford.

This work constitutes volume eighteen of Clark's Foreign Theological Library. It was originally issued in four divisions, at intervals between 1840 and 1856. These are now translated and combined in one volume.

The author's design is to develop a system of practical theology from the single principle, "God is Love." Part I. bears the title, "*Divine Love, its Contrast and the Reconciliation thereof.*" Under this he discusses the Nature of God; the Trinity; Creation; the Image of God in Man; Sin and the Law; the Person of Christ; the Atonement; the Sacraments, and Justification by Faith.

Part II., "*Of Divine Love, Renewing, Obeying, and Perfecting,*" embraces the subjects of Purifying Love, Uniting Love, Obeying Love, the Patience and Hope of Love, and closes with a brief discussion of Eternal Life, the Last Judgment and the Victory of Love.

The proposition "God is Love" is treated as a definition in the strictest sense of that word. "Love is not so much an attribute which God has as the nature which He is." From this fact the author argues, first, the necessity for a Trinity. The substance of his argument is, that the nature of love is to impart, hence the fact that God is love implies a distinction of persons in the Godhead, and as "the perfection of love consists not in duality but in trinity," there must be three persons and only three.

In discussing the nature of man he infers, "If God, who is love, made man in His own image, this image must have chiefly consisted in the filling of man's soul with Divine Love. Love created man to resemble itself." Our first parents lost their innocence by apostasy from the love of God. "This was the fall that man did not remain in love but fell into selfishness." Selfishness is the germ of all sin.

The law is not a mere series of moral precepts, but the expression of God's loving will, and the type to which man, made in the image of God, should conform. The opposition of God's holy law to sin involves its imputation. "Guilt is sin imputed." The medium of this imputation is conscience. Conscience "is the consciousness of Divine law as the original norm and form of human nature." "The revealed law of God written in Holy Scripture is the objective conscience of mankind."

Man's fallen state is one of utter inability, for selfishness cannot be changed by

its own will into its opposite. This can be effected only by the gracious, conquering love of God as manifested in the incarnation, obedience, and sacrifice of His Son.

As the nature of sin is selfishness, the expiation of sin consists in self-denial. Suffering and death are the wages of sin, but they do not atone for sin. Expiation is effected only "by the sacrifice of self, by the surrender of its will in submission to the Divine punishment, in obedience to the Divine will." Such a sacrifice Christ offered to God for man.

Man is received into communion with the Reconciler by the Holy Spirit working in and through the appointed means, the Word and the Sacraments. Baptism is "neither a mere representation of previous, or a prefiguring of subsequent effects, but the first actual investiture with the benefits of the Redeemer's baptism of suffering." It is "not administered *because* there is faith, but *that there may be* faith." The Lord's Supper is not a mere commemorative feast, but the means by which He imparts His real presence.

Justification is not "a mere remission of external punishment on the condition of faith." It is rather the reacceptance of the sinner into the fatherly love of God, of which he is conscious through faith." It is, however, to be carefully distinguished from sanctification. "Justification is the reception of the love wherewith we are loved; sanctification is the giving of the love wherewith we love."

The purification of the heart by believing, self-denying love, is no human work or merit, but the good gift of God.

Purifying love, in proportion as it overcomes the selfishness which separates, becomes *uniting* love, the perfect love of all rightly organized society. It is also the inspiration of the Christian's patient endurance while filling up that which is behind in the sufferings of Christ, and of his triumph in death.

The state of the pious dead is "one of happy peace in silent concealment, yet one of desire for their manifestation and perfection in glorified corporiety." . . . At Christ's appearing in glory "they shall come forth from their quiet abodes and enter with delight into the new resurrection bodies which God will make for them." The ungodly, meanwhile, are in "the cold, dark sheol (Hades, as distinguished from Gehenna)" unclothed spirits in "sad, despairing nakedness."

The question as to a possible restoration is answered thus: "Scripture forbids any hope for those who in this life had Moses and the prophets, who both externally and internally clearly apprehended the voice of the Holy Spirit, but arrogantly or frivolously hardened themselves against it. . . . On the other hand, Scripture does leave ground for hope for those who, like sinners before the deluge or the heathen at the present day, had the law of God written on their hearts, and transgressed it, but, having not yet heard the Gospel, are therefore guiltless of contemptuous unbelief of it, and of the sin against the Holy Ghost."

"Not according to their disobedience to the law, which is expiated by His obedience upon the cross, but according to their unbelief in the Gospel, will Christ judge all men at the close of their whole history at the last day."

After the judgment which takes place at Christ's second coming, "the unjust, *i.e.*, the unjustified, shall go into eternal punishment, but the righteous, or justified, into life eternal." Eternal life is life in the eternal love of God. Eternal death is endless separation from the kingdom of love.

Such is, in outline, the author's conception of the Doctrine of Divine Love, "which embraces all things pertaining to life and godliness."

It is scarcely necessary to indicate the defects of the work or its points of divergence from the Calvinistic creed. His argument for the Trinity is unsatisfactory, and in some points fanciful. His high Sacramentarian views, or at least the terms in which he expresses them, are open to serious objection. His conclusion that, for

some, there is a probation after death, rests on slight affirmative evidence, while the evidence against it is ignored.

The book is, however, eminently suggestive and instructive, revealing a profound study of Divine things and a rich personal experience. It is evidently the work of a preacher, pervaded by a true preacher's earnestness, and regard for practical ends. The tone is throughout Scriptural, tender, and devout. GEORGE ALEXANDER.

THE BIBLE TRUE TO ITSELF. A treatise on the historical worth of the Old Testament. By A. MOODY STUART, D.D., author of "An Exposition of the Song of Solomon," etc. James Nisbet & Co., London.

The right of the Christian people to ascertain and interpret the Word of God for themselves is an essential principle of Protestantism, and a precious possession which they will not readily surrender. In the meantime a suspicion has been very generally disseminated, that the discoveries of scholarship were undermining the historical substratum of the Sacred Scriptures we have inherited from our believing ancestors, leaving behind only a delusive surface of sentiment or ritual. This destructive work has been going on in a great measure in the dark, as far as the mass of Christian people are concerned, and has been operated by processes of learned and scientific criticism of which they have little conception, and no accurate understanding. Indeed, the assumption is often more than tacitly made by those who advocate the truth of the revolutionary views as to the structure and origin of the several parts of the sacred volume that the entire nature of the problems involved is so recondite, that only scholars of special learning and of special critical insight are competent to form an opinion, or worthy of having their opinions respectfully considered in the case.

But believers can no more delegate the power and responsibility of deciding upon the essential historical foundations of their faith to special scholars and their secret processes, than they can delegate the deciding the dogmatic content of their faith to councils or doctors. And it is well to be assured that the sacrifice is not necessary. Prof. Kuenen, the most influential master among the disciples of the "Newer Criticism," sets the facts of the case forth fairly and clearly as follows: "The Bible is in every one's hand. The critic has no other Bible than the public. He does not profess to have any additional documents, inaccessible to the laity, nor does he profess to find anything in his Bible *that the ordinary reader cannot see*. It is true that here and there he improves the common translation; but this is the exception and not the rule. And yet he dares to form a conception of Israel's religious development *totally different* from that which any one can see *is set forth in the Old Testament*, and to sketch the primitive Christianity in lines which *even the acutest reader cannot recognize in the New*." Hence the results of the "Newer Criticism," Prof. Kuenen himself being judge, rest on evidence which in all essential particulars is open alike to the whole body of educated believers, and these results are diametrically opposed ("totally different") not to the traditional belief of the whole Christian Church only, but to all the representations of fact and history and character, which, every one can see, are set forth in the Old Testament and the New.

The Rev. A. Moody Stuart, D.D., is not a special student of language or criticism or history, but a highly cultivated and eminently respected and effective pastor of one of the Free Churches in Edinburgh. He has written for all educated people with competent knowledge of the present state of the controversy, and with admirable clearness of style. He has, we think, succeeded in showing, over the whole extent to which he has carried the discussion, that "the proposed reconstruction of the Bible is a failure," and that the historical faith of the Christian Church in its inherited Scriptures has stood the test of the most searching controversy unshaken.

A. A. HODGE.

THE following books, in the department of Systematic Theology, have recently appeared :

A Pocket System of Theology, by the Rev. John Reid, with an Introduction by the Rev. John Hall, D.D. Presbyterian Board of Publication. This small volume contains, in a short compass, the substance of the Calvinistic faith, expressed in lucid and concise language. The author is favorably known by some thoughtful books, which have been well received by the religious public—such, for example, as “The Voices of the Soul answered in God.” It is admirably adapted for Sabbath-school teachers and church-members generally—the class for whom it has been specially prepared. The imprimatur of the Presbyterian Board is evidence of the soundness of the doctrine contained in it. If it can be extensively read and pondered, in connection with the Sabbath-school instruction given in the church, a blessing will be seen to follow, both to teachers and pupils. We hope that it may have a wide circulation.—*A Higher Catechism of Theology*, by William Burt Pope, D.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. This is a statement of the evangelical faith from the Arminian point of view, by an English theologian, who is the “theological tutor in Didbury College, Manchester.” It is constructed in the form of question and answer, and, so far as simplicity and fullness are concerned, reminds somewhat of the Heidelberg Catechism. We do not know where a student would find a better analysis of this type of doctrine, upon which some of the strongest and most useful denominations of Christendom are founded. There is much in it which the Calvinist will heartily assent to. At the same time the points of difference between Arminianism and Calvinism are carefully marked by the author, and his own dogmatic position firmly maintained. The principal of these points cluster, of course, about the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty. The author adopts the Semi-Pelagian position that original sin is not guilt in the strict sense, the tenet of synergism in regeneration, and of universal redemption (pp. 122, 141, 142). These views modify the whole subject of decrees. The Calvinist cannot accompany him here. But in regard to actual transgression, the nature of guilt and of conscience and of law, the office of punishment, the divine-human person and vicarious work of Christ, the work of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of the Trinity, the reader will find scriptural statements of the common faith once delivered to the saints. Such a well-reasoned treatise as this, like Watson’s *Institutes*, should be read by the Calvinist, not only that the Arminian system may be understood by him, but that certain aspects of the truth, common to both systems, may be the better appreciated—in the same way that the *Institutes* of Calvin may be profitably studied by the Arminian for the same purpose. The consequence of such a dispassionate study of the strong books, upon both sides of the great problem, will be to make consistent theologians upon both sides, who respect each other because they understand each other. We recommend the *Higher Catechism* of Dr. Pope to theological students of all denominations.—*Qualifications for Membership in the Presbyterian Church*, by the Rev. J. Howard Nixon, D.D., is a little tract published by the Presbyterian Board. The author, in very brief limits, describes the “belief professed,” the “knowledge required,” and the “piety demanded,” by those who would enter the Presbyterian Church. It is an excellent manual, deserving to be read by every one about to make confession of his faith.—*What we Believe*, is a tract similar to the preceding, by the Rev. L. P. Bowen, issued by the publishers of the *St. Louis Presbyterian* and *Texas Presbyterian*. It takes particular notice of the misrepresentations of Calvinism, and is calculated to remove the popular misconceptions that prevail concerning it.

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD.

IV.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

HANDBUCH DER THEOLOGISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN in encyclopädischer Darstellung mit besonderen Rücksicht auf die Entwicklungsgeschichte der einzelnen Disciplinen. In Verbindung mit Prof. DD. Cremer, Grau, Harnack, etc., herausgegeben von Dr. Otto Zöckler. V. Halbband. Nördlingen, 1883. New York: B. Westermann & Co.

We have here, the fifth half-volume of this comprehensive work. It makes the conclusion of the third volume which treats of Ethics and Practical Theology. The latter subject, to which the fasciculus before us is devoted, after an introduction by Prof. Zezschwitz, is divided into Evangelistik, Katechetik, Homiletik, Liturgik, Pastorallehre, Diakonik, and Rubernetik, each of which, especially Homiletik, is treated with considerable fulness. The work is done with the thoroughness one always expects from a German professor, but in the Literature appended to the several sections, the references to English writers are very few, and there are none at all to American authors. The evangelical tone of the various writers is distinct and prominent, and the references to the Divine word as a norm are abundant and satisfactory. Some American pastors who have dropped the Catechism as antiquated and obsolete may be reminded that this volume which devotes forty octavo pages to Katechetik only follows the custom observed in all modern works on Practical Theology. The profound and learned scholars of the Continent have not yet discovered that the generations which set great store by catechetical instruction were behind their age.

T. W. CHAMBERS.

SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. By GEORGE SMITH, LL.D., F.R.G.S. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1884.

This volume belongs to the excellent Series of Hand-Books for Bible-Classes and private study, issued by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. It consists of three parts. Part I. is entitled "Judaic Preparation, B.C. 2,000 to A.D. 70." Part II.: "Latin Preparation, A.D. 70 to 1784." Part III.: "English Universal Evangelization, 1784-1884." As was to be expected from the author of the Lives of Dr. Wilson and Dr. Duff, the work is written in an admirable spirit, is comprehensive and far-reaching in its views, and contains a carefully prepared sketch of the historical development of Christian missions. "That begins with Abraham as a preparation; it culminates in the conversion of the Roman Empire. It is continued in the conversion of the peoples of Europe to the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and in the Peace of 1783 which recognized the Independence of the American Republic. This *Preparatio Evangelica* then passes into the organized and truly catholic attempts to evangelize all nations, for which Great Britain's possession of India and many colonies, and America's marvellous extension, have made the past century remarkable,—though, at the best and in the light of the future, this is still the day of small things." This outline shows the scope of the work. It is the best brief manual of the history of missions that we know of. But it is very brief, and gives only faint outlines and glimpses of the great subject. An encyclopædia of Christian missions, covering the whole ground of home as well as foreign evangelism, prepared by the joint labors of many skilled hands, dealing in a wise and catholic spirit with the difficult, unsolved problems relating to the progress of the Gospel, and inspired throughout by the faith of the Son of God, would be a real benediction to the Church.

G. L. PRENTISS.

SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE NEW ENGLAND COMPANY. By the Senior Members of the Company. Spottiswoode & Co., London, 1884.

This is a welcome publication. It gives information which has long been needed, and often sought in vain with reference to this most ancient of the British Missionary Societies. This Society being a private one, with ample endowments, it has carried on its work quietly and in a retired way. It has not appealed to the public for funds, and has apparently felt no responsibility to the public with regard to the disposition of its trust funds. Its annual reports have been printed exclusively for private circulation among the members, so that it has been exceedingly difficult to learn anything about its missionary operations at the present time.

We shall embrace this opportunity to give our readers some account of this great Missionary Society. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England was the earliest of the Missionary Societies in Great Britain in modern times. It was founded in 1649, by ordinance of the Long Parliament as a perpetual corporation called, "The President and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England." It was authorized to receive and dispose of monies in such manner as "shall best and principally conduce to the preaching and propagating the Gospel among the natives, and for the maintenance of schools and nurseries of learning for the education of the children of the natives." A general collection was appointed by Parliament to be made in all the counties, cities, towns, and parishes of England and Wales, "for a charitable contribution to be as the foundation of so pious and great an undertaking." This collection amounted to nearly £12,000. It was invested in landed property at Eriswell, in Suffolk, and a farm at Plumstead, in Kent, as well as several houses in London. The property in Suffolk consisted of 7,000 acres. We have been informed, on the highest authority, that it was sold a few years ago to an East Indian prince for £120,000 for a hunting park. This and the other investments of the Society have made it a very wealthy corporation. Its name has been changed to "The New England Company," and it is probably the richest missionary society in the world.

The movement which resulted in the organization of the Society was brought about by two influences, the one in Old England, the other in New England. The Puritans were urged to do something to Christianize the native American Indians so soon as they were brought in contact with them. In 1641, William Castell presented a petition to Parliament "for the propagating of the Gospel in America and the West Indies, and for the settling of our plantations there." This was approved by the signature of seventy distinguished Puritan divines of England, and Alexander Henderson, and other worthies of Scotland. It was therefore a general missionary movement on the part of the Puritans. It was still further advanced by the marvellous zeal of John Eliot, the apostle of the Red men. The first account of Eliot's work was published in London, in 1643, "*New England's First Fruits*," and immediately attracted great attention. In 1646 Eliot began preaching to the Indians in their own tongue, and was very much encouraged. The results were reported to London in a series of tracts: "*The Day breaking if not the sun rising of the Gospel with the Indians in New England*," London, 1647; "*The clear sunshine of the Gospel breaking forth upon the Indians of New England*," 1648; "*The glorious progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England*," 1649.

In 1648 the General Court of Massachusetts passed an act for the encouragement of the work, and Eliot received financial aid from England. This was the immediate occasion of the organization of the first Missionary Society of Great Britain.

The corporation consisted of 16 persons. They at once appointed Commissioners in New England to look after their interests there. The work was conducted with great interest and enthusiasm during the Commonwealth period, and a series of tracts reporting progress were published in London: "*The light appear-*

ing more and more toward the perfect day," etc., 1651; "*Strength out of weakness,"* 1652; "*Tears of Repentance,"* 1653; "*A late and further manifestation of the progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England,"* 1655; "*A further account of the progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England,"* 1659; "*A further account,"* etc., 1660. These tracts were published by the Society.

The Society was deprived of its charter at the restoration, and Eliot fell into disfavor, but through the influence of Robert Boyle, Richard Baxter, and Henry Ashurst, its treasurer, a new charter was granted Feb. 7, 1661(2). The members of the Company were forty-five in number, including churchmen and dissenters. Lord Chancellor Clarendon and other noblemen were on the list. Robert Boyle was made the first governor. And many distinguished dissenters were associated with him. The charter was enlarged, and the Company was constituted "a Society or Company for Propagation of the Gospel in New England, and the parts adjacent in America."

"For promoting and propagating of the Gospel of Christ unto and amongst the heathen natives in or near New England, and parts adjacent in America; and also for nourishing, teaching, and instructing the said heathen natives and their children, not only in the principles and knowledge of the true religion, and in morality, and the knowledge of the English tongue, and in other liberal arts and sciences, but for the educating and placing of them or their children in some trade, ministry, or lawful calling."

Robert Boyle took a great interest in the Society. He gave them £300, and afterward in his will left them £100, and recommended his executors, that after all debts and legacies were paid, to use the greater portion of the balance "for the advancement of the Christian religion amongst Infidels." Commissioners in America were again appointed, including Increase Mather and Cotton Mather, and Eliot was aided in bringing out his translation of the Bible and other Indian books. The New Testament was printed in 1661, the Old Testament in 1663. He also translated Baxter's "Call to the Unconverted," 1664: Bayley's "Practice of Piety," 1665. He also published an Indian Grammar in 1666, Indian Primer in 1669, Indian Dialogue 1671, Logick Primer 1672; Harmony of the Gospels, 1678. An *Indian Covenanting Confession* (without date), composed and published by Eliot, on a broad sheet was recently discovered in the Library of the University of Edinburgh by the librarian, John Small, M.A., and republished in Edinburgh, 1880. He also wrote the eleventh and last tract of New England, Indian series, in 1671. "*A brief narrative of the progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England in the year 1670.*" Eliot resigned his charge at Roxbury in 1688, and died in 1690. Besides the work carried on by Eliot at Nantick, the Society supported Thomas Mayhew's work at Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket, etc. A succession of Mayhews continued in the work of the Society for over 150 years. They also supported Mr. Bourne, and John Cotton, and Mr. Hawley, in their work at Mashpee, 50 miles from Boston.

A considerable number of Indian churches were organized, and a native ministry established. A letter from New England in 1689 reports six churches of baptized Indians, 18 assemblies of catechumens, and 24 preachers. Ruling elders were associated with the ministers in conducting discipline. The ministers were ordained by Eliot and Cotton, by laying on of the hands and prayer after fasting.

The work of the Society was carried on in New England until the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. The funds were then allowed to accumulate until 1786, when work was begun in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia. These funds had been considerably enlarged by the legacy of Dr. Daniel Williams, the eminent Presbyterian divine of London, who died January 26, 1715(6). The three funds, *e. g.*, the charter fund, the Boyle fund, and the Williams fund, were carefully invested, and their appropriation regulated by three decrees of chancery in 1836. The clause "adjacent parts" in the charter enabled them to abandon New England, and carry on the work in Canada.

Several grants have been made in the West Indies and elsewhere—but the work of the Society has been chiefly in Canada.

Their stations are as follows :

I. Near the Grand River, on the Reserve of the Six Nations : (1) Mohawk station, where there is a church, parsonage, and an educational institution for 45 children. (2) Tuscarora station, with a church and parsonage. (3) Kanyeah station, with church and parsonage. (4) Cayuga station, with church and parsonage. II. On Rice and Chemung Lakes, with a church at Chemung, and parsonage and school-house. III. In British Columbia. The work was begun here in 1870. There is a mission-house and a farm on Kuper Island, about five miles from Vancouver Island. These missions are now prosecuted by the New England Company, with the income of the immense endowments of the three original trust funds. They do not report the amount of these endowments, but they can scarcely be less than £200,000, and it may be far in excess of this sum. So far as we can learn, the Society makes no appeals for contributions for the work they have in hand ; but limit themselves to a wise management of the trust committed to them. We thank the venerable author for the valuable information he has given us. At the same time we cannot help expressing our regret that he has not given a *fuller* account of the missionary operations of the Society through nearly two centuries and a half, and embracing the entire period of missionary work among the North American Indians. And in our judgment the Society owe it to the British public, that they should give an account of the amount of funds in their hands, and of the income from the same, together with the uses that are made of this income. For one cannot escape the impression that such large endowments ought to yield greater results than those that appear on the surface. The Society seems to be conducting its missions on undenominational and unsectarian lines. And yet this is not as distinct as it ought to be.

C. A. BRIGGS.

BIBLE CLASS PRIMERS. Edited by Prof. SALMOND, D.D., Aberdeen. Edinburgh : MacNiven & Wallace. New York : A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

The object of this series "is to provide text-books abreast of the scholarship of the day, but moderate enough in size and price to fit them for general use among young people under religious instruction at week-day and Sunday schools and in Bible classes." The following numbers have already appeared : "Life of David," by the late Rev. Peter Thomson, M.A., St. Fergus ; "Life of Moses," by the Rev. Jas. Iverach, M.A., Aberdeen ; "Life of Paul," by the Rev. J. Paton Gloag, D.D., Galashiels ; "The Life and Reign of Solomon," by the Rev. Rayner Winterbotham, M.A., Fraserburgh ; "The Kings of Israel," by the Rev. W. Walker, Monymusk ; "Joshua and the Conquest," by the Rev. Prof. Croskery, Londonderry ; "The Kings of Judah," by the Rev. Prof. Given, Ph.D., Londonderry ; "The History of the Reformation," by the Rev. Prof. Withrow, Londonderry. Each primer is a complete text-book, divided into sections and furnished with map and questions. They are so small and convenient to carry, being four inches by six and of about 100 pages each, that they might be called the pocket series. Their style is clear, simple, and attractive. They embody the latest results of Biblical criticism and historical investigation. One is surprised at the fullness of information given in such a small compass. The point of view of the authors, as the name of the editor indicates, is evangelical, and there are no works, which we have recently seen, dealing more judiciously with the difficulties of Biblical History. Indeed we know of no better brief presentations of this history. In many respects they are superior to many of the larger works of similar title—which too often are a mixture of homily and history—and they are much more profitable for study. These are purely historical in their method.

EDWARD L. CURTIS.

THE following books in Practical Theology may be briefly mentioned :

Touchstones ; or, Christian Graces and Characters Tested. By the Rt. Rev. A. Oxenden, late Bishop of Montreal. (Thomas Whittaker, New York.) This volume offers very useful suggestions on some of the leading points of character and conduct belonging to a true Christian. It is written in a plain, straightforward style, and in a genial and tender spirit, furnishing a useful criterion of faith, love, repentance, unworldliness, humility, holiness, etc. Its positions are in the main correct and serviceable, but in explaining the Gospel mention of persons that need no repentance, the author speaks of some who have grown up from childhood in the fear of God and have long devoted themselves to his blessed service, and therefore "have not the same need of repentance as the publicans and open sinners." But this explanation evades the very gist of the difficulty. In the touchstone of Unity the author treats only of the external bond, and distinctly refers to the Church of England as the true focus around which "separatists" may be conveniently gathered. Such dreams do not hurt anybody, but they are the weakest of vain imaginations, and even if realized would still leave large room for the cultivation of true unity.—*Foregleams of Immortality and An In Memoriam.* By Rose Porter. (A. D. F. Randolph & Co.) This beautifully printed volume is faithfully, though not very gracefully, described in its title. In the interest of the bereaved it gathers up the intimations of the Future Life found in Scripture, and reproduces them in a simple, touching way. These are then set forth concretely in the experience of one passed into the better land. There are neither names nor dates, but suggestive passages and stirring reminiscences, illumined by the imagination and adorned with many a poetic gem. The book is not an argument, but to kindred spirits would have the force without the forms of logic. Others, we fear, would find it vague and unsatisfying.—*Spiritual Life : Its Nature, Urgency, and Crowning Excellence.* By the Rev. J. H. Potts. (New York, Phillips & Hunt.) A devout and earnest volume, the execution of which is scarce equal to the author's aims. Bating its advocacy of the substance of the "higher life" doctrine, it is just and true, yet says nothing which has not been said before equally well if not better. Why do men write when they have nothing to say?—*Alone with God : Studies and Meditations of a Sick-room.* By the Rev. Jos. Cross, D.D., LL.D. (T. Whittaker.) This volume is divided into three parts, styled respectively, God, Christ, the Christian. The treatment doctrinally is unexceptionable, though occasionally the writer's exegesis is at fault. Dr. Cross writes in a fluent, florid style, and occasionally "drops into poetry." In the latter we detect no afflatus of the Muse, but only measured prose or rhetoric in rhyme. Nor do we say this because we have not been "fed," the lack of which, according to the preface of the volume, is the reason of a certain kind of criticism, but simply because truth demands it. If Dr. Cross's productions were *multum, non multa*, the result would be better.—*Notes on the Opium Habit.* By A. P. Meylert, M.D. Second edition. (G. P. Putnam's Sons.) This well-written and candid brochure deserves a wide circulation. The author treats the subject with great good sense, showing not only the prevalence and the evils of the habit, but also the best means of prevention or of cure. He thinks that the method of curing by a gradual reduction of the amount taken is very painful and in the end impracticable, and he therefore urges the method of treatment by substitution. It is sad to be compelled to believe that this dreadful habit is on the increase in our country. The worst of all drunkards is the opium drunkard.—From B. Westermann & Co. we have received *Die Evangelization der Welt eine Möglichkeit. Eine Predigt von H. St. Brown Aus dem Englischen von L. Rehtness.* (Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann). *Missions-Bibel. Zusammengestellt und herausgegeben von Paul von Zychlinski.* (Ibid.) The former of these neat pamphlets is a translation of an admirable sermon which, after reciting the work of the Apostle Paul, and setting forth his advantages and his disadvantages in doing it, argues in a

very convincing way the feasibility of the missionary enterprise in its largest extent. The latter is a second edition of the "Missionary Bible," of which Dr. Warneck justly says, in his brief preface, that it is mightier far than the most eloquent speech of mere men, since it shows the prime and central importance of the missionary work as a golden cord running through the whole economy of salvation; so that the Bible is through and through a missionary book. Pastor Zychlinski has simply collected together the words of Scripture bearing on the subject, and arranged them in appropriate order. The first part bears the title, "The heathen-world an abomination before God," under which are set forth the utterances of Scripture concerning (a) the gods of the heathen, and (b) the sinfulness and misery of the heathen. The second part is superscribed, "The heathen-world an object of the Divine love," under which we have (a) the calls to the heathen to put away their idols, (b) the commands to perform mission work and what is to be preached, (c) prayers for missions, (d) promises of success, (e) praise for the grace of missions, on the part of those who perform the service, and also of the heathen who are the objects of it, and finally (f) the benedictions upon the work and all engaged in it. The whole thing is exceedingly well done. The words of Scripture are recited at length, and the references given in the side margin. It would serve a very good purpose to have this translated into English and widely circulated as a missionary tract. (Of course the citations from the Apocrypha would require to be omitted.) For it is certain that even in our own day, and in the most favored regions there are multitudes of Christians who have no proper conception of the extent to which the missionary idea is the Bible idea—that is, not merely one point among many others, but the great, pervading, characteristic feature of the Divine word. Nor will the Church ever approach the fulfilment of its duty until this truth is taken up into the consciousness and experience of all who call Jesus Lord. It is gratifying to receive a fresh impulse in this matter from our brethren on the Continent.—*Sabbath Bells for Sunday-schools*. By Wm. B. Blake. (Fireside Friend Publishing Co., Springfield, O.) This book is very good of its kind—that is, it contains a reasonable number of hymns and tunes of the modern style, both new and old, and nearly all with a ringing chorus; but the kind is not to our taste. Why are the young to be continually accustomed to a certain kind of musical praise in the Sunday-school, and then when they come into the church to join in public worship, to pass at once into a style entirely different? Surely there is no call for this. School music should be the same in style as church music, and should be a suitable introduction to it. Besides, the precious hymns and versions of psalms which have (many of them for a century) commended themselves to the people of God as genuine aids to devotion, are crowded out from books of this kind, and the children suffer a loss hardly to be expressed in words.

T. W. CHAMBERS.

V.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE UNITY OF NATURE. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. pp. 571. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

In spite of some faults of construction that sometimes obscure its purpose and lead the reader away from the main track into the discussion of side issues, and that render it difficult occasionally to see the organic connection of the several chapters with one another, the work before us makes a very strong impression. It is not a professed defence of Christianity, but is nevertheless a valuable contribution to our apologetic literature; and we are glad to say that it is not one of those attempted "Reconciliations" which, beginning with the premature assumption that certain scientific hypotheses are true, usually end in very humiliating concessions to unbelief.

The Unity of Nature is, to be sure, a popular scientific conception, but the Duke of Argyll does not attempt to defend that conception as it is commonly held by the advocates of the empirical philosophy. He shows very lucidly, in his first chapter that, by seizing upon external resemblances, some have found a unity that does not exist, and have lost sight of the real unity of purpose and adjustment. This indeed may lessen the argumentative value of the book. For, though employing the phraseology by which some of the current antitheistic conceptions are denoted, the author uses it in a sense so different from that intended by the antitheistic thinkers themselves, that we do not feel that any adequate answer has been given to antitheism when it is shown that, used in the sense intended by the Duke of Argyll, this phraseology carries no antitheistic implication. We feel this to be particularly true in regard to what is said in connection with Automatism. But the book must not be regarded as a reply to Agnosticism or Materialism. It is rather a fresh presentation of the facts in nature which reveal a marvellous unity of adjustment and which, without the aid of argument, point to an intelligent and purposing Author. We do not mean by this that the Duke has simply been doing Paley's work over again, although those who remember the use he makes of the bird's wing in his *Reign of Law* need not be told of the consummate ability with which he rivets our attention to the old teleological argument, mainly through the force of new and exceedingly apt illustrations. But the present work is more than the defence of a thesis. It is an independent study of the Unity of Nature, and though not written with a polemic intent, abounds in arguments which in an incidental way hit hard at the theory of naturalistic evolution. Thus in regard to those who admit that experience will not account for Instinct in the individual, but maintain that it must be held to explain its origin in the race to which the individual belongs, the Duke shows that the disposition to make the first efforts in the direction of the habit afterwards organized in the race would have been accounted for. He shows that the gradual formation of an instinct, as the result of a series of efforts, would correspond to what takes place in the artificial process of training to which man subjects the lower animals, but that evolutionists would be slow to reason upon this analogy. For "if there be anything analogous—if animals by themselves can school themselves by gradual efforts into the development of new powers—if the habits and powers that are now purely innate and instinctive were once less innate and more deliberate—then it will follow that the earlier faculties of animals have been the higher, and that the later faculties are the lower in the scale of intelligence. This is hardly consistent with the accepted idea of evolution, which is founded on the conception of an unfolding or development from the lower to the higher, from the simple to the more complex, from the Instinctive to the Rational."

The opening pages of the volume are intended to show that Man is part of Nature. This looks like a concession to the monistic view of the world, made for the sake of showing afterwards that it does not involve the anti-theological consequences which are commonly drawn from it; or perhaps it is meant as a protest against the view taken by some theological writers, that man belongs to the supernatural. It may be, however, that the author has particularly in mind the contrast which Tyndall and others assume to exist between Man and Nature. We do not think that the point is one of so much importance, though the Duke has very lucidly shown that there is no way of making a sharp antithesis between Man and Nature. The truth is that in one sense man is a part of nature, and in another sense the critic of nature and to that extent outside of it. The volume under notice is really constructed upon the recognition of this fact. Body-wise, at least, man is a part of nature. The elements of which his body is composed are common to the inorganic world, and in his dependence upon his organs for the conditions of his life as well as in the general plan and structure of his organs, he has palpable kinship in the way of resemblance with the whole organic world. In

his structure and in the relation of his structure to his life, man is part of a great scheme of adjustment. It is as proper to speak of man as a machine intended to think and reason as it is proper to think of a bird as a machine intended to fly or to catch fish. And mind-wise man is a part of nature too. For man is not the only animal that has mind. If the dog and the horse are not supernatural, man is not supernatural. The brutes show the phenomena of mind. Throughout nature, indeed, we see a rising scale of intelligence involving adaptation of means to end, and in the case of man, culminating in the phenomena of free Personality. This does not prove that the higher mind grew out of the lower, but only that the scheme of nature exhibits all degrees of mental life, whatever be the agency to which this mental life is due.

To this we see no objection, and if we do not misinterpret the object for which the earlier part of the treatise is intended, we should say that the idea that man as to his mind illustrates the continuity of mental phenomena in nature is very well defended. But we should be obliged to say that some of the most interesting parts of the discussion do not seem in our judgment to strengthen the author's position; on the contrary, they rather embarrass it.

The author very correctly says that "the phenomena of mind are not confined to man. They are manifested in the first place visibly and directly, although in varying degrees, throughout the whole series of living animals. They are manifested in the second place, as obviously, though less directly, in the innumerable adaptations of which these animals are the most conspicuous examples." It is true that these are manifestations of mind, but in very different senses. The inferences suggested by these two classes of phenomena are, in the first case to the existence of minds working in and through organisms, and the other to the existence of a mind that wrought on the material and produced the organism. It is true that the distinction based upon "inside" and "outside" as characteristic of the working of nature and of art breaks down when we undertake by means of it to prove that man is not part of nature. For the bee, and particularly the beaver, works outside of its material, yet the bee and the beaver are products of nature. The same nature that makes the beaver's organs has provided the beaver's instinct. "Between adapted structures of all living creatures and those other adapted structures which these creatures have been fitted and formed to make, there is indeed no break of continuity, but there is the introduction of an intervening Personality—of a living will however narrow its bounds—of a derived and delegated power to do afresh, in small measures and degrees, that same kind of work which, in much larger measures and degrees, has been done for them in their own structure and for their own existence and enjoyment. These works of living creatures are thus, as it were, works of nature done by commission and second-hand." This means of course that the nature which makes the organism makes the intelligences; that the products of these intelligences are the product in the last analysis of the nature that produced the intelligences; that Intelligence exists in widely differing degrees; and that when "we look at the infinite gradations under which Personality is constituted among living creatures, and how various are the degrees of freedom and of originating power which have been given to them, we must see that in this respect there is no distinction between the highest and the lowest." We should not use the word Personality in this passage, but we agree with the Duke when he says: "I know of no definition of Intelligence or Will which does not include the lowest manifestation as well as the highest." When, therefore, the author concludes that man is the child of nature both as to body and as to mind, meaning that he is part of a great scheme of adaptation or adjustment, we are in full accord with what he says. When the Duke of Argyll says this, however, he means that the phenomenal world as we know it, whether of mind or matter, reveals a unity of purpose or adjustment; that man is as much a part of this phenomenal world as the other organic beings which are his companions: and that

all together are the outcome of the creating and adapting mind of God. This is certainly true. But this does not obliterate the distinction between man and nature as nature is commonly understood. There are two ways of looking at man: as a product and as an agent. As a product, whether we contemplate him body-wise or mind-wise, he is part of nature; for God made him as he made all the rest of nature. But man knows himself as agent before he knows himself as product. And he must know himself as a cause before he can realize the unity of nature and conceive of himself as a part of a great system of adjustment. And knowing himself as an agent, that is as a free personality, he is led by that very anthropomorphism which it is the object of this book to defend, to make a sharp distinction between himself and nature; he knows himself as being or as possessing mind; he knows nature as being the product of mind. He may learn to widen the area of nature,—to understand that the organic world, the world of intelligence, that even man himself is part of nature; and so he may come to see that he stands in a sense antithetically related to himself—in other words, that he is not only a mind possessed of Intelligence and Will, but that he is the product of an Infinite mind possessed of Intelligence and Will. Now it is not a question whether the antithesis between Man and Nature shall continue; but rather, whether, besides considering his fellow-men, and the lower animals throughout the scale of intelligence, as parts of nature, that is, as the products of Intelligence, he shall also treat them as separate Intelligences like himself. In the case of his fellow-men, the inference is clear and indisputable; but what is to be said of the beaver and the bee? what especially is to be said of the moth, which the Duke makes the subject of such interesting remark in the early pages of his book? These are questions to which we should like an answer, but we have read and re-read the portions of this volume which deal with the matter not only without finding an answer to our question, which considering the difficulty of the subject is not surprising, but without being sure that we understood what inference the Duke of Argyll intended that we draw. The case he describes is that of a moth, which was able on approach of danger to cover up the color in its wings, and at the same time by suitably changing its place become undistinguishable from the mass of dried and crumpled leaves on which it lighted. The Duke remarks, "There are other forms of mimicry in which the completeness of the deception depends on some co-operation of the animal's own will. This was one of these." But ability to hide its plumage at will would have been of no advantage if it had remained perched upon a leaf; it must choose a place where its resemblance to other objects around it would be its protection, "and therefore it was that the moth passed by all the beautiful leaves and flowers and settled rather on a clod." The Duke adds, however, "But this 'therefore,' with all the train of reasoning which the choice involved, we cannot suppose existed consciously in the moth." Speaking upon a similar topic a little further on, the author says: "The intimate knowledge of physical and physiological laws—the knowledge even of the mental qualities and dispositions of other animals—and the processes of reasoning by which advantage is taken of these, this knowledge and this reasoning, cannot without manifest absurdity be attributed to the birds themselves." "All the knowledge and all the resources of mind which is involved in these instincts is a reflection of some agency which is outside the creatures which exhibit them" (106). Speaking of the resemblance of the lower animals to man he says: "They all partake of that individuality, of that separateness, and of that voluntary power in which Personality consists." It is hard for us to combine these passages so as to deduce any consistent theory of instinct. In one passage the author imputes volition and intuition to these animals; in another, he accounts for all their mental manifestations by referring them to an external mind. In one passage he clothes them with the attributes of personality, in another he treats such an imputation of the attributes of personality as absurd. His one strong and clear assertion is, that Nature is every-

where a manifestation of mind. The lower animals reveal mind. They act as if they thought, reasoned, purposed, and willed. Do they act consciously, or are they inspired? and if inspired, do they have minds or are they only manifestations of mind? The Duke of Argyll seems to embody his own belief when he says of the bird that "anterior to all experience, and without the aid of instruction or of example, it is inspired to act in this manner on the appropriate occasion." Again, on p. 364 he says:

"The lower animals do reasonable things without the gift of Reason. . . . They work for that which is to be, without seeing or feeling anything beyond that which is. They enjoy, but they cannot understand. Reason is, as it were, brooding over them and working through them, whilst at the same time it is wanting in them."

It may be said that inquiries touching the psychology of brutes are fruitless, because we can never understand the brutes' consciousness; and, moreover, that our beliefs respecting the human mind, whose operations we know so well, are not open to correction by comparison with the operation of the brute's mind, of which we know so little. But questions of comparative psychology are nevertheless interesting, and their practical bearing upon human psychology must not be overlooked. For if the purposive acts of the beaver be explained mechanically, it would be useless to deny that analogy would suggest a mechanical explanation of the purposive acts of man. Or if inspiration will explain the purposive mimicry of the "moth on the Riviera" without the necessity of imputing to the moth a mind, it will be thought by some more natural to explain the purposive acts of man by a similar inspiration of an external mind. It is one thing to believe that man reveals mind and another thing to believe that he has *a* mind. It is important to believe in *Mind* in nature, but it is more important to believe in *Minds* in nature. The Duke of Argyll believes in minds as well as in Mind, and we should have been glad to have from him a fuller expression of opinion touching this interesting question in comparative psychology to which the discussion in his book gives rise.

But when we say that brutes think and reason as we do; or that the adaptations of animal organisms to their environments are due to the presence and presiding agency of mind, we are reasoning analogically. We are anthropomorphic in our conceptions of nature. This is indeed the charge that is brought against the teleologist. It is said that man looks at nature and sees his own face in her glass. The present volume is in great part a defence of this anthropomorphism, or, as His Grace prefers to call it, anthropopsychism. With the anthropopsychic view of nature we of course entirely sympathize; indeed, no one has ever succeeded in banishing anthropopsychism from his modes of thought. And with much that is said in this volume in defence of it we concur. But it is clear that we cannot defend anthropopsychism by proving that man is part of a great scheme of adjustments, and that being a part of nature, and in harmony with nature, what he reads in nature is, therefore, true. Because in order to prove that man is a part of nature, and that nature is a great scheme of adjustments, we must presuppose the very anthropopsychism which we afterwards undertake to establish. For Anthropopsychism to prove the Unity of Nature, and then for the Unity of Nature to put Anthropopsychism on its feet, might be a very equitable sort of reciprocity, but logicians call it by another name. Far stronger, in our opinion, is the subsequent defence of anthropopsychism that consists in showing that it is an irresistible tendency of our nature, that there is no good reason against it, and that even those who reject its theological implications, nevertheless cannot get rid of the idea. The Duke reminds us of the frequency with which teleological language appears in the writings of Darwin, and after adverting to the absurd habit which some writers have of ascribing to material force the attributes of mind, makes this very pertinent remark: "I do not mean that naturalists should be always following up their language to theological conclusions; or that any fault should be found with them when they stop where the sphere of mere physical observation terminates. But those who seek to remodel phi-

losophy upon the results of that observation cannot consistently borrow all the advantage of anthropopsychic language, and then denounce it when it carries them beyond the point at which they desire to stop."

When, however, we see mind in nature, we are of course seeing a correspondence between man's mind and the mind that is supreme in nature. In proving that man is a part of nature we also prove that he is above nature. In showing that he is organically related to what is below him, we show that he is very closely related to that which is above him. Between these positions there is no inconsistency. The charge of inconsistency lies rather against those who affirm that "our livers and our lungs, our vertebræ and our nervous systems are identical in origin and in function with those of the living creatures around us"; but who believe that "there is nothing in nature or above it which corresponds to our Forethought or Design or purpose—to our love of the Good or our admiration of the Beautiful—to our indignation with the wicked or to our pity for the suffering and the fallen"? Reading mind in nature is another way of saying that man is related to a mind above nature. This mind man is necessitated to think of as Infinite, and this he does with the consciousness of his own intellectual limitations and of personal unworthiness.

The order of sequence in the author's thought, if we are not mistaken in our analysis of his book, is something like this: Man is first considered as a part of nature. But man discovers that he is a part of nature by being the critic of nature. His criticism of nature proceeds upon the assumptions of anthropopsychism. These assumptions must be defended. But being defended they prove not only that man is part of nature, but that man is in the image of God, since the mind that man reads in Nature is no other than He who is the author of nature. From man's relation to nature the transition is easy to man's relation to God. Accordingly the author proceeds, in subsequent chapters, to consider man's moral nature, his degradation, and the nature and origin of religion.

These chapters reveal a very appreciative acquaintance on the part of the author with the course of modern discussion in regard to ethical theories and the philosophy of religion; and though some of them contain nothing that will impress the professed student of philosophy and theology as particularly new, they are well reasoned and to the general reader will be of very positive value. Moreover, they sustain a very important organic connection with the other parts of the book. But the chapters which deal with the moral degradation of men are written with exceptional power, and are perhaps the most important as they certainly are the most original portion of the volume. There is no interruption of the unity of nature, when in the rising scale of Intelligence we pass from mind in brutes to mind in man. "It would be strange indeed, if there were no link connecting, more closely than any of the lower animals can connect, the Mind that is in Creation with the mind that is in the creature. This is the place occupied by Man's Reason—Reason not outside of, but in the creature—working not only through him, but in him—Reason conscious of itself and conscious of the relation in which it stands to that measureless Intelligence of which the Universe is full." Man as possessed of Reason is not an anomaly. "That which is really exceptional, and indeed absolutely singular in Man is the persistent tendency of his development to take a wrong direction." The author goes on to show that man is a constant prey to morbid appetites, horrible imaginations, and destructive practices; that in these respects he is far below the brute; that this aberrant tendency in which he contrasts so strongly with all other animals calls for explanation; that "it looks as if something exceptional must have happened"; that, in short, "the corruption of human nature is not a mere dogma of Theology, but a fact of science." The attempt to explain this aberrant tendency on the part of those who take the savage as a type of primitive man is disposed of by showing that such a view would represent the contrast between man's "instincts and those of the lower animals as greatest and widest at the very moment when he

first appeared among the creatures which, in respect to these instincts, are superior to himself." Whatever view be taken as to man's origin, primitive man, the author shows, could not have practiced cannibalism and infanticide. There is a development downward as well as a development upward, and as has been shown by the same author in a former work, "all the lines of evidence go to prove that Barbarism is a development quite as much as Civilization. The chapters under discussion are a welcome contribution to the defence of one of the fundamental dogmas of Theology; and the whole work is a timely and most effective protest against "the processes of the negative Philosophy," which "systematically suppress more than one-half of the Facts of Nature; and as systematically silence more than one-half of the Faculties of Man."

F. L. PATTON.

PETER THE GREAT, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA. A Study of Historical Biography. By EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph.D., LL.D. 2 vols., 1004 pp., 8vo. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

In these volumes we have Mr. Schuyler's serial, originally published in *Scribner's Monthly*, rearranged, and largely rewritten. The task of accurate criticism is not easy; since the author's work is drawn mostly from original documents in languages with which few modern scholars are acquainted. Moreover, if we are not mistaken, few persons, in this country at least, have more than a superficial acquaintance with the history of this prince, formed in great part from popular narratives in which the character of Peter is incrustated with popular legends.

On its face, however, this is an unusually honest, thorough, and scholarly piece of work. Mr. Schuyler has brought to his task exceptional qualifications. His long residence in Russia has enabled him to become acquainted with the Slavonic tongues, and has given him access to a multitude of valuable documents; while his acquaintance with the political history of Russia has been formed on the ground, and from the stand-point of a diplomat. The work further gives evidence of a persevering industry applied to the search and sifting of a mass of material which might easily have daunted a less conscientious and enthusiastic student. It is seldom that Americans make so good use of a residence abroad as is evinced by Mr. Schuyler's "Turkestan" and the present work; and his achievement is the more significant from the fact that he had not merely to say over again, in his own way, what others had said before him, nor even to present the same outlines in a new light and from a different point of view; but to draw a new portrait. The character of Peter had been overlaid with fables, and distorted under superficial treatment. Mr. Schuyler had to do in his book something of the same kind as that which Carlyle did for Cromwell, though with a quite different result; for the figure of Peter as drawn by him, does not gain in dignity. One does not lay down the book with the feeling that he has been walking with a great general or a far-seeing statesman, however he may have been impressed with the Tsar's native vigor, force of will, and indomitable energy. Peter was capable of contemplating great results for Russia, but his wisdom was not equal to his ambition. His attempts to solve his problem appear rather as experiments, than as the outcome of a large, deep, and far-seeing policy.

He was at once the product and the master of a semi-barbaric race. The conditions of society indicated by certain customs abolished by the edicts of Sophia, sufficiently indicate how low was the plane of Russian civilization. Nor was his early education of a character to engender higher ideals. It was in no sense princely, as that term is now understood. The education of the Russian upper classes "seldom consisted of anything more than reading, writing, and singing by note, with some ideas of history, geography, and of the productions of the earth, conveyed by means of picture-books; but instruction in grammar, in mathematics—even in arithmetic—or in the higher branches of learning, was exceedingly rare, except among the clergy.

Even the princes of the royal house received scarcely anything more than this elementary education." Peter's military education was largely a playing at soldier. He was indeed strict in the performance of these mock duties; but his military training was such as he chose to give himself. "There was nothing in it similar to the regular course of training practiced in a cadet school." His disposition led him to vigorous, out-of-door life. He had the tastes of a mechanic rather than of a statesman; and his knowledge of ship-building, which he turned to the national account, was due rather to his prosecution of a favorite amusement, than to conscientious study.

His administration was largely shaped by his keen susceptibility to foreign influences. He admired western civilization, and felt the contrast presented by the barbarism of his own country; and he vainly thought to recast Russia, by sheer force, into the moulds of the Occident. Russian sentiment was against him in this particular. There was a deep-seated feeling in the Russian mind that the country suffered from foreigners, and that foreign countries were in conspiracy to keep Russia poor. The political economists wished to put a sort of Chinese wall around the country. They were protectionists in the most positive form. Very few Russians had been abroad, except on foreign embassies, and those were diligently occupied in carrying out the prescriptions of a formal etiquette, and were cut off, by their ignorance of foreign languages, from the possibility of understanding Western Europe. There was the fear lest the contact with the West and with foreigners should corrupt Russia, and above all lead to heresy, especially to Roman Catholicism. To build a St. Petersburg—a costly blunder—to clip the beards of his subjects and the skirts and sleeves of his nobles, to import the models and methods of western ship-builders, to invite foreign generals, statesmen, and professors into his empire,—all this could not make his subjects Western Europeans. "One blame," says Mr. Schuyler, "may, we think, be rightly attached to Peter; that he brought Russia prematurely into the circle of European politics. As to the effect upon Europe, contemporary national rivalries hinder a fair conclusion. As to that upon Russia there can be but one opinion. The result has been to turn the rulers of Russia away from home-affairs and the regular development of internal institutions, to foreign politics and the creation of a great military power. In this sense it cannot be deemed beneficial to Russia." It needs more than all the evidence of Peter's love for Russia and the Russian people to reconcile us to his personal characteristics. Only conventionally religious, not a model husband, coarse and boorish in manners, with a peasant's taste for vulgar shows and mummeries, breaking into furious outbursts of passion, striking at priest or general in his childish wrath, a true Slav in his love of strong drink,—he is a fair illustration of the familiar proverb—"Scratch a Russian, and you find a Tartar."

In point of style Mr. Schuyler seems to us to have improved upon his "Turkestan," which was not pre-eminently readable. He is easier and lighter in these volumes, without any sacrifice of vigor or directness. Nothing of his own personality appears in the book. It is a study *ab extra*; its tone is cool and judicial, and the subject inspires the author only to patience and industry. He attempts no summary of his hero's character, but leaves the reader to construct the portrait for himself. Many valuable sketches of contemporary men are to be found in his narrative, notably that of Charles XII. of Sweden. Few biographies are freer from "padding." It is solidly worked up throughout. There is no eking out of meagre information with moral reflections, nor making hazy views of history or diplomacy more hazy by ornate rhetoric.

The work forms two handsome volumes, profusely and well illustrated, and in every way creditable to the publishers.

MARVIN R. VINCENT.

FROM THE FORECASTLE TO THE PULPIT. Fifty Years among Sailors. Containing an account of a Wonderful Revival upon the Sea. By CHARLES J. JONES, D.D., Chaplain of the Sailors' Snug Harbor, New York. pp. 528. New York: N. Tibbals & Sons.

Since the year 1863 Dr. Jones has filled with great acceptance the useful and responsible position of Chaplain of the Sailors' Snug Harbor, which is one of the wealthiest, and at the same time one of the most beneficent, charitable corporations in New York. Here he has ministered, out of the wealth of a large experience, to the spiritual wants of multitudes of sailors who have come from all parts of the world to find in the retreat at Staten Island a safe anchorage for the rest of their days. Previous to his appointment to this position Dr. Jones was pastor of the Mariners' Church, an organization under the care of the New York Port Society. In this position he came in contact with seafaring men engaged in the active duties of their calling. The affectionate solicitude with which Dr. Jones followed the members of his floating congregation to all parts of the world will excite the admiration of his readers, and they will share with him most tenderly the grateful satisfaction of knowing that his labors have been so abundantly blessed.

The early part of the volume is taken up with an interesting account of Dr. Jones' early life, of his varied and often perilous experiences on shipboard, and of his conversion to Christ. It is written in an admirable style, and with a flavor of the sea that would make it interesting as a novel to all sea-loving people, apart altogether from its religious character. This is one of the bright, breezy books which boys will read, and it should have a place in every Sunday-school library.

F. L. PATTON.

REISE IN SYRIEN UND MESOPOTAMIEN. Von Dr. EDUARD SACHAU, Ord. Professor an der könig. Freiderich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin. Mit zwei Karten von Professor HEINRICH KIEPERT, 18 Abbildungen und 22 Lichtdruckbildern. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1883.

For this interesting book of travel and investigation we have to thank Emperor William and the Prussian Ministry of Public Instruction, as well as the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin, who lent their name and aid to the enterprise. The reputation of the author as a Semitist, also, was sufficient recommendation. He was granted entire freedom for linguistic, epigraphic, and geographical investigations. The famine prevailing in Northern Mesopotamia, while he was making the journey, and the severe winter (1879-80) were, however, formidable hindrances.

The five chapters of the work before us describe as many sections of travel: From Damascus to Aleppo; thence to Urfa; via Ragga to Dêr; to Mosul; to Alexandrette. The author is undoubtedly correct in stating that "Scarcely another land is to be found so rich as Syria in ancient monuments, comparatively well-preserved, and yet found exposed upon the surface." To this the excellent phototypes of the first chapter attest,—for instance, those of the ruins at Palmyra, Hamath, Apamea, and Aleppo. It is to be regretted that similar pictures do not accompany the other chapters, particularly those relating to Zebed, Edessa, and Mosul. The reader may, however, obtain a fair idea of ancient oriental architecture as influenced by that of Greece and Rome. During the latter portion of the journey Professor Sachau's own hand supplied excellent drawings, from which a number of engravings have been made.

The Professor presents us with quite a number of inscriptions, which he copied. Those found in Syria are nearly all Greek, and date early in the Christian era; some are Syriac; some Arabic later than Mohammed. Just as the Syriac language was regaining the ascendancy on its own soil over Greek, the Muslim's sword and his Arabic drove it out, and it is now confined to a few localities in the North. Three inscriptions found at the Tadmor (Palmyra), of 1 Kings ix. 18; 2 Chr. viii. 4, are Palmyric, a dialect of Aramaic. One inscription, copied from the stone over the

portal of the great Basilica (now in ruins) at Zebed, several hours southeast of Aleppo, is trilingual,—Greek-Syriac-Arabic. It tells us that this church was dedicated, A.D. 512, to the martyr St. Sergius. It is remarkable that this oldest extant and ante-Mohammedan monument of the Arabic language should be found so far north. Upon the hill Nimrûd Dâgh, 700 feet above Edessa, are the ruins of the so-called Jacob cloister, similar to those on the Orontes in Syria. On the east side, under the only window, is a large bi-lingual, Greco-Syriac, inscription. The Syriac of this inscription is regarded, for internal reasons, as the oldest extant—certainly as early as the second century, when “cloisters and monks could not have been the order of the day”—hence that part of the building must be older than the rest: a fact further attested by the absence of the usual crosses and other Christian signs. These inscriptions are valuable to the philologist, and have been published by Professor Sachau in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, from time to time.

A large number of Syriac MSS., for the most part from Northern Mesopotamia and the Tigris, were found and brought to Berlin. Many of these are of comparatively recent date, but some are more ancient, and constitute valuable contributions to oriental Christian literature. At Mosul, Alkôsh, and Mardin are libraries. That at Mosul the author was not allowed to examine, though the works of Bar-hebraeus, the “*de coelesti hierarchia*” of John, Metropolitan of Dârâ, of the tenth century, and commentaries by Thomas of Harkel, and Dionysius Bar Selibhî, the Peshitto, and other works, were brought to a cold room for his examination. That at Alkôsh he was not allowed to see at all. It is in the hands of the Nestorians, who are connected with the Roman Church. But he was convinced that the collection was large and valuable, and that admission might possibly be secured through the consent of the papal legate at Mosul. That at Mardin (since removed to Dijârbekr) is a remnant of another patriarchal library, in which are ten or twelve MSS. of the ninth or tenth centuries.

The record of days' marches; often through the desert, is somewhat tedious. But the excellent style of the author, and the occasional paragraphs on the customs, rules, and regulations of Christian, Mohammedan, Bedouin, and Kurd life,—the ignorance and superstition of the first two, the fetich religion (or no religion) of the third, and the devil-worship of the last,—dispel what might otherwise be monotony. It must be remembered that the first object of the book is *instruction*, and true to its purpose it offers much information concerning the geography and topography of Syria and Mesopotamia. For details we must refer to the work itself. A little more attention to the explanation or translation of names which, as in the East, have a historical significance, would improve the work for others than specialists. The same remark applies, though less forcibly and frequently, to titles of officials and the like, which are often puzzling to the Western reader.

Professor Sachau has given us in this volume, and in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, many results of his investigations which are invaluable to science. We deplore the severity of the winter and the famine which prevented his march and investigations further eastward and southward along the Tigris. Hence we are granted but a single paragraph on the cuneiform inscriptions and the great excavations across the river from Mosul, where Nineveh stood. As Professor Sachau says: “Excavations in some of the oldest cities and ruins visited might reveal much for the historian, particularly at Tigranocerta, ancient Hamath, and on the Orontes, which were important parts of successive ancient empires.”

Professor Sachau is undoubtedly correct in his opinion that the American missionaries, who have their college at Beirût, a medical school at Aintab, and their mission stations and schools distributed far to the East, are better acquainted with the countries and peoples visited by him than any other foreigners. But the missionaries would hardly concur in his conclusions that “Islam and Christianity

will never approach and become reconciled to each other"; nor that "the efforts of Christian missionaries in Mohammedan lands are absolutely without result" ("Einleitung," p. 15). "The Christians have, upon the whole, only a single, but still a mighty, advantage over them,—the constitution of the Christian family." Again, and more correctly: "Truly, if any ideal undertaking of our time deserves the hearty recognition of the world, it is the work of the American missionaries for the spiritual regeneration of Christianity in the Orient" (p. 423). They are the best friends of the poor Christians and of the people, who, unprotected by the purposeless and almost powerless arm of the Turkish Government in the far East, are robbed and afflicted by the Bedouins and Kurds. Their ministers, doctors, and schools, laboring at great sacrifice to themselves and their families, are inestimable blessings to that joyless, suffering humanity.

Within a score of years a number of excellent works on the Orient, written from different stand-points, have appeared; and much has been written upon the cuneiform inscriptions and the excavations at Babylon, Nineveh, and other parts of Mesopotamia. The present volume will, nevertheless, fill an important place in regard both to scientific research and Oriental literature,—particularly the early Syriac and Arabic,—besides giving much valuable information concerning the present condition of the peoples, lands, and languages.

W. L. PEARSON.

BRIEF mention may be made of the following books:

To Mexico by a Palace Car. By James W. Steele. Jansen McClurg & Co., Chicago. A dainty little paper-cover quarto of 95 pages, recording the author's impressions of a journey to, and a sojourn in, Mexico. There is nothing noteworthy in it.—*College Greek Course in English.* By William Cleaver Wilkinson. pp. 302. New York: Phillips & Hunt. "The subject of this volume is to furnish readers, not versed in any tongue but the English, with the means of obtaining, at their leisure and without change of residence on their part, approximately the same knowledge of Greek letters as is imparted to students during the average four years' stay in the average American college." The volume consists of a series of chapters on Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Æschylus, Sophocles, and others, in which liberal quotations from representative works of the several authors are introduced and commented on. That it supplies a felt want is indicated by the fact that this is the seventh edition. The book is well printed, and it would be hard to say that it may not serve a useful purpose. It is, however, one of those short-cuts to difficult knowledge of which we have a poor opinion.—*Wit and Wisdom of Jean Paul Richter.* *The Home in Poetry*, compiled by Laura C. Holloway. *Archibald Malmaison*, by Julian Hawthorne. *Himself Again*, by J. C. Goldsmith. *Chinese Gordon*, by Archibald Forbes. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. These volumes belong to the well-known Standard Library Series of the Messrs. Funk & Wagnalls, from whose publishing house so many good things have come to us of late. It is needless to say that the volumes of this series are not all of equal merit, and that at least one of those mentioned above cannot be commended as wholesome reading for the Christian fireside. Forbes' account of Chinese Gordon, however, is a most admirable volume.—*Sacred Books of the East.* Vol. xv. Edited by F. Max Müller. Upanishads. Part II., vol. xxi. The Saddharma Pundarika. Clarendon Press, Oxford. The publication of this series began in 1876. In his preface to the first volume Prof. Max Müller says: "What I contemplate at present, and I am afraid at my time of life even this may seem too sanguine, is no more than a series of twenty-four volumes, the publication of which will probably extend over eight years." The thanks of all students of religious philosophy are due to Prof. Max Müller for this valuable series, which is now approaching completion. Volume xv. is the second volume of Max Müller's translation of the Upanishads, the first volume having appeared, in 1876, as the initial volume of the series. Volume xxi. is a translation of the Sad-

dharma Pundarika, or the Lotus of the True Law. By H. Kern, of Leiden. Volumes xx., xxii., and xxiv., completing the series, are in press.—*Brahmoism*, or History of reformed Hinduism, from its origin in 1830, under Rajah Ram Mohun Roy, to the present time, with a particular account of Babu Keshub Chunder Sen's connection with the movement. By Ram Chandra Bose, M.A., of Lucknow, India. pp. 222. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. This little volume gives a sketch of the rise of Brahmoism, and the changes it has undergone. It begins with an account of the Adi Somaj of Ram Mohun Roy, founded in 1830. This is followed by an account of the Brahmo Soinaj of Keshub Chender Sen, and a criticism of Mr. Sen. The author recognizes the good points in the movement, and he is not too severe in his statements regarding its anti-Christian character. The book is, nevertheless, too polemic, and its partisanship will repel many to whom a clear and discriminating account of Brahmoism would be exceedingly welcome.—*The Man versus The State*. By Herbert Spencer. Reprinted from the *Popular Science Monthly*, with a postscript. pp. 113. New York: D. Appleton & Co. The object of this pamphlet is to show that the Liberals of to-day are really Tories; that they are sinning, as the Tories always sinned, in the direction of over-legislation. The essence of Liberalism, according to Spencer, is the right of the individual in opposition to tyranny, whether it be the tyranny of the sovereign or of majorities. Mr. Spencer's contention is that since Liberalism has gone into power it has become a tyrant itself. He closes his forcefully written pamphlet with these words: "The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the power of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the power of parliaments."

F. L. PATTON.

THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED:

FROM PHILLIPS & HUNT, NEW YORK:

ONE LITTLE REBEL. By JULIA B. SMITH.

CHRISTINA; OR, THE PERSECUTED FAMILY. A tale of sorrow and suffering, founded on A Chapter in the History of the Vaudois. By Rev. J. DILLON.

A. D. F. RANDOLPH & CO.:

HOW SORROW WAS CHANGED INTO SYMPATHY. Words of cheer for mothers bereft of little children. Out of the Life of Mrs. Ptentiss.

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THE POACHER'S DAUGHTER. Translated from the French. By ANNE H. GILES.

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